


















The Dissertation Committee for Audra Rebecca Diers Certifies that this is the 
approved version of the following dissertation: 
 
 
The Strategic Model of Organizational Crisis Communication:  
An Investigation of the Relationships Between Crisis Type, Industry, and 















The Strategic Model of Organizational Crisis Communication:  
An Investigation of the Relationships Between Crisis Type, Industry, and 











Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of  
The University of Texas at Austin 
in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements 
for the Degree of  
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 








This dissertation, that I affectionately (sometimes) call ‘the Beast’ is dedicated to my 
parents—Gordy and Claire. Your involvement and support of my education and activities 
has always been fantastic. You instilled in me a strong desire to learn, to excel, to 
challenge myself, and to achieve or follow through with any project that I start and care 
about. You encouraged me to follow my interests—always making it clear that your 
interest was my well-being—including this…trek into my graduate education. I greatly 
appreciate your enthusiasm for your “Dr. Daughter”—you were probably enthused about 
it even at points that I wasn’t all that excited about the process. Your unconditional 
support for the insanity of graduate school, my choices, and my goals is a gift that is truly 









Aside from my parents, there are a lot of people who have meant a lot to me in 
this graduate school process. First and foremost is Marty Birkholt. A thousand years ago 
you were my coach, but you have remained my advocate, my mentor, and my very dear 
friend. I cannot even express my gratitude—especially without getting all gushy—for all 
that you have done for me over the years and your continuing support and friendship. 
Second, Karen Vincent—what a funny pair we are, but it works and it has always 
worked. I am so glad that you are my friend and so very thankful for your friendship and 
support.  
Third, to my committee—thank you. Laurie Lewis, it was in your classes that I 
figured out what really moved me, academically speaking, and I am incredibly grateful 
for your classes and your feedback. Though we may not have always seen eye-to-eye on 
choices, ideas, and dissertation topics, I know that you have always had my best interests 
at heart and have always challenged me and I greatly appreciate that and that you stuck 
by me. Rajiv Rimal, thank you for your enthusiasm, your collaboration, and for your 
support. Working with you—whether in classes or outside of class—is always a pleasure 
because your enthusiasm for the projects and your students is infectious. I so appreciated 
our conversations in and outside of class and learned so much about methodology and 
research design from you. Craig Scott, thank you so much for always demanding 
 vi
excellence. Your support and supervision Team-Based Communication was so helpful—
you gave me the tools to learn how to be a better instructor, but also gave us the freedom 
to experiment and work on course design. You challenge your students and help us to 
perform so much better. Larry Browning, while this dissertation is more of a technical 
document, I really want to thank you for helping me to be a much more artful writer and 
for pushing me toward the narrative. I always appreciate your candor, your interactions, 
and your advocacy. Dawna Ballard, thank you so much for being a part of my 
dissertation—you are such a pleasure to work with and I do wish we could have worked 
together more.  
To all of my friends that I made in Austin and hope to keep in touch with…well 
beyond our time together in Austin… you helped me to explore Austin, to keep me sane 
(arguably) in a fairly insane process, and are just darned fabulous people!!!! To Zach and 
Josh Fogelman—seriously guys what would I have done without you? There is so much 
of my Austin experience and memory that involves the two of you and your friendship. 
Amy Young and Tim Duggan (and of course Hermit the big fluffy)—did you happen to 
see the truck that hit me? You two are so fantastic! Thank you for letting me invade your 
house ☺ and you are always welcome to invade mine!!! Scott D’Urso, Caroline Rankin, 
Kristen Hoerl, John Banas, Amy Schmisseur, Kanan Sawyer, Steve Rains, Brian 
Richardson, Felipe Gomez, and everyone else who helped make graduate school at UT 
such a fantastic experience—you all fantastic and much appreciated! And now, to 
conclude my acceptance speech (come on, these always read like an Oscar speech and is 
probably the closest that most of us will ever get), this has been one hell of a ride and 
everyone that I have been around while I’ve been here has made the ride worthwhile.  
Finally, to our office staff—Margaret, Jennifer, and Deanna, as well as Susan—
you make it all possible—everyone would be lost without your help! 
 vii
The Strategic Model of Organizational Crisis Communication:  
An Investigation of the Relationships Between Crisis Type, Industry, and 
Communicative Strategies Used During Crises 
Publication No._____________ 
Audra Rebecca Diers, Ph.D. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2006 
Supervisor:  Laurie K. Lewis 
 
For organizations crises are pervasive, difficult to keep quiet, challenging, 
unexpected, and can be catastrophic. Since the late 1970s, there has been a breadth of 
research focusing on crisis communication strategies. However, while our knowledge of 
what crisis response strategies exist and are used is broad, there is a dearth of research 
and analysis emphasizing relationships between response strategies, the influence of 
situation and organization, and outcomes. The present research proposes a Situational 
Model of Crisis Communication and begins to test the model in a cross-sectional sample 
of crises between November, 2004 and December, 2005 by focusing on the influence of 
type of organization and type of crisis on the message components of crisis response 
strategy and invocation of organizational culture. Findings indicate that organization and 
crisis type strongly influence message components, the invocation of organizational 
culture is an important component in crisis response messages and that the use of crisis 
response strategies emerges into eight particular approaches to crisis response in 
contemporary organizations.  
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For organizations they are pervasive, hard—if not impossible—to keep quiet, 
challenging, unexpected, and can be catastrophic. They are organizational crises. 
Organizational crises have been conceptualized in a fairly consistent manner and Pearson 
and Clair (1998) offer a concise definition, “An organizational crisis is a low-probability, 
high-impact event that threatens the viability of the organization and is characterized by 
ambiguity of cause, effect, and means of resolution, as well as by a belief that decisions 
must be made quickly.” (p. 60) In recent history organizations have faced a range of 
crises with some notable examples being: Tylenol’s arsenic crisis, Jack in the Box’s E. 
Coli crisis; the crash of the Exxon Valdez; NASA’s explosion of the Challenger, the Iran-
Contra Affair, tainted blood from the American Red Cross, the tobacco industry and 
facing the tobacco settlement, Nike’s labor practices, Enron’s accounting scandal, and the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. These examples demonstrate some of the trends 
related to organizational crises: (a) crises affect all types of organizations; (b) causes of 
crises can range from circumstances entirely out of an organization’s control to careless 
mistakes of individuals, to systematic break-downs or inefficiencies (Argenti, 2002; King, 
2002; Pearson & Clair, 1998; Reilly, 1987); (c) they threaten organizations with effects 
ranging from financial, to environmental, to threats to life (Hayes & Patton, 2001; King, 
2002; Pearson & Clair, 1998); and (d) media coverage of crises is an inescapable truth 
(Moore, 2004). What is also important to note is that organizational crises come in a host 
of shapes and sizes, and are not limited to simply public relations or financial crises. In 





product tampering, copyright infringement, environmental disasters, security issues, 
boycotts, homicides, rumors, natural disasters, terrorist attacks, and sexual harassment—
just to name a few (Pearson & Clair, 1998). Mitroff, Alpaslan, and Green (2004) point 
out that a central challenge for organizations in managing crises is that they are often ill-
structured and complex in nature.   
 Gonzales-Herrero and Pratt (1996) argue that the explosion of crises and the need 
for their active management by organizations is only going to increase in the years to 
come. It seems organizational executives already know these truths with nearly 90 
percent of them acknowledging the likelihood of crises. The irony is that according to the 
same study, while only about half of these Fortune 500 executives had crisis management 
plans in place, 97 percent of them felt that they would be able to effectively manage a 
crisis without preparation. In lacking crisis management plans, these organizations lack a 
systematic effort to avert all crises possible and also lack existing mechanisms to manage 
those that do occur (King, 2002). This flies in the face of the growing body of literature 
and research on crisis management arguing that although organizations cannot predict 
what crisis they may face and when, a crisis management and communication plan ought 
to be in place. Such organizational crisis plans should include: brainstorming crises to 
which an organization may be susceptible; potential stakeholders affected; and potential 
crisis response strategies (see Dilenschneider & Hyde, 1985; Elsbach, Sutton, & Principe, 
1998; Hayes & Patton, 2001; Henderson, 2003).   
Crisis management represents systematic efforts to avert or manage crises 





2002); for example, getting to the scene, and having a crisis plan are often referred to as 
crisis management (e.g., Argenti, 2002; Delenschneider & Hyde, 1985; Elsbach et al., 
1998; Sheaffer, 1998). In light of an inherent tension between preparation and executives’ 
seeming efficacy in managing crisis communication (see , Gonzales-Herrero & Pratt, 
1996) it begs the question, how do organizations manage their efforts in the face of 
organizational crises? One of the strengths and primary areas of scholarship in the crisis 
communication literature has focused on examinations of crisis management, effectively 
addressing issues ranging from issue management to post-crisis recovery (e.g., Hayes & 
Patton, 2001; Martinelli & Briggs, 1998). Much of the work endeavoring to examine how 
organizations manager their efforts during crises include examinations of: (a) assorted 
methods of crisis management employed by organizations (see Coombs & Schmidt, 
2000; Martinelli & Briggs, 1998; Mohamed, Gardner, & Paolillo, 1999); (b) overall crisis 
management (see Elsbach et al., 1998; King, 2002; Loosemore, 1999); (c) crisis 
outcomes and evaluation (see Baucus & Baucus, 1997; Pearson & Clair, 1998; Ulmer, 
2001); and (d) internal crisis management (see Glynn, 2000).   
However, Heath and Millar (2004) argue that there are two separate dimensions to 
any crisis—the technical or managerial that deals with the actual dimensions of 
organizational crises and the communicative dimension to a crisis. Crisis communication 
involves communication between an organization and its stakeholders prior to, during, 
and after an organizational crisis (Heath & Millar, 2004; King, 2002). These messages 
can certainly include a host of forms and channels, but what defines them specifically as 





crisis or set of crisis issues. This definition suggests a wide variety of purposes and 
content that may be included in CCMs. However, one significant purpose of CCMs is to 
protect, preserve, or rebuild an organization’s legitimacy1. As such, during crises 
organizations and their spokespersons are likely to develop verbal accounts about their 
situation. These messages are aimed at explaining, rationalizing, or legitimating the 
actions taken by the organization (Elsbach, 1994). Elsbach (1994) argues that these 
messages may affect an organization’s legitimacy. As a result, organizational decision-
makers are likely to be strategic in their selection and use of messages during 
organizational crises. One of the common areas of study in crisis communication, 
therefore, examines crisis response strategy. This refers to the selection of particular 
types of CCMs in an effort to protect the organization by eliminating or reducing the 
crisis situation’s damage to the organization’s legitimacy (Coombs & Holladay, 1996).  
The Need for Theory Building in Crisis Communication  
The strength in our knowledge of crisis communication is the depth of knowledge 
regarding individual crisis response strategies. The weakness of our knowledge of crisis 
communication is a failure to develop a theory-based set of connections between 
situational factors and crisis communication (Coombs & Holladay, 1996; 2004; Hearit & 
Courthright, 2003). This failure to understand the relationships between crisis situation 
and crisis communication makes difficult any endeavor to connect crisis communication 
with outcome specific to managing the organization’s communication during a crisis. 
Pearson and Mitroff (1993) argue that organizations often contribute to their own crises. 
                                                 
1 Organizational legitimacy is the perception of an organization’s trustworthiness, recognizability, 





Therefore if we are to understand crises successful management and outcomes, we must 
first understand those variables that are likely to influence the type of communicative 
strategies employed during crises before we can legitimately examine the outcomes of 
crises. The present study represents a meaningful step toward building a more 
comprehensive model relating features of crisis situations to crisis communication 
messages used in contemporary organizational crises. In this section I will argue for the 
contributions such a study can make and briefly introduce the key crisis communication 
and situational concepts.  
Contributions of a more comprehensive situational crisis communication model. 
In an editorial in the Journal of Management, Feldman (2004) argues that for a work to 
have a meaningful theoretical contribution it: (a) asks research questions that are non-
trivial, that is those with an a priori reason to study them; (b) may be either theory-driven 
or phenomenon-driven depending on the knowledge development needs of the literature; 
(c) such works need to go beyond the synthesis of previous research to provide new 
insights, critiques, or directions for theory-testing—going beyond predecessors’ results; 
and (d) that the differences postulated will make a difference. The proposed study meets 
each of these criteria.  
Coombs and Holladay (1996; 2004) and Hearit and Courthright (2003) argue that 
our knowledge in crisis communication, while deep in understanding crises and many 
elements of crisis communication, has not progressed to be able to differentiate between 
crisis communication used in different types of situations. Coombs and Holladay (2004) 





cases for response strategies.  They argue that developing a situational crisis 
communication theory is valuable and that the development of such a theory ought to be 
used to evaluate our knowledge of crisis communication. This suggests that a research 
study, like the one presented here, asking question about the relationships between 
situation/ context and crisis communication has a priori value in the study of crisis 
communication as a phenomenon.  
Second, the present study emphasizes the phenomenon of crisis communication 
and endeavors to build more meaningful heuristics in order to understand the 
phenomenon. This is meaningful because if we are to understand crisis communication 
and crisis response strategies then we must endeavor to build models and theory specific 
to the phenomenon. This is presently lacking; while contemporary work like Millar and 
Heath’s (2004) collection of research and contemporary knowledge on crisis 
communication includes applications of theories like Attribution Theory, Burkean 
Counternature, and Multidimensional Modeling, these theoretical applications either 
focus on the larger construct of crisis management—not crisis communication. This 
weakness is highlighted Coombs and Holladay’s (2004) work, emphasizing the 
limitations in our theoretical application at present. Therefore the present is a 
phenomenon-driven work versus one where crisis communication is merely a side-
product of crisis management.  
Third, the present study will necessarily go beyond the synthesis of contemporary 
research to provide new insights, directions for future study, and theory building. At 





between situation and crisis communication. Two studies of note are the aforementioned 
situational crisis communication theory experimental studies by Coombs and Holladay 
(2004) and Perry, Taylor, and Doerfel’s (2003) study examining the influence of crisis 
type on the use of the Internet as a consistent channel of communication during crises. 
The authors in each of these studies note the need for a deeper development of theory in 
crisis communication, which is the central goal of this study. Therefore, one of the 
proposed study’s primary contributions is to build on previous knowledge to develop a 
more comprehensive theory and begin testing elements of that theory.  
Finally, the explication of relationships between situation or context and crisis 
communication will be independently useful. Coombs and Holladay (2004) identify three 
advantages of research effectively building strong theoretical relationships between crisis 
communication and those contextual factors influencing the communication. First, they 
argue that it is reasonable to assume that crisis communication should be affected by the 
context in which it is grounded, so advances in our knowledge of the context are 
intellectually important in understanding crisis communication. Second, theoretical 
connections between crisis communication and its context(s) provide valuable insights 
for practitioners to: (a) be better able to engage in effective crisis planning; (b) more 
effectively assess the potential utility of their communicative options; (c) be better 
prepared for crisis communication because they know what strategies are often used in 
what situations; and (d) build faster potential responses to crisis situations because they 





models provide guidelines for reasoned action—more effectively avoiding ‘seat-of-the-
pants’ thinking in understanding organizational crises.  
 In short, this study—as a study of the relationships between crisis context or 
situation and crisis communication will meet the four central criteria established by 
Feldman (2004) to determine whether a theoretically-focused study is valuable. Moreover, 
by understanding that organizations must respond to a set of crisis circumstances when 
engaging in crisis communication is to move toward understanding the nature of crisis 
communication qua communication (Hearit & Courthright, 2003).  
 A brief introduction of the key crisis communication and situational concepts. 
One of the primary strengths in the field of crisis communication, to date, has emphasized 
crisis response strategy. Crisis response strategy is most typically examined in terms of 
the individual crisis response strategies (sometimes also referred to as tactics—see 
Mohammed et al., 1999) used in CCMs by organizations. While crisis response 
strategies are discussed at length in chapter two, these strategies may be thought of as 
individual messages purposefully selected by organizational decision-makers to better 
enable them to communicatively manage the crisis (Hayes & Patton, 2001). This 
scholarship has addressed issues such as: factors affecting message evaluation (see Arpan, 
2002; Elsbach & Elofson, 2000), image repair discourse, and response strategies (see 
Coombs & Schmidt, 2000; Greer & Moreland, 2003; Sturges, 1994; Turner, 1999). 
Benoit’s (1997) analysis of US Air’s image repair discourse, Elsbach’s (1994) study of 
strategies used by the California cattle industry to manage legitimacy, Kauffman’s (2001) 





(2002) study of Nike’s use of promotionalism and subpolitics as communication 
strategies to manage its labor critics are all examples of case studies of strategies used in 
particular crises.  
Emerging from this body of research has been a substantial number of response 
strategies that organizational decision makers are likely to use when developing crisis 
communication messages (see Table 1). Some authors have also developed in-depth 
taxonomies of crisis response strategies. Two examples of these taxonomies include 
Mohamed et al.’s (1999) taxonomy of organization impression management tactics, 
categorizing crisis response strategies based on dimensions of directness, assertiveness, 
and defensiveness, or Benoit’s (1997)  foundation typology of image restoration 
strategies. These studies reflect strength in our understanding of individual strategies as 
well as an emergent assumption that crisis communication is an exercise in strategic 
planning (Fishman, 1999).   
While the discovery and categorization of different crisis response strategies has 
been the most prevalent feature of crisis communication messages studied, the crisis 
communication literature has also made strides in suggesting factors that are likely to 
affect the selection of crisis communication messages. In his theoretical discussion of 
crisis communication Seeger (2002) argues that variance in other factors of crisis 
situations and communication such as: type of crisis, type of organization, 
communication channel, or even phase of crisis development are likely to affect the 





potential success2 of an organization’s crisis communication efforts. Unfortunately in the 
literature there is scant examination of the effects of such situational factors on the 
selection of crisis communication messages. Moreover, of those situational factors, the 
type of organization (see Arpan, 2002; Millar, 2004) and the type of crisis (see Coombs 
& Holladay, 2004, Hearit & Courthright, 2003) emerge as critical situational factors that 
are likely to influence crisis communication messages. If scholars and practitioners were 
to better understand these factors that influence crisis communication messages, we 
would be better positioned to address the effects of such messages than we are at present.  
A second area of weakness in the literature is that there is also a limited 
examination of a factor that might be represented in crisis communication messages. The 
invocation of an organization’s culture is often assumed to be an inherent part of crisis 
communication (Pearson & Mitroff, 1993). Trice and Beyer (1993) suggest that 
organizational culture—like other forms of culture—is an essential part of the 
organizational experience because they reflect collective experience, ideologies, and is 
actively used in communication to reinforce shared ideologies. In the context of crisis 
communication this is even more critical because crisis communication is often thought 
of as an effort to demonstrate that an organization’s norms, values, and beliefs are in line 
with those of its stakeholders—despite the emergence of the crisis (Massey, 2001). 
Specifically, Knight and Greenberg’s (2002) analysis of Nike demonstrates that the 
corporation has been successful in managing much of the criticism of its labor practices 
                                                 
2Because the aim of developing successful accounts is to explain, rationalize, or legitimize the actions taken 
by an organization (Elsbach, 1994); the success of crisis communication may be thought of in terms of its 





by specifically communicating a vision of Nike’s organizational culture focusing on 
associating the brand name with positive social values ranging from fitness to social or 
environmental responsibility, and even patriotism:  
Nike has been adept at using the logic of promotionalism to craft a flexible, 
multifaceted identity that enables the company to represent itself simultaneously 
as serious and ‘cool’, socially conscious and fashionable, earnest and ironic, 
image conscious and technologically sophisticated. (p. 545)  
Taking the importance and potential effects on crisis communication messages of 
contextual factors and organizational culture the goal of this study is to further our 
knowledge of crisis communication messages. I will do so by first proposing a model that 
examines the influences of crisis type, organization type, channel of communication, 
characteristics of interorganizational relationships, and phases of crisis development on 
crisis response messages including crisis response strategy(ies) chosen by organizational 
decision makers and emphasizing aspects of organizational culture. Second, after 
proposing the model I will also propose a study to begin to test some of the relationships 
explicated by the model.  
Ultimately this study will better identify relationships associated with the 
situational factors affecting crisis communication messages. Such a study is necessary, as 
Coombs and Holladay (1996) argue, because in the process of developing our 
understanding of crisis communication, we must first develop “lists” of strategies and 
variables, then understand how these messages are and can be used in the context of 





In order to accomplish my goal, this dissertation will: (a) develop a rationale for the 
utility and necessity of this work; (b) review the appropriate literature in order to form 
Research Questions and Hypotheses; (c) develop and justify the methods for data 
collection and analysis; (d) report the results of the data analysis; and (e) discuss the 
results in the context of the proposed model, implications for the research, and address 
areas for future research.  
Developing the Rationale for Examining Crisis Communication 
 “Communication can be used to influence how stakeholders interpret a crisis and 
the organization in crisis” (Coombs & Holladay, 1996, p. 280). A study of crisis 
communication messages used in efforts to manage crises will meaningfully advance our 
knowledge of crisis communication and better inform efforts to guide organizations in 
crisis. The goal of studying publicly-focused crisis communication is two-fold. From a 
scholar’s perspective, if we better understand how a crisis’s critical factors (e.g., crisis 
type) influence crisis communication messages actually used by organizational decision-
makers and spokespersons, we will later be better able to create effective predictions 
regarding the outcomes of crisis communication efforts as well as the ultimate outcomes 
of a crisis (e.g., financial impact, image, etc) (Coombs & Holladay, 2004). In an applied 
setting, this ability to better understand and predict the ways in which situational factors 
of a crisis affect crisis communication messages is an absolutely necessary step to help 
practitioners be better able to form strategies to help their organizations plan for and 





Therefore, this study’s central assumption is that a better understanding of the 
relationships between the situational factors of crises (e.g., crisis type, organization type, 
channels of communication chosen, and phases of crisis development) and elements of 
crisis communication messages (e.g., individual strategies used, forms of organizational 
culture invoked) is an important, albeit missing, component to developing our 
understanding of crisis communication and ultimately the effective management of 
organizational crises. In this section, I will argue that this is both a valid and important 
assumption on which to base the proposed study by: (a) discussing the need for a more 
systematic examination of crisis messages and (b) arguing that it is appropriate to use 
contemporary crisis communication messages as a benchmark for evaluating 
relationships between elements of crises and crisis communication messages.  
The Need for Systematic and Thorough Examination of Crisis Communication  
 When well-managed, organizational crises can serve a number of functions for an 
organization, but every crisis also presents an array of risks for organizations. For 
example, organizational crises can lead to more effective organizational learning (Roux-
Dufort, 2000), they can help point out areas of an organization’s culture that have to 
change because it is detrimental to the organization’s capabilities (Ross & Benson, 1995), 
and crises can point out systemic flaws in organizations’ abilities (Argenti, 2002; Greer & 
Moreland, 2003). However, organizational crises—by their very nature—also represent a 
credible threat to an organization’s well-being (Hayes & Patton, 2001; Pearson & Clair, 
1998). For example, these threats can include conflicts between the needs of shareholders 





image (Elsbach et al., 1998), or they can even jeopardize the livelihood of an 
organization (King, 2002).  
To manage crises, clear and specific crisis communication strategies are needed. 
This point has been made by practitioners (Dilenschneider & Hyde, 1985) and in the 
reviews of cases, like post 9/11 analyses of crisis response (Greer & Moreland, 2003). 
Regardless whether the research and/or recommendations are addressing crisis planning 
in the Third World (Sriraj & Khisty, 1999), lessons learned from industry deregulation 
(Basham, 2001), arguing for continual planning for crisis management in the tourism 
industry (Henderson, 2003), or offering an overview of the process of crisis management 
(Loosemore, 1999) planned response strategies are advocated.  
Knight and Greenberg (2002) argue problems that organizations face and their 
resolution is not simply about matters of organizational practices, but also about 
communication. They argue that crisis response strategies are inherently important 
because they involve issues of sincerity and credibility that penetrate the heart of 
corporate identity as the principal instrument and goal of an organization’s success. It is 
for this reason that there is a wealth of studies examining crisis communication strategies, 
for example the communication of compassion in crisis responses (Coombs, 1999), 
apologia in online crisis response strategies (Hearit, 1999), model and anti-model 
arguments in crisis response messages (Sellnow & Brand, 2001), or the use of crisis 
websites (Snellen, 2003).  
Across the research and in these cases the emphasis on developing purposeful 





light of the crisis, is a hallmark of crisis management and communication research. Given 
that is the case, how can we reasonably expect specific response strategies to be 
developed, tested, and recommended when, conceptually, we have not linked critical 
components of message construction in our contemporary crisis communication lexicon? 
This is the point that both Coombs and Holloday (2004) and Hearit and Courthright 
(2003) make as each set of authors suggest that the present crisis communication 
literature has fundamentally failed to develop a theory-based connection between the 
context or situation associated with a crisis and the crisis communication messages used 
by organizations. These situational factor issues influencing message needs include such 
factors as crisis type, organization type, phases of crisis development, and channels of 
communication (Seeger, 2002). These also include variables like crisis response 
strategy(ies) used or appeals to the organization’s cultural strengths. Herein, lays a central 
problem in analyzing crisis outcomes or in the current development of effective crisis 
communication plans. Coombs and Holloday (2004) point out that each of these issues or 
variables have been discussed in the literature, but never discussed in a coherent and 
exhaustive manner together: 
Three points must be addressed to understand how to match crisis response 
strategies (Feldman, 2004); identification of crisis response strategies; 
identification of crisis types; and creation of a link between the crisis response 
strategies and the types….The first two points have been addressed. 
Unfortunately, there has been limited progress in linking crisis response strategies 





Therefore, there is excellence in elements of our knowledge of crisis communication, but 
it also suffers from a lack of connection among the critical variables that might influence 
the messages and enable us to more accurately predict potential outcomes of crisis 
response strategies. Identifying relationships between these critical variables is absolutely 
necessary in order to properly advance our knowledge and theory-building regarding 
crisis communication.  
A Rationale for Studying Current Crisis Communication Messages 
 While identifying the limitations in the present study of crisis communication 
messages is an important reason to justify the proposed study, the choice of the messages 
to analyze is equally important. Because such extensive work has been conducted 
regarding crisis communication and because Americans’ understanding of crises has been 
irreversibly shaped by the experience of 9/11, an examination of contemporary crisis 
communication messages will offer the most fruitful development of our knowledge of 
the relationships among the variables. 
There are, however, several other benefits to conducting a deep analysis of crisis 
communication messages presently being used to better predict factors affecting them. 
Initially, using such messages recognizes that executives and organizations have 
benefited from past crises and crisis experiences. While there remains a substantial 
percentage of executives3 and organizations still without crisis plans and strategies, more 
and more organizations are learning and have learned that preparedness for crises is 
essential. In fact, one of the critical lessons many organizations learned from September 
                                                 
3 Based on Gonzales-Herrero and Pratt’s (1996) discussion of the prevalence of crises and executives 





11 is that having crisis management and communication plans in place is absolutely 
essential (Argenti, 2002). Additionally, we have had a generation of executives and crisis 
planners since Tylenol’s arsenic case demonstrated how a quick and decisive corporate 
plan can minimize the negative outcomes of a crisis. This suggests that an examination of 
contemporary crisis communication messages would be the most valid way to investigate 
the factors that affect crisis communication messages. In fact, one example of such a 
study was conducted by Perry et al. (2003) focusing on the use of the Internet as a 
consistent channel of crisis communication. They found that regardless of organization or 
crisis type, organizations are consistently using the Internet to manage crisis 
communication. Therefore, it is both timely and worthwhile to develop a deeper 
understanding of relationships among the variables influencing crisis communication.  
 Drawing upon our knowledge strengths. Additionally, the proposed study uses the 
field’s strong understanding of crisis response strategies and other variables influencing 
crisis communication while developing new and important knowledge regarding the 
relationships between those variables. While these variables will be discussed in depth in 
the literature review, our contemporary knowledge of crisis communication really 
represents a detailed photograph of crisis communication. Unfortunately, because the 
critical variables have not been effectively analyzed together, the challenges by previous 
authors to explicate the relationships between crisis communication and features of the 
crisis have gone largely unmet (Coombs & Holladay, 2004; 1996). In short because this 





development of a more meaningful heuristic, it affords communication researchers and 
practitioners better opportunities to build models and applications of those models.    
Therefore, my central focus for this study is to analyze contemporary crisis 
communication messages which are both relevant and useful in order to examine the 
factors affecting message construction along with variations in the message content itself. 
In the next chapter, I will develop the model driving the proposed study and review the 
body of previous research to discuss the situational factors, message features, and 





























In the first chapter I argue that the field’s knowledge of crisis communication is 
much like a well-focused and highly detailed photograph; however, it is a photograph that 
resembles a jigsaw puzzle. Each piece is valuable, yet without assembly and exploration 
the picture is difficult to discern. There is both breadth and depth to our understanding of 
crisis communication; unfortunately, there has been insufficient attention paid to a more 
holistic analysis of the strategies, message components, and factors that influence crisis 
communication messages communicated by organizations to their stakeholders. In short, 
there has been insufficient development of models of strategic crisis communication. As 
such, our ability to evaluate crisis communication efforts, crisis outcomes, and more 
effectively build crisis communication messages is limited. Therefore, the purpose of this 
chapter—and more broadly of this study—is to begin to build a new model that 
emphasizes the relationships between crisis communication response strategies, 
situational factors affecting those strategies, and potential crisis outcomes. Once the 
model is developed, this chapter will propose a study that focuses on the first four 
variables to be tested by exploring the relationships between crisis response strategies and 
two critical situational factors that are likely to affect the use of those strategies by 
organizations in crisis and the invocation of organizational culture in crisis response 
messages.  
Building the Strategic Model of Organizational Crisis Communication 
In the first chapter, I argued that if communication scholars and crisis managers in 





organizational crises, then we ought not treat the study of crisis communication in a 
piecemeal fashion. Even Coombs and Holladay’s (1999, 2002) work in developing the 
Situational Crisis Communication Theory still only focuses very closely on the 
relationships between crisis variables (i.e., crisis responsibility, severity, and performance 
history) and crisis communication strategies. There are, however, other important 
components necessary to build a strong understanding of the role of crisis communication 
in organizational crises. Therefore, this chapter’s first task will be to identify and briefly 
discuss the critical components to a Strategic Model of Organizational Crisis 
Communication (SMOCC). In doing so, I propose the theory (see Figure 1) with three 
components: situational factors; message features; and outcomes.  
SMOCCs Organizational and Situational Factors 
“Organizations do not exist in a vacuum….” (Trice & Beyer, 1993, p. 299). This 
statement underscores the point that context, situation, and environment are critical 
components for organizations coping with day-to-day business, let alone crises. Sutcliffe 
(2001) argues that organizational environments are socially constructed. This suggests 
that environments are dynamic, not dependable, nor particularly stable because they are 
changed by what organizations do and how people perceive their environment (Trice & 
Beyer, 1993; Sutcliffe, 2001).  
Negotiation of the environment, the variance in situations, and potential for both 
similarity and difference in crisis experience is at the heart of Seeger’s (2002) argument 
that a thorough understanding of the features affecting a crisis situation can help us better 





discussion of organizational crisis responses, Coombs and Holladay (2002) advocate 
Situational Crisis Communication Theory as a way to articulate the variables, 
assumptions, and relationships they believe ought to be considered in selecting crisis 
response strategies. In their study focusing on relationships between crisis response and 
organizational reputation, they argue that a situational response is necessary to 
understand the different ways in which organizations might have to face different crises: 
Needed is a situational approach to selecting crisis response strategies, that is, 
what an organization says and does after a crisis to protect the organization’s 
reputation…He (Boyd, 2000) challenged scholars to understand how the crisis 
type (or situation) influenced the selection of crisis response strategies. To meet 
this challenge, scholars must identify the range of possible crisis types and crisis 
responses, and explain how crisis types affect the selection of crisis responses (p. 
166). 
Additionally, Sellnow and Seeger (2001) argue that because crises are threatening, 
often destructive, and sometimes devastating, understanding factors that influence crisis 
communication is critical. In particular they point out that understanding messages and 
their construction is of particular importance to this endeavor in order that our crisis 
communication is able to be more sophisticated and flexible. At its heart, this task is what 
this section, chapter, and project is trying to contribute—the development of a more 
sophisticated and flexible way of understanding crisis communication messages. In order 
to help accomplish this task, this section will develop three situational factors likely to 






 While type of organization has not been previously included as a variable for 
studying crisis communication messages, a number of authors suggest that “niches” or 
“sector” are likely to influence an organization’s reaction to crises (e.g., Arpan, 2002; 
Glynn, 2000; Massey, 2001; Millar, 2004). For example, in a study of a crisis in a 
heritage organization, Hayes and Patton (2001) found that organizations that depend on 
public support are uniquely affected by organizational crises because there is a public 
presupposition of reputation. Consequently, public support can be fickle if they 
reputation is damaged. At a broader level, Ginzel, Kramer, and Sutton (1993) point out 
that what an organization does, its identity, and organizational routines that place role 
constraints on members are important factors in determining what type of an 
organizational response emerges during a crisis and even the degree to which those 
responses may be effective. Massey (2001) emphasizes that part of an organization’s 
identity is its niche which will necessarily affect the organization’s reaction to crises. 
Similarly, Glynn (2000) argues that different types of industries have different identities; 
therefore, affecting organizational needs that emerge in times of crisis.  
 These studies emphasize that it is more than just a case of ‘different organizations 
and identities’, rather they build a case for examining industries as the critical 
operationalization of organization type. Groupings by industry demonstrate a similarity in 
function and overall organizational needs (Glynn, 2000) and therefore, make a strong 
operationalization of organization type. Table 2 represents a list of the 20 industries 





2002 North American Industry Classification System (NAICS), a part of the US Census 
Bureau (Bureau, 2002).  
An additional way in which it might be useful to consider organization type is by 
thinking of ‘type’ as also being representative of whether an industry has a history of 
managing crises. In a study of a decade of major crises emerging—and using the NAICS 
to categorize the findings—Millar (2004) found that the following industries were most 
crisis prone: (1) Finance and Insurance, with banking, stocks and bond brokerages, and 
insurance companies most crisis prone; (2) Professional, Scientific, and Technical 
Services with aerospace and pharmaceuticals most crisis prone; (3) Information with 
telecommunications and computer software most crisis prone; (4) Transportation and 
Warehousing with air transportation most crisis prone; (5) manufacturing with motor 
vehicle manufacturing most crisis prone; and (6) Mining with oil and gas extraction 
operators most crisis prone. Consequently, at any given time, we would expect more 
crises identified for those six industries than the remaining 14. Further, findings using an 
organization’s crisis history as a central variable for determining outcomes associated 
with crisis communication of a current crisis (Coombs & Holladay, 2004) indicate that an 
additional conceptualization of organization type as being in a crisis prone or non-crisis 
prone industry would be valid. Additionally, based on the previous analysis suggesting 
that organizational type and particular industry are likely to influence organizational 
reactions to crises as well as propensity for crisis occurrence, organizations experiencing 
crises in crisis prone industries are likely to respond to crises differently than those 






Pearson and Mitroff (1993) point out that for the first time in human history, 
human-induced crises have the potential to rival natural disasters both in terms of scope 
and magnitude; therefore, they claim that recognizing different crisis types afford 
organizations and stakeholders better opportunities to attribute blame and take action. 
This point also suggests that while the scope and magnitude of crises can be great, not all 
crises are likely to rival the floods of 1993 in terms of devastation. Accordingly, it is 
critical to recognize that different crisis types not only exist, but are likely to merit 
different types of crisis response strategies. Several authors (e.g., Coombs & Holladay, 
1996; Coombs & Holladay, 2002; Hearit, 1999; Pearson & Mitroff, 1993) argue that the 
context for a crisis is of vital importance in determining appropriate organizational 
responses. Specifically Coombs and Holladay (2002) argue: “Identifying the crisis type 
enables an initial assessment of the amount of crisis responsibility that publics will 
attribute to a crisis situation” (p. 169).  
Table 3 identifies a typology of crises that organizations are likely to face, based 
on those identified across the crisis communication literature and drawing heavily from a 
typology that Coombs and Holladay (2002) created. However, what distinguishes this 
typology from others is a more explicit classification of crises into crisis categories. 
Three crisis categories and 18 types of crises emerge. The first category is organizational 
transgressions. These represent those crises for which blame is attributable to the 
organization itself—whether the actions were intentional or unintentional (see, e.g., 





behavior, technical breakdown accidents, technical breakdown product recalls, 
megadamage incidents, human breakdown accidents, and human breakdown recalls. The 
second category is organizational events, representing incidents that may or may not be 
within the organization’s locus of control and may or may not have significant negative 
effects on the organization, but that are still crises. Included in this category are crises 
centering on: mergers and failed mergers; strikes; economic downturns resulting in 
actions like downsizing; and workplace violence. The third category includes those 
events or actions that are outside of an organization’s locus of control; however, are still 
crises with which an organization has to deal. Included in this category are crises 
centering on: rumors about the organization; product tampering by external agents; 
challenges or pressure group activism; shifting political attitudes that harm the 
organization; natural disasters; and acts of terrorism.  
 Coombs and Holladay (2002) also argue that using typologies of crisis 
communications along with crisis types is necessary, yet typically lacking in current 
crisis communication research. They argue that a lack of integration of message and crisis 
type prevents managers from effectively understanding the crisis communication 
necessary for any particular situation.  
Crisis Phase 
In their work, Gonzales-Herrero and Pratt (1996) emphasize that it is not enough 
to examine critical situational factors like I have already discussed—organization and 
crisis type. They argue it is also important to examine crisis lifecycles because in 





emerge. Further, Massey (2001) argues that research on crisis communication should be a 
longitudinal endeavor because crises are not static events also suggesting that 
communicative needs and strategies are likely to change over the course of a crisis. There 
are three phases to an organizational crisis: events prior to the crisis, during the crisis, and 
after the crisis.  
 Gonzales-Herrero and Pratt (1996) argue that crisis communication efforts before 
a crisis actually erupts are characterized by proactive strategies and measures. 
Specifically, during this phase they argue that issue management and planning prevention 
occur for those organizations engaging in crisis communication prior to a crisis’s 
emergence. Issue management involves scanning the organization’s environment to 
identify troublesome issues before the organization is obligated to deal with it—as such, 
crisis communication can be used to avoid crises from erupting (though they cannot 
avoid crises) (Elsbach et al., 1998; Gonzales-Herrero & Pratt, 1996). Therefore 
communicative efforts prior to a crisis are likely to redirect stakeholders’ attention from 
an issue or communicate positive messages about the organization. A study of 
anticipatory crisis management associated with hospital billing found that impression 
management before a crisis can distract stakeholders from complaining as well as change 
their information processing habits regarding the issue (Elsbach et al., 1998). 
Additionally, Heath and Millar (2004) argue that there are two functions that pre-crisis 
communication serves: “looking for and reducing the likelihood that a crisis will occur; 
and communicating with key markets, audiences, and publics to prepare them for a crisis 





 Gonzales-Herrero and Pratt (1996) argue that at the second phase, the crisis has 
already occurred and the communicative efforts at this point are designed to handle the 
media, develop crisis materials (i.e., position statements, frequently asked question 
responses, preempt negative publicity, communicate with stakeholders). They argue that 
communication during the crisis targets messages to particular audiences, obtains third 
party support, implements internal communications, and tries to control rumor 
mongering. This suggests that the options and possible communicative choices during the 
crisis are almost limitless (Heath & Millar, 2004).  
 During the post-crisis phase, Gonzales-Herrero and Pratt (1996) argue that 
organizations must: (a) pay attention to stakeholders and their continued involvement 
with the crisis; (b) monitor issues; (c) inform media of organizational actions; (d) 
evaluate crisis plans; (e) incorporate feedback into the crisis plan; and (f) develop a long-
term communication program to lessen any damages to the organization’s reputation 
caused by the crisis. Essentially, “…postcrisis, a vital part of the process, entails 
providing information that demonstrates how, why, and when the organization has put 
things right as well as what it plans to do to prevent the recurrence of a similar crisis.” 
(Heath & Millar, 2004, p. 8). Based on this analysis and the organization’s needs after a 
crisis, we should see strategies emphasizing a positive message about the organization 
and the crisis’s resolution.   
SMOCCs Message Features 
 In Argenti’s (2002) discussion of crisis communication after 9/11, he makes the 





crisis response strategies to be effective, the information has to be received by 
appropriate audiences and received in intended ways. In crisis communication, this point 
is particularly salient as Arpan (2002) notes that crisis responses or accounts are 
delivered to specific audiences for specific purposes in order to influence the potential 
outcomes of the crisis such as: economic implications (e.g., stock prices or losses in 
sales/ profits), increased scrutiny by the media or government regulatory agencies, or 
image/ legitimacy implications. Additionally, in the study of crisis communication, 
considerable attention has been given to cataloguing the types of messages that are 
delivered over the life of an organizational crisis. In developing this depth and breadth of 
knowledge, previous authors (e.g., Benoit, 1997; Mohamed, Gardner, & Paolillo, 1999; 
Sellnow & Ulmer, 1995) have identified that the crisis communication messages are 
typically organized in terms of crisis response strategies. Crisis response strategies (CRS) 
are those individual messages purposefully selected by organizational decision makers to 
better enable them to communicatively manage a crisis (Hayes & Patton, 2001). Finally, 
Marra (1998) makes the point that the invocation and use of an organization’s culture is 
an inherent part of the crisis communication process. Therefore, the above suggests that 
in building a strategic model of crisis communication, there are three critical features of 
crisis messages—crisis response strategies, the invocation of an organization’s culture in 
crisis response messages, and the audience receiving the messages.  
Crisis Response Strategies 
As previously discussed in Chapter 1, crisis communication involves messages 





crisis (King, 2002). These messages can certainly include a host of channels and forms, 
but what defines them as CRS is that they are explicitly linked to a specific crisis or set of 
crisis issues. Until now, the research has been building an understanding of individual 
components of these messages and has not yet examined the ways in which these 
components work together to build an organization’s total crisis communication effort.  
Benoit’s (1997) work is widely regarded as one of the first and best discussions of 
message strategies. In his Theory of Image Repair Discourse, Benoit developed a 
typology of Image Restoration Strategies that included denial, evasion of responsibility, 
reduction of offensiveness, corrective action, and mortification. That work was also 
extended in 1997 with Czerwinski in an analysis of US Air’s image repair discourse 
subdividing many of his categories in the typology (see Benoit & Czerwinski, 1997). The 
Mohamed et al. (1999) taxonomy of organizational impression management tactics is a 
thorough review of CCM strategies. Building on Benoit’s (1997) and Benoit and 
Czerwinski’s (1997) work, Mohamed et al. (1999) created their taxonomy based on 
directness and assertiveness. It included: direct and assertive tactics; indirect and 
assertive tactics; indirect and defensive tactics; as well as direct and defensive tactics.  
These three works combine to make an effective basis for defining crisis response 
strategies; therefore, drawing from these as well as other research and typologies of crisis 
message strategies Table 1 outlines the taxonomy of crisis response strategies that 
organizations facing crises may use in their CRS, each strategy’s definition, along with 
key authors. This taxonomy includes eight categories of strategies and 45 individual 





of an updated taxonomy on CRS, one of the contributions that the proposed research can 
make is in terms of being among the first pieces of research to compare the concurrent 
use of crisis response strategies in a comprehensive model of factors. The groundwork 
and value of such research has been laid with comparisons of crisis response strategies 
used in single crises with single organizations; such as Kauffman’s (2001) analysis of 
strategies used by NASA during the 1970 explosion aboard the Apollo 13 or Sellnow and 
Ulmer’s (1995) analysis of message ambiguity in the Jack in the Box E. Coli crisis. 
However, it would be an important step forward in our understanding of CCMs to 
examine crisis response strategies used across different situational variables.  
 Crisis response strategies focusing on self-enhancement. CRS focusing on self-
enhancement include marketing and image advertising strategies. These two crisis 
response strategies emphasize quality, information to make the organization look 
favorable, and frame issues for stakeholders (e.g., Heath, 1994; Proto & Supino, 1999). 
While these strategies are not exclusive to crisis situations, such strategies have been 
included in the study of crisis communication. For example, Heath (1998) argues that one 
of the necessary elements of managing a crisis is improving communication with all 
groups through better image management and marketing. Additionally, Proto and Supino 
(1999) argue that in industries whose processes could threaten the environment in some 
way, it is critical for those organizations to engage in image and marketing activities to 
increase the perception of transparency in the relationship between the company and 





 Crisis response strategies focusing on routine communication. Crisis response 
strategies sometimes focus on routine communication. Such types include the 
Communication of Mission/ Vision, Annual Reports, and Newsletters. These crisis 
response strategies emphasize communication about the organization, who it is, and what 
it does (e.g., Fiol, 1995; Heath, 1994; Proto & Supino, 1999). Like the self-enhancement 
strategies, routine communication is not exclusive to CRS; however, the occurrence of an 
organizational crisis would also suggest that these routine communications would be 
likely to report the crisis, its affects, and address stakeholder concerns about the 
organization’s viability during and after the crisis.  
 Crisis response strategies that frame the crisis. An organization might also 
choose to explain the crisis, their role in it, how important it is, and what they are doing 
about it by using one of the crisis response strategies that framing the crisis (e.g., Bennett, 
1998; Kauffman, 2001; Williams & Olaniran, 1998). These strategies include: Accounts, 
Information Dissemination, Issue Salience, and Preconditioning.  
 Crisis response strategies that frame the organization. In addition to trying to 
define the crisis for their stakeholders, organizations may also choose to incorporate 
crisis response strategies that frame the organization. In this way, they are making claims 
about the character of the organization as a way to minimize potential negative effects of 
the crisis (e.g., Coombs & Schmidt, 2000; Marra, 1998; Sellnow & Brand, 2001). These 
strategies include: Ingratiation, Organizational Promotion, Issue Management, 





 Crisis response strategies that are anti-social or defensive. Much research 
attention has been devoted to crisis response strategies that emphasize an organization’s 
defensive or even negative reactions to organizational crises (e.g., Benoit & Czerwinski, 
1997; Mohamed et al., 1999; Ulmer & Sellnow, 2000). As such nine such strategies have 
emerged from the research that typify an organization’s communicative effort being to 
cover themselves or refusals to admit culpability for a crisis. These include the following 
strategies: Noncompliance, Disclaimers, Defensive Compliance, Evasion of 
Responsibility, Shifting the Blame, Simple Denial, Strategic Ambiguity, Minimization, 
and Transcendence.  
Accommodative strategies. On the opposite side of the coin to the anti-social or 
defensive strategies are the accommodative crisis response strategies, in which the 
organization communicates an emphasis on compliance, helpfulness, contrition, openness, 
and sympathy. Accordingly, accommodative strategies are typified by an organization 
admitting fault and/or emphasizing coping or sympathy (e.g., Benoit, 1997; Henderson, 
2003; Martinelli & Briggs, 1998). These strategies include the following: Corrective 
Action/Compensation, Apologia, Compassion, Offering Reassurances, Eliciting 
Sympathy, Transparency, and Volunteering.   
 Excellence or renewal strategies. The hallmark of these crisis response strategies 
is a communicated emphasis on moving forward—beyond a crisis (e.g., Henriques & 
Sadorsky, 1999; Milliman et al., 1994; Williams & Olaniran, 1998). These could 
certainly be communicative efforts that occur during a crisis, but also after as well. These 





 Emphasizing interorganizational relationships strategies. The final nine strategies 
can be grouped as those crisis response strategies that emphasize some dimension of 
interorganizational relationships. These strategies range from those that hide connections 
to other organizations in the midst of crises, to those that highlight either positive or 
negative links to other organizations, to those that emphasize cooperation and each 
organization’s legitimacy in the relationship (e.g., Martinelli & Briggs, 1998; Mohamed 
et al., 1999; Sellnow & Brand, 2001). These strategies include: Blaring Others, Blasting, 
Burying, Blurring, Belittling, Boosting, Boasting, Burnishing, and Collaboration.  
Organizational Culture 
Trice and Beyer (1993) explain that organizations: 
…arrive at their shared ideologies through collective experience and 
repeated social interactions over time. They use cultural forms to 
communicate and reinforce these shared ideologies. Organizational 
cultures, like other cultures, develop as groups of people struggle together 
to make sense of and cope with their worlds. (p. 4) 
In this definition of organizational culture, Trice and Beyer (1993) emphasize that culture 
is a compilation of an organization’s ideologies, which are hard to measure in typical 
research language, but that those ideologies are made concrete in the forms. This supports 
Marra’s (1998) analysis that organizational culture and crisis communication are 
inextricably linked from the decisions about what to communicate to the content of 
messages that are communicated. Closer examination of the four forms of organizational 





and communication and why it is a critical message feature when examining crisis 
response strategies. Table 5 identifies examples of the forms of organizational culture 
developed by Trice and Beyer (1993).  
Symbols. The first form is symbols, which includes the tangible representations of 
abstract values, like objects, settings, or performers (Trice & Beyer, 1993). Cheney and 
Christensen (2001)  argue that the world becomes “real” through symbols that 
organizations and social actors employ because they help to manage issues, image, and 
organizational identity. Thus a symbolic view of culture emphasizes two points: (a) 
culture and communication are inextricably intertwined and (b) culture is a public 
phenomenon (Phillips & Brown, 1993). The relationship between crisis communication 
and symbols has been strongly made, particularly in Coombs and Holladay’s work (1996, 
2001). In their 1996 work, Coombs and Holladay argue that crises themselves can come 
to symbolize the organization and reflect on the values of the organization but that crisis 
responses may be able to shape the ways in which the symbols are both constructed an 
interpreted by critical stakeholders. In their 2001 work, the authors examined crisis 
history as a critical component and part of the symbolic management of organizations, 
finding that this history shapes how stakeholders view both the crisis and the 
organization. Further, in a study of conflict in a symphony orchestra, Glynn (2000) found 
that identity and symbolism was a critical component of conflict and ultimately crisis in 
the organization as the organization was not able to effectively manage multiple 
identities. Taken together, this suggests that symbolism is likely to be invoked in crisis 





Language.  Language is the second form that emphasizes the ways in which 
individuals interact and includes jargon, slang, humor, gossip, metaphors, proverbs, or 
slogans (Trice & Beyer, 1993). They claim that each organization or negotiated culture 
has its own language. We see proverbs and slogans often used in the management of an 
organization’s image or legitimacy. One important example of how language both helps 
to manage and potentially even contribute to organizational crises is Nike. In their 
analysis Knight and Greenberg (2002), argue that Nike has successfully created their 
identity using slogans and other types of promotional communication, “that enables the 
company to represent itself simultaneously as serious and ‘cool,’ socially conscious and 
fashionable, earnest and ironic, and image conscious and technologically sophisticated” 
(p. 545). However, this same incorporation of elements of language have also fueled 
pressure groups’ arguments that they abuse their overseas laborers and are not socially 
responsible through the use of counterbranding4 and subpolitics5.  
Narratives. Third, Trice and Beyer (1993) claim that narratives are a cultural form 
because stories or texts convey messages about the organization and organizational life. 
                                                 
4 Knight and Greenberg (2002) argue that when counterbranding occurs it is about communicating an 
interest in the well-being of others and uses a politics of identification. In the case of Nike, “Antisweatshop 
activism involves a desire to empathize with and care about the situation, interests, and aspirations of those 
at a distance while assuming a critical stance toward something that is culturally and geographically more 
proximate, that is, the corporation." (p. 554).  
 
5 Knight and Greenberg (2002) define subpolitics as: “Subpolitics refers to the politicization of situations, 
practices, and processes that comes from below the formal political system (from non-elites) and from 
outside it. It operates at both a more localized and globalized level than official politics and its institutional 
supports (parliamentarism 
and political parties). Subpolitics is the politics of interest groups, social movements, activism, and 
advocacy groups whose interests radiate out beyond the sphere of institutional politics and whose targets 
include power centers other than the State. Subpolitics emanates from and refers to the interstices of social 






Like language, narratives can be used strategically. Strategically told stories relate the 
organization to the stakeholders in an attempt to legitimate an organization’s position and 
enhance its image to pacify dissatisfied groups, garner support, or lessen opposition or 
conflict (Phillips & Brown, 1993). In crisis response strategies, narratives are closely 
linked with the organization’s efforts to build accounts of the situation. In Kauffman’s 
(2001) analysis of the crisis communication response of NASA to the April, 1970 
explosion aboard the Apollo 13, he demonstrates how the invocation of a cultural 
narrative can be a critical component of CCMs. The narrative used invoked a frontier 
theme that had previously been successful in characterizing NASA’s space program and 
framed the event, not as a failure but a success. The narrative had four elements: (a) it 
portrayed the astronauts as rugged, independent pioneers; (b) travel in space for these 
pioneers was rugged in a hostile environment; (c) they had to overcome a malevolent 
antagonist in order to succeed; and (d) that there was a specific geographic location 
capable of being conquered by these pioneers. This particular example demonstrates how 
a narrative is certainly a symbolic creation, and can include multiple strategies—in this 
case account and preconditioning.  
Practices. The final form Trice and Beyer (1993) outline are practices, defined as 
rituals, routines, taboos, rites, or ceremonies, but emphasize that “Behaviors become 
cultural forms when their efficacy is taken for granted and their appropriateness is rarely 
questioned.” (p. 107). Jablin and Sias (2001) emphasize the importance of routines in 
their description of them as organizational-level knowledge that are able to create and re-





organizations. Because organizational crises often involve an organization’s practices and 
can result in the organization’s culture changing to address the crisis issues (Ross & 
Benson, 1995), communication about practices is likely to be an important feature of 
crisis response strategies.  
Though organizational culture has infrequently been considered as a specific 
element of crisis communication (see Marra, 1998; Ross & Benson, 1995 as exceptions 
to the rule) this discussion demonstrates that it is a critical component of crisis 
communication messages.  
Audience  
 The audience is an important component to understanding crisis message 
outcomes and is linked to crisis messages because the message’s success relies on an 
appropriate message being delivered to and received by intended audiences (Argenti, 
2002; Hayes & Patton, 2001). As such it is an important element of the message 
component in the Strategic Model of Crisis Communication. Traditionally, the ‘audience’ 
is more precisely defined as groups of stakeholders. Stakeholders are those groups and/ or 
individuals who can affect or be affected by a focal organization (Freeman, 1994). These 
groups form because of an awareness that the focal organization’s activities are relevant 
to and perhaps changeable by the group (Connolly, Conlon, & Deutsch, 1980). In 
identifying stakeholder groups, much of the work in stakeholder theory (i.e., Connolly et 
al., 1980; Frooman, 1999; Henriques & Sadorsky, 1999; Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997; 
Rowley, 1997) incorporate the dimensions of interorganizational relationships such as: 





group (Atkins & Lowe, 1994); (b) a history of interaction with stakeholders that affords 
organizations the ability to build structures and rituals of interaction (Harris, 1994; 
Jennings, Artz, Gillin, & Christodouloy, 2000; Scott & Lane, 2000; Trice & Beyer, 
1993); (c) a stakeholder group’s legitimacy—or the recognizeability, reputation, or 
expertise (Haley, 1996; Suchman, 1995); (d) the power that a stakeholder has to influence 
the organization (Heath, 1994; Mitchell et al., 1997); and (e) the urgency or extent to 
which a stakeholder’s interest or influence is time sensitive and critical to the 
organization (Connolly et al., 1980; Mitchell et al., 1997; Scott & Lane, 2000).  
 Based on the combination of the elements discussed (i.e., relational valence, 
history, legitimacy, power, and urgency), four stakeholder groups emerge: strategic 
stakeholders; moral stakeholders; desirable stakeholders; and dangerous stakeholders. 
These four groups are defined based on a focal organization’s perspective. Thus, in a web 
of relationships, identification and placement of stakeholder groups is dependent on the 
organization’s perspective and the negotiation of that perspective over time.  
 Strategic stakeholders. Strategic stakeholders are groups denoted in that they have 
a relational history, are powerful, the relational quality can be either adversarial or 
cooperative, and are considered legitimate. Strategic stakeholders demand an 
organization’s attention because they can directly affect the organization (Frooman, 
1999) and the relationship is likely to be highly interdependent (Clarkson, 1995; Scott & 
Lane, 2000). An example of a strategic stakeholder relationship is found in a joint 
venture, where two or more organizations pool their resources to create a separately 





Harrison, 2000). Such a joint venture was created with SEMATECH in the computer 
semi-conductor industry (Browning, Beyer, & Shetler, 1995). However, these 
relationships are not limited to joint ventures, the U.S. wine industry’s collaboration to 
improve their market share is also an example of a strategic set of stakeholders (Brown & 
Butler, 1995).   
 Moral stakeholders. Moral stakeholders are denoted in that they are unlikely to 
have a distinctive relationship history, are not powerful, can have either an adversarial or 
cooperative relational quality, but an organization does not view their claims as 
legitimate. Thus, these stakeholders are not explicitly recognized and obligations to them 
might only be of an ethical or moral nature—something broadly defined under the 
auspices of ‘public interest’ (Bendheim, Waddock, & Graves, 1998; Maitland, 1994; 
Nicholson & Robertson, 1996; Scott & Lane, 2000). Moral stakeholders relationships and 
their implications are typically less obvious and not clearly defined (Massey, 2001). 
Finally, moral stakeholders are likely to be those influenced by or affected by an 
organization’s actions, but lack decisive influence on that organization (Clarkson, 1995). 
 Desirable stakeholders. Desirable stakeholders refers to those with legitimate 
claims, but do not necessarily have a relational history with an organization, lack power, 
and are perceived as having a positive relational valence. Thus in a “perfect” world, an 
organization would like to facilitate these stakeholders’ claims, so reactions to them are 
either by choice or ability (i.e., extra resources) (Henriques & Sadorsky, 1999). The 
relationship itself between an organization and its desirable stakeholders may be largely 





legitimacy with its other stakeholders (Heath, 1994; Massey, 2001). However this is not a 
trivial relationship, as desirable stakeholders often include social and political 
stakeholders facilitating the maintenance of public affairs facilitating both the 
organization’s legitimacy and survival (Meznar & Nigh, 1993). 
 Dangerous stakeholders. Dangerous stakeholders may have a relational history, 
are powerful, are not considered legitimate, and are only considered adversarial. This 
category represents those stakeholders that an organization “fears” and either seeks to 
avoid contact with or manage the damage they could do. Thus, the emphasis in the power 
relationship is likely to be on these stakeholders’ coercive influence. Further, the barrier 
for an organization to be able to seek a strategic alliance with these stakeholders might lie 
in fundamental ideological incompatibility (Meyerson, 1994). Additionally, the 
organization’s perception that these stakeholders can exercise influence is critical, so that 
threats of withholding resources or even attaching strings to resources are likely to be 
taken as credible, but are also predictive of the dangerous stakeholder relationship 
(Frooman, 1999). Milliman et al.’s (1994) finding that the relationships between some 
environmental groups and businesses were only adversarial and cooperation was unlikely 
demonstrates the propensity for such stakeholder relationships to exist. Essentially, 
dangerous stakeholders would be considered the “enemy.” 
Channels of Crisis Communication 
One of the central assumptions that crisis communication research makes is that 
organizations essentially have to communicate to relevant stakeholder groups when they 





be a critical component of the message design. In fact, one of the arguments I make in 
Chapter 1 is that organizational crises are inherently communicative phenomena (King, 
2002). A part of the reason that organizations communicate with their stakeholders is that 
they are more effectively able to avoid rumors and the dissemination of misinformation if 
they are providing a source of information about the crisis and the organization (Snellen, 
2003).  
 There are eleven different channels identified in the crisis communication 
literature and six of those are public channels and five are private channels of 
organizational crisis communication (see Table 4). The study of crisis communication has 
traditionally focused on those messages delivered to public audiences; therefore, to 
appropriately apply that literature and develop and apply the message strategies, 
communication of IORs, and inclusion of organizational culture in CCMs to each of the 
factors—including channels—this study will also focus on the six public channels of 
crisis communication. They include: the mass media, advertising, Internet, editorial 
boards, organizational activism, and third party channels. Argenti (2002) emphasizes that 
the selection of the appropriate channel for crisis response strategies is important to 
ensure that information and messages have the opportunity to be received by appropriate 
audiences and are received in intended ways. 
 The mass media and Internet are the two channels that have received the most 
attention in academic scholarship on crisis communication. After 9/11 studies of the 
Internet as a channel of crisis communication erupted in the literature. While technology 





(2004) argues that its emergence makes us more carefully examine how information is 
crafted and used in engaging our changing environments: 
Technology is fusing information with action—a convergence filled with 
implications for executives and officials confronted by an unexpected disaster or 
charged with identifying and planning for potential crises. The costs of failing to 
understand will be far more dramatic than in the past. (p. 29)  
More specifically Moore (2004) argues that the Internet and mediated forms of crisis 
communication represent a collaborative platform to manage both crises and their 
surrounding issues. Analysts argue that the Internet and other mediated forms of crisis 
communication are effective channels during crises because: (a) they are widely 
available; (b) they are easily updated, enabling timely responses; (c) the content is 
flexible so that the organization can communicate compassion to victims while helping 
the organization to communicate to the public as well as the media; and (d) they are 
inexpensive to maintain (Greer & Moreland, 2003). Snellen (2003) points out these are 
desirable types of features because stakeholder groups who are interested in the issue and 
the crisis are likely to be seeking information. If an organization in crisis fails to make 
information available, stakeholders will look elsewhere—enabling rumors and 
misinformation to be more readily spread.  
Ultimately, this use of the Internet as a channel of crisis communication cuts 
across both organization and crisis type, as a majority of organizations have turned to the 
Internet to communicate with stakeholders during a crisis (Perry et al., 2003). According 





Internet; 79 percent of new technology organizations, 71 percent of consumer product 
organizations, and 57 percent of government-related organizations integrated the Internet 
into their crisis communications.  
However, the same study also found that while the use of the Internet is 
increasing as a channel for crisis messages, organizations continued to prefer traditional 
methods of crisis communication. Part of this reason is because during disasters or very 
large organizational crises, organizations use the mass media to communicate with their 
stakeholders, suggesting that the media can be a target audience as well as a channel of 
communication that can enhance the credibility of an organization’s crisis response 
strategy (Argenti, 2002; Benoit and Czerwinski, 1997; Henderson 2003). With 
relationship to 9/11, Argenti (2002) demonstrates this point: 
Normally, of course, the news media and corporate America have what may be 
best described as an adversarial relationship—one that communications officers 
are asked to ‘manage.’ However, as the events of 9/11 unfolded, many of them 
realized that they needed to start thinking of the media as allies—in part because 
their failed communications systems left them no other choice. (p. 105)  
These findings suggest that there is a strong link between channel of communication and 
the intended audiences for the communication. 
 Taken together, crisis response strategy, organizational culture, and audience 
constitute the second component of the Strategic Model of Crisis Communication. The 





model is that each component of the model is built on the one before. Therefore, the 
situational factors of the model necessarily influence the message features of the model.  
SMOCCs Outcomes Identification 
 The final component of the Strategic Model of Crisis Communication identifies 
the critical outcomes from the communicative elements to managing an organizational 
crisis. Like the message features before it, the outcomes are likely to be influenced by 
both the situational factors and the message features of the crisis. Specifically, authors 
like Ulmer (2001), emphasize the role of communication in organizational crises—
regardless of whether the outcomes are ultimately positive or negative for the 
organization. The outcomes of organizational crises and their management can range 
from issues associated with basic organizational survival (Stacks, 2004) to organizational 
learning where changes in routines and practices are made because of the crises (Roux-
Dufort, 2000); however, most assessments of crisis outcomes can be grouped into four 
categories: economic; image or legitimacy; organizational scrutiny; and 
interorganizational relationships.  
Economic Outcomes  
 Despite whether the crisis was a result of acts of terrorism or illegal corporate 
activities, organizational crises can dramatically affect an organization’s economic 
outlook. In their analysis of renewal strategies by companies after 9/11, Ulmer and 
Sellnow (2002) pointed out that as a result of the terrorist attacks that tens of thousands of 
employees were laid off in the airline industry, in travel agencies, hotels, catering 





tourism industry, Gonzales-Herrero and Pratt’s (1998) critical outcome emphasized the 
relationship between the viability of tourism in a region following crises and consumer 
perceptions of risk. When those risks are too great, such as in the case after 9/11, all 
industries linked with the crisis are likely to be financially affected. These financial 
effects can also have significant long-term consequences, particularly in the case of 
illegal corporate behavior. For example, in a study of the long-term negative financial 
impacts of illegal corporate behavior in the accounting industry, Baucus and Baucus 
(1997) found that firms experiencing such crises had diminished returns over five years 
and slower sales growths at the three and five year markers after convictions.  
Any sector may be financially affected by crises and the effectiveness of their 
management; Hayes and Patton (2001) found that when crises in the nonprofit sector 
were not managed effectively, the public financial support of those institutions was 
critically threatened. Economic outcomes associated with crises can include: stock 
market reactions to the crisis (Arpan, 2002; Baucus & Baucus, 1997); losses in sales and 
production (Arpan, 2002; Baucus & Baucus, 1997; Gonzales-Herrero & Pratt, 1998; 
Hayes & Patton, 2001; Ulmer & Sellnow, 2002); fines or punitive damages being 
assessed against the organization (Baucus & Baucus, 1997); protracted legal costs from 
litigation and appeal processes (Baucus & Baucus, 1997); and less money devoted to and 






Image/ Legitimacy Outcomes 
 Almost by their very nature, organizational crises are likely to affect the 
perceptions of an organization’s image, viability, credibility, and/or legitimacy in the 
eyes of different stakeholder groups (Pearson & Clair, 2001). Certainly, damage to an 
organization’s image is one potential outcome of an organizational crisis (Gonzales-
Herrero & Pratt, 1996; Heath & Millar, 2004; Marra, 1998); however, one of the essential 
goals of crisis response strategies is to either minimize or re-build that damage (Elsbach 
& Elofson, 2000; Sellnow & Ulmer, 1995; Ulmer & Sellnow, 2002). In investigations of 
communicative strategies such as renewal strategies (Ulmer & Sellnow, 2002), the use of 
labeling and packaging to affect trustworthiness (Elsbach & Elofson, 2000), emphasizing 
an organization’s crisis history (Coombs, 2004), and using strategic ambiguity (Sellnow 
& Ulmer, 1995) the research found that specific communication strategies could affect 
the image and legitimacy outcomes of a crisis. Further, Gonzales-Herrero and Pratt 
(1996) make the point that corporate response to crises is, in effect, a test of corporate 
social responsibility and social responsiveness among critical stakeholder groups.  
Outcomes Increasing Organizational Scrutiny 
 Because one of the virtually inescapable truths of organizational crises is that 
public attention will be brought to the case because of media coverage of crises (Moore, 
2004), another important outcome of organizational crises is increased scrutiny on the 
organization by multiple types of groups. For example, Enron’s accounting scandal 
brought greater scrutiny and regulation over accounting practices in all organizations 





consistent with findings that crises can increase government scrutiny of both the industry 
and the organization facing the crisis (Arpan, 2002; Heath, 1998). Increased scrutiny is 
not, however, limited to government agencies; in fact, the media itself and other pressure 
groups (e.g., activist organizations, stakeholder groups affected by the crisis, etc.) can 
also become active in seeking information, regulation, participation with, and even taking 
action against organizations facing crises. The outcome of scrutiny is often associated 
with the effectiveness of the communicative management of those groups and the media. 
While scrutiny itself many not connote the most risky outcome category for organizations 
in crisis, failure to effectively manage such scrutiny can be disastrous for organizations as 
Heath (1998) succinctly argues: “Poor media management can destroy an organization.” 
(p. 216). Yet, successful management of such scrutiny can improve perceptions of 
competency-based trustworthiness in organizations (Elsbach & Elofson, 2000).  
Interorganizational Relationship Outcomes 
 Trice and Beyer (1993) argue that organizations seek interorganizational 
connections to stabilize their experiences in their environment. Sutcliffe (2001) points out 
that the organizational environment is a social construction, arguing that what surrounds 
an organization is constructed through organizations—and their members—undergoing a 
process of noticing, interpreting, and actively engaging what affects it/them. This desire 
to stabilize their environment is particularly true in two circumstances—uncertain 
environments and with new or unproven organizations—as the social structure of 
interorganizational relationships is a consideration when organizations are evaluated by 





organizational crises, the environment for an organization can be defined as an unstable 
one. Accordingly, the final outcome focuses on the crisis’s effects on the relationships 
that an organization holds with other organizations and groups. Ulmer (2001) argues that 
not only can IORs be effectively employed in crisis response strategies when managing 
crises, but if an organization’s IORs were effectively cultivated before and during the 
crisis, those relationships can be strengthened over the course of a crisis. Yet, because 
crises can substantially damage an organization’s image, crises also represent a threat to 
IORs (Heath & Millar, 2004; Marra, 1998). For example, an organization may choose to 
distance itself as much from another to avoid negative repercussions to its image or to 
avoid the scrutiny of its practices (Mohammed, et al., 1999).                     
An Initial Investigation of the SMOCC 
 The Situational Model of Crisis Communication represents a more holistic 
heuristic for approaching the study of crisis communication than found in previous 
models and theories. It examines a linear set of relationships between the three 
components of the model: situational features of a crisis, message features of a crisis, and 
outcomes of a crisis. The model can be described as linear because its central assumption 
is that each component builds on the one before. Therefore, a fruitful place to begin to 
test and assess the model would be by testing relationships between critical situational 
and message features in crisis communication. A study, like that proposed here, would 
address a central weakness in our knowledge of crisis communication—a failure to 
develop theory-based connections between situational factors and crisis communication 





 This suggests that a first study applying and continuing to develop the model 
should focus on the relationships between the two explicitly communicative components 
of message features, specifically crisis response strategies and the invocation of 
organizational culture with situational factors like organizational type, crisis phase, crisis 
type, and channels of crisis communication. These situational features can be separated in 
two ways. First are those situational factors directly related to specific organizational 
crises—crisis type, crisis phase, and channel of crisis communication. The second 
category are those situational factors that effectively characterize the organization—
organizational type.  
 In the initial examination of the SMOCC, the two most important situational 
factors are organization type and crisis type (see Figure 2 for components of the model to 
be tested in the present study). Organization type is a situational factor characterizing the 
organization as being from a crisis prone industry or not; therefore, focuses on 
characterizing the organization in a way that is directly relevant to organizational crises 
and explores new information about relationships between CRS and situational variables. 
Given that the type of an organization or its industry has been identified as an important 
component affecting an organization’s reactions to crises (e.g., Arpan, 2002; Millar, 
2004) and that it has not been formally included as a predictive variable of crisis response 
strategies, the type of organization is an essential variable to include in an initial 
evaluation of the SMOCC. Including organization type also meets Feldman’s (2004) 
criteria for work that makes a theoretical contribution discussed in Chapter 1. 





represents a new level of understanding of crisis response strategies, going beyond 
previous research on the influence of organization on crisis communication, and can help 
both practitioners and researchers better understand the components of a situation that 
influence the selection of crisis response strategies.  
Crisis type is the second critical situational variable to include in the proposed 
study because it is directly applicable to organizational crises and explores new 
information about relationships between crisis response messages and situational 
variables. Moreover, while often identified as a critical determinant of crisis 
communication (see Coombs & Holladay, 2004; Hearit & Courthright, 2003; Seeger, 
2002), as Coombs and Holladay (1996; 2004) point out, the relationships between our 
knowledge of crisis types and crisis communication have yet to be fully explicated. As 
such, the importance of crisis type has firmly been established, but the proposed research 
also meet’s Feldman’s (2004) criteria for work that makes a strong theoretical 
contribution because it is explicating a set of relationships that have been established as 
an important set of relationships in the study of crisis communication, but that have not 
presently been explicated. As such, the findings and the inclusion of crisis type goes 
beyond a synthesis of previous research, but focuses on testing beyond predecessors’ 
results.  
Organization Type 
 The previous research addressing organization type and crisis communication has 
four central findings. First, niches and sectors are likely to influence organizational 





work an organization performs, its routines, and multiple dimensions of that 
organization’s identity can often place restraints on an organization’s responses to crises 
(Ginzel, et al., 1993; Glynn, 2000). Third, industries are meaningful ways to group 
organizations because organizations within the same industry are similar in terms of 
function and overall needs (Glynn, 2000). Finally, an organization communicating about 
its crisis history (i.e., whether they have a history of crises and their severity) can 
minimize the potential damage of a crisis on that organization (Coombs, 2004). Taken 
together, this literature suggests that the type of organization facing a crisis is very likely 
to affect the type of crisis response employed by the organization. This literature also 
suggests that emphasizing the degree to which an organization is in an industry that is 
crisis prone or not is a meaningful distinction in understanding the relationship between 
organization type and crisis response strategies. However, the previous research does not 
clearly suggest specific ways in which organization type may affect crisis response 
strategies invoked by organizations during crises; therefore, I propose the following 
hypothesis and research question: 
 Hypothesis 1: There will be differences in the crisis response strategy categories 
employed by organizations, depending on the type of organization.  
Hypothesis 1A: There will be differences in the crisis response categories 
employed by organizations experiencing crises in crisis prone industries when 
compared to those experiencing crises in industries that are less crisis prone. 
Hypothesis 1B: There will be differences in the crisis response categories 





 Research Question 1: Are there differences in the invocation of the forms of 
organizational culture by organizations depending on organization type? 
Research Question 1A: Are there differences in the invocation of the forms of 
organizational culture by organizations experiencing crises in crisis prone 
industries when compared to those industries experiencing crises that are less 
crisis prone? 
Research Question 1B: Are there differences in the invocation of the forms of 
organizational culture by organizations in different industries? 
Crisis Type 
 The previous research addressing crisis type and organizational communication 
has three central findings. First, crises range in magnitude from small internal issues with 
few potential effects to those whose magnitude can affect the environment, millions of 
lives, and an organization’s survival (e.g., Hearit, 1999; Pearson & Mitroff). Second, the 
context for a crisis is a vital determinant of an organization’s response to the crisis 
(Coombs & Holladay, 2002). Third, crisis types include: organizational transgressions 
(i.e., blame can be attributed to the organization regardless of the organization’s intent); 
organizational events (incidents either in or outside of the organization’s locus of control, 
but that emerge as crises for the organization); and external events leading to crises (such 
crises are entirely outside of an organization’s control, but still represent a crisis for the 
organization).  






The crisis manager should select a crisis response strategy that is appropriate for 
the amount of potential reputational damage a crisis may inflict. The stronger the 
potential reputational damage, the more the crisis response strategy must try to 
accommodate the victim or victims, that is, those adversely affected by the crisis. 
Publics will expect an organization to do more for victims when the organization 
is held more accountable for the crisis (p. 168).  
This would suggest that those crises, where the onus of responsibility is more clearly 
borne on the organization—such as with organizational transgressions—that 
organizations should select message strategies emphasizing the organization’s image and 
accommodation of those affected by the crisis. As Coombs and Holladay (1996) point out 
with transgressions, “The only viable option is to improve the perceptions of the 
organization…An organization must show it is returning to adherence of stakeholder 
expectations” (p. 285). Further in their 1996 analysis, Coombs and Holladay also argue 
that in crises where the onus of responsibility is outside of the organization’s control and 
where accidents occur that are unintentional that crisis communicators should emphasize 
issues focusing on the type of crisis, the organization’s inability to prevent the crisis, or 
even portray itself as a victim of the crisis. Finally, the authors argue that in events where 
the onus of responsibility is ambiguous—such as with many organizational events or 
even challenges to the organization—that organizations should frame the crisis and its 






 Hypothesis 2: Organizations facing organizational transgression crises will 
emphasize message strategies focusing on self-enhancement, framing the organization, 
accommodative, and/ or excellence/ renewal crisis response strategies. 
 Hypothesis 3: Organizations facing organizational event crises will emphasize 
message strategies that focus on framing the crisis, framing the organization, and/or anti-
social/defensive strategies.  
 Hypothesis 4: Organizations facing crises where the events or actions are outside 
of the organization’s locus of control will emphasize crisis response strategies focusing 
on framing the crisis, framing the organization, and/or anti-social/defensive strategies. 
 While the previous research does offer some clear expectations regarding the 
relationship of some crisis response strategies, it does not—as Coombs and Holladay 
(2002) recommend—provide a total integration of crisis type and crisis response 
strategies. In addition, it fails to consider the ways in which the type of crisis may relate 
to the invocation of organizational culture. Therefore I propose the following research 
questions:  
 Research Question 2: What combinations of crisis response strategies are 
associated with organizations facing each type of crisis? 
 Research Question 3: To what extent does crisis type influence the forms of 
organizational culture invoked by organizations during periods of crisis?  
Research Question 3A: To what extent do organizational transgressions influence 





Research Question 3B: To what extent to organizational events influence the 
forms of organizational culture invoked during periods of crisis? 
Research Question 3C: To what extent do events outside the organization’s locus 
of control influence the forms of organizational culture invoked by organizations 
during periods of crisis? 
 Additionally, in order to fully explore the relationships between organization type, 
crisis type, and crisis response strategies, I pose the following research question: 
 Research Question 4: To what degree will organization type and crisis type be 
associated with different crisis response strategies invoked by organizations during 
periods of crisis? 
Research Question 4A: To what degree will organizations in crisis prone 
industries facing organizational transgressions, organizational events, and 
external events invoke different crisis response strategies during periods of crisis? 
Research Question 4B: To what degree will organizations in non-crisis prone 
industries facing organizational transgressions, organizational events, and 
external events invoke different crisis response strategies during periods of crisis? 
Research Question 5: To what degree will organization type and crisis type be 
associated with the invocation of the forms of organizational culture by organizations 
during periods of crisis? 
Research Question 5A: To what degree will organizations in crisis prone 





external events invoke different forms of organizational culture during periods of 
crisis? 
Research Question 5B: To what degree will organizations in non-crisis prone 
industries facing organizational transgressions, organizational events, and 
external events invoke different forms of organizational culture during periods of 
crisis? 
Crisis Response Strategies 
 The research on crisis response strategies has produced strong findings regarding 
combinations of strategies. In their analysis of US Air’s image restoration strategies, 
Benoit and Czerwinski (1997) found that US Air used three different strategies in their 
efforts to manage communication after the 1994 crash near Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: 
bolstering, denial, and corrective action. The authors concluded that while organizations 
may use multiple message strategies that, “…image repair strategies may not work well 
together…” (p. 54). This would seemingly suggest that an organization would want to 
avoid using strategies that seemed fundamentally incompatible—in the case of US Air 
using denial with corrective action.  
It might very well be that organizations are likely to use complementary message 
strategies when forming their crisis response strategies. For example, in a study of the 
California cattle industry, Elsbach (1994) found that accounts were often linked to either 
information dissemination6 or denial. Additional inquiries by Elsbach (1994) found that: 
(1) information dissemination was more effective than denial; (2) references to the 
                                                 
6 She used the term acknowledgement; however, the conceptualization of information dissemination 





institutional characteristics (i.e., preconditioning) were more effective than references to 
technical characteristics; and (3) the combination of accounts, information dissemination, 
and references to institutional characteristics were more effective than messages with 
only one of these components. Elsbach’s (1994) research makes two important points. 
First, combinations of message strategies are likely to benefit an organization’s overall 
crisis response strategy. Second, this research also demonstrates that complementary 
crisis response strategies are likely to be most prominent combinations of strategies. 
Because the taxonomy of crisis response strategies (see Table 1) represents a new 
conceptualization of crisis response strategy categories, an update on previous 
taxonomies, and that previous research has never compared all of the strategy categories 
at once, I propose the following research question: 
 Research Question 6: To what extent are crisis response strategies combined in 
crisis response messages? 
The findings from previous research discussed here suggest that not all crisis 
response strategies are likely to work well together. Further, organizations have most 
effectively used complementary crisis response strategies together. Therefore I propose 
that as organizations develop crisis response strategies they are more likely to use an 
overall tactic that is internally consistent with multiple crisis response strategies. 
Therefore I propose the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 5: Organizations will use multiple crisis response strategies more 






 While organizational culture has long been considered important to crisis 
communication; it has infrequently been considered as a specific factor in such studies 
(see Marra, 1998; Ross & Benson, 1995 as exceptions). There are several studies, 
however, that establish the inclusion of organizational culture as a critical component of 
crisis communication. For example, Glynn (2000) identified the communication of 
symbols to be a central component of conflict and crisis management in a symphony. 
Further, language and the use of slogans or proverbs has been a mainstay of Nike’s crisis 
communication messages (Knight & Greenberg, 2002). NASA has endeavored to use 
narratives as a way to characterize itself and a crisis in the wake of the 1970 explosion 
aboard Apollo 13 (Kauffman, 2001). Finally, in a study of a massive crisis with the 
Sunstrand Corporation, Ross and Benson (1995) found that communication about 
practices was used to help the organization manage its image in light of the crisis. Taken 
together, these examples of the broad invocation of organizational culture demonstrate 
that crisis response messages are likely to incorporate different forms of organizational 
culture. Therefore I propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 6: The forms of organizational culture will be a significant component 
of crisis response messages invoked by organizations during periods of crisis.  
However, because there have been few studies specifically considering the forms 
of organizational culture as a feature of crisis response messages, there is little knowledge 





crises and the relationship between crisis response strategies and the invocation of culture. 
Therefore, I propose the following research questions: 
Research Question 7: To what extent are the different forms of organizational 
culture invoked (i.e., symbols, language, narratives, and practices) combined in crisis 
response messages? 
Research Question 8: In what ways are the forms of organizational culture 





















 Krippendorf (1980) argues that, “content analysis is a research technique for 
making replicable and valid inferences from data to their context.” (p. 21). Because the 
central purpose of the proposed study investigates the relationships of crisis response 
strategies to aspects of the crisis situation, a content analysis (CA) of crisis messages will 
be the most effective method to answer the eight research questions and six hypotheses 
proposed in the previous chapter.  
The function of content analysis is to identify, enumerate, and analyze 
occurrences of specific messages and message characteristics embedded within texts 
(Frey, Botan, & Kreps, 2000). Babbie (2001) argues there are two types of content in CA: 
latent content—examining the underlying meanings of a text; or manifest content—
examining the visible or surface content in a text. This suggests that CA may be either 
qualitative or quantitative in nature. Frey et al. (2000) argue that qualitative CA is 
employed when researchers are more interested in the meanings associated with 
messages (i.e., latent content) than the trends in message variables (i.e., manifest content). 
As such, they define quantitative CA as: 
Systematic and replicable examination of symbols of communication, which have 
been assigned numeric values according to valid measurement rules, and the 
analysis of relationships involving those values using statistical methods, in order 
to describe the communication, draw inferences about its meaning or infer from 






Because the proposed study is interested in such a systematic and replicable examination 
of crisis response strategies, a quantitative content analysis is the most appropriate to 
address each of the research questions and hypotheses posed. Frey et al. (2000) also note 
that quantitative CA is also a useful method when investigating the effects of important 
variables, such as crisis type and organization type, on the content of messages—
particularly when employing analytical methods like correlation and regression.  
 In the context of organizational crises and crisis response strategies, CA is a 
strong method to employ, particularly when selecting messages presented in public media 
outlets. The media allows public audiences from all corners of the globe rapid access to 
information about organizations, especially during times of crisis; therefore allowing 
organizations the ability to actively participate in the communication of “news” about 
themselves (Molleda, Connolly-Ahern, & Quinn, 2005). The news media is also 
important because the public opinion of organizations can be shaped through the media’s 
coverage of events, in particular when those events involve the combination of corporate 
profit, government interest, and/or public risk (Andsager & Smiley, 1998):  
…public opinion is vital to organizations and organizations that seek to 
understand and shape the pulse of their constituencies. When the actors involved 
have direct access to the news media, they have the option to communicate their 
side of the conflit to the media… In communicating information through 
interviews, press conferences, and press releases, public relations practitioners 
can transmit organizational policy. Thus, media agents…are capable of impacting 





In their study of House Majority Leadership, Malecha and Reagan (2004) underscore the 
importance of the media as a vehicle that can be used strategically to promote agendas, 
affect visibility, and significantly frame both issues and the ways they are interpreted by 
the public by: (a) using the media to signal a group’s intentions; (b) using the media to 
help manage relations with important external stakeholders; and (c) using the publicity to 
affect image.  
 Consequently, analyzing news stories about organizational crises that include 
crisis responses from the organization is a valuable and strategically grounded method for 
analyzing the proposed research questions and hypotheses. Precedent for such an analysis 
is grounded methodologically in CA, but also in practice. For example, two recent studies 
use content analysis to relate crisis messages in the media to variables of interest. 
Molleda et al. (2005) examined cross-national conflict shifting using content analysis in a 
case involving a bribery scandal that occurred in the southern African nation of Lesotho. 
Additionally, Andsager and Smiley (1998) examined policy actor framing of the 1991-
1992 silicone breast implant controversy by corporate, medical, and citizen activist 
groups. Therefore, the proposed study involves a 2 (crisis prone) and 17 (industry) (both 
of previous are organizational type) x 3 (crisis type) x 8 (crisis response strategy) x 4 
(organizational culture) content analysis design. The central purpose of the proposed 
study is to explore the relationships between these situational features of organizational 
crises and crisis response strategies. This chapter will: (a) discuss the population and 
sampling procedures proposed; (b) outline the coding schema; and (c) briefly preview the 





Population and Sampling Procedures 
 Frey et al. (2000) point out that the first step in conducting a content analysis is to 
effectively identify and specify the population to which the researcher wants to generalize. 
The authors also point out that one of the challenges in identifying populations and a 
sample with content analysis is the sample frame must be effectively constructed. This 
section will first discuss the procedures used to derive the population and then the 
sampling methods used.  
Deriving the Population 
 This study used the search engine Lexis/Nexis™7 to identify the population 
because effective precedent and procedure for its use has been established in studies 
analyzing crisis communication in news stories. In a 2003 study of the ways in which 
organizations integrate the Internet into their crisis response messages, Perry et al. 
identified their study population by surveying the two most widely used news websites—
CNN.com and MSNBC.com—to identify crises meeting three criteria. First, to be 
included in the study, the crisis had to be significant enough to disrupt the organization. 
Second, the crisis had to attract extensive news media coverage. Finally, the crisis had to 
be a situation where public concern necessitated a ‘need to know’ circumstance for the 
organization’s communication. Further, in their analysis of the silicone breast implant 
controversy, Andsager and Smiley (1998) included six major regional or national 
newspapers in their sample and did an exhaustive key word search for “silicone breast 
                                                 
7 Lexis/Nexis™ is a collection of news stories, Congressional Testimony, business publications, and 
scientific/medical shorts that is updated daily with local, national, and international publications. It is a 





implants” for a three-month period to obtain all news stories possible. Finally, in their 
study of cross-national conflict shifting, Molleda et al. (2005) used the Lexis/Nexis™ 
database to identify news stories about the bribery scandal in Lesotho. In their discussion, 
the authors point out that Lexis/Nexis™ is a database emphasizing prestigious, traditional 
daily, and English-language media that give greater weight to traditional voices such as 
the government and corporations in the reporting of the news.  
 Taken together, these studies (i.e., (Andsager & Smiley, 1998; Molleda et al., 
2005; Perry et al., 2003) help to establish a rigorous procedure for identifying the 
population to which a content analysis of crisis communication may generalize. There are 
five components of this procedure. First, media sources are an effective outlet to derive a 
population of organizational crisis significant enough to disrupt the organization. Second, 
it is important to identify a priori criteria, specific to organizational crises to determine 
their inclusion in the population. Third, specific time frames should be used in identifying 
the sample’s population. Fourth, exhaustive searches including relevant key word 
searches are effective in maximizing cases to be included in the population. Finally, the 
selection of effective and appropriate databases for searching is critical to identifying an 
appropriate study population from which the sample may be drawn.  
 Applying this procedure for forming criteria, the proposed study identified its 
study population based on the following six criteria. First, the search for organizational 
crises was limited to six months—between the October 1, 2004 and March 31, 2005. 





the study is to apply the SMOCC analyzing crisis response strategies and crisis situations 
relevant to organizations today.  
Second, within the time frame, an exhaustive search for organizational crises was 
performed in the Lexis/Nexis™ business and industry index. Lexis/Nexis™ is considered 
to be one of the most comprehensive indexes of current news articles that focus on stories 
from prestigious, daily, and English-language media that gives weight to industry voices 
(Molleda et al., 2005); therefore, it is an appropriate search engine for a study of response 
strategies by organizations in crisis. An initial search on the term “organizational crisis” 
was used and yielded an unusable search result8. Alternatively a more specific key term 
search was performed using key terms identified in previous crisis communication 
literature and reflected by Table 3. Key terms included: illegal corporate behavior, price 
fixing, antitrust violations, discrimination, patent infringement, securities fraud, technical 
breakdowns, accidents, crashes, product recall, mega damage, human error, 
organizational misdeeds, injury, mergers, failed mergers, strikes, work stoppage, 
employee lockout, labor negotiations, downsizing, layoffs, economic downturns, 
bankruptcy, buyouts, hostile takeovers, acquisitions, workplace violence, shootings, 
stabbings, sexual harassment, rumors, false information, product tampering, malevolence, 
challenges, pressure groups, activism, boycotts, shifting political attitudes, federal 
legislation, political attitudes, natural disasters, hurricane, floods, tornados, tsunami, 
earthquakes, terrorism, terrorist attack, collapse in demand, and infrastructure breakdown.  
                                                 
8 Search results on Lexis/Nexis™ yielding over 1000 articles are not listed and the engine requires that the 





Third, the crisis had to be significant enough to be reported in a major regional or 
national publication. The use of Lexis/Nexis™ as the search database helped to ensure 
this criteria was met without undue bias placed on researcher knowledge of major papers.  
Fourth, the crisis had to be significant enough to attract multiple days of coverage. 
This was an effort to make Perry et al.’s (2003) criterion of a crisis that was significant 
enough to disrupt the organization more concrete.  
Fifth, because the focus of the proposed study emphasizes crisis response 
messages, in the initial reporting of the incident, a company had to have a response to the 
crisis. In so doing, this also demonstrates the organization taking an active role in trying 
to communicate about the crisis as several authors (i.e., Andsager & Smiley, 1998; 
Molleda, et al., 2005) suggest.  
Finally, because of the Lexis/Nexis™ bias for English-language media (Molleda 
et al., 2005), the population was limited to crises affecting U.S.-based companies. One of 
the primary findings from Molleda et al.’s (2005) research was that there is a significant 
geographic bias for reporting stories relevant to that area’s population. In order to avoid a 
population bias by analyzing crises from foreign-based companies only reported in 
English-speaking papers, the population for the study remains more consistent and any 
sample drawn from it more generalizable if the strength of the database is also 
emphasized in the population.  
Applying these six criteria, all possible and reasonable effort was taken to identify 





October 1, 2004-March 31, 2005. A total of 1072 distinctive organizational crises were 
identified in this period.  
Deriving the Study Sample 
 Glass and Hopkins (1996) argue that, “Except in surveys, it is almost impossible 
to select a true random sample from the population because of logistic barriers. Never-
the-less, this is the goal and researchers should strive to get as close to the goal as they 
possibly can.” (p. 229). Kerlinger (1992) defines randomization as a “method of drawing 
a portion of a population or universe so that all possible samples of a fixed size n have the 
same probability of being selected.” (p. 110). He points out this can be achieved in one of 
two ways; from random assignment to categories or random selection for inclusion in the 
study.  
 A stratified sampling procedure was employed in this study and the unit of 
analysis is the single news story for a crisis. While drawing a completely random sample 
from the study population would achieve the, statistically, best sample, statis caely, it 
does not ensure this sample population would be representative; therefore, the potential 
for error due to sampling would increase substantially. Because crisis type has previously 
been found to correlate to particular crisis response strategies, in order to improve this 
study’s generalizability and decrease the probability of sampling error, the proposed 
study will employ a stratified random sampling procedure to identify the crises for the 
sample. Babbie (2001) indicates in such a procedure that instead of randomly selecting 
from the population, the sample is organized into subsets—in this case stratified based on 





stratified random samples are appropriate sampling procedures in content analyses. In 
order to stratify the sample a preliminary assessment, based on the search term used, of 
the crisis type was made to ensure an approximate balance among the three crisis types. 
 In maintaining a balance between crisis types and ensuring the criteria for 
selection, discussed above were appropriately employed, from the 1072 distinctive crises 
identified for the period, crises were removed if they had fewer than three news stories 
covering the crisis during the period. Once that adjustment to the population was made, 
crises were selected at random within each category of crisis type (i.e., organizational 
transgressions, organizational events, and events outside the organization’s control) by 
numbering the crises and using a random number generator to select the crises. This 
resulted in a total of 47 viable organizational transgressions, 50 viable organizational 
events, and 36 viable events outside of the organization’s control. For each of the 133 
total crises selected, three news stories were selected; the first story on the crisis 
including a message(s) from the organization, the last story on the crisis including a 
message(s) from the organization, and a story approximately in the middle of the crisis 
including a message(s) from the organization. This resulted in a total sample size of 399 
news stories for the study. While the message selection is purposive in its sampling 
procedure, the study remains based on a probability sample because it uses a random 
sampling procedure in at least one stage of sampling (Kerlinger, 1992).  
Coding Scheme 
 Previous studies of crisis response messages (e.g., Benoit & Czerwinski, 1997; 





that when studying crisis communication, examining the interplay of messages and 
different strategies employed affords researchers more information about an 
organization’s approach to crisis communication. This is informative in terms of selecting 
a unit of analysis for this study. Because the proposed study examines the relationships 
between situation and crisis response strategies, the unit of analysis that makes the most 
sense is a full crisis message—specifically operationalized as a single news story. That is, 
each of the three news stories sampled per crisis, any statements from interviews, press 
releases, or press conferences will be coded as three units of analysis.  
 There were two independent coders—the researcher and one other—each coded a 
total of 60 percent of the sample. Additionally, to ensure the viability of the sample and 
the coding scheme as well as to train the second coder—an undergraduate research 
assistant—ensuring the consistency of the interpretations and coding scheme in 10 
percent of the sample (five percent per coder) the coders collaborated to ensure they were 
consistent in their coding approach and to identify any problems or needs from the 
sample. This preliminary coding found the overall coding scheme and instructions for 
each content category to be viable. Therefore the remainder of the sample was 
independently coded. Following procedures to establish intercoder reliability used by 
Molleda et al. (2005), an additional 10 percent of the sample was randomly selected for 
both of the coders to code. An overall intercoder reliability analysis was conducted 
finding the coding scheme to be reliable (α = .91).  
The coding scheme is based on manifest content, for each variable, 





5. Nine elements of either the situation or crisis response messages were coded producing 
nominal data. First, each of the 133 crises were assigned a number. Second each of the 
messages coded will be assigned a code 1-3. The codes will be assigned based on the date 
of the article (i.e., the earliest article will be labeled “1”, the middle “2”, and the last “3”).  
Third, each organizational type will be identified as both industry and crisis prone 
versus non-crisis prone. Because organization type was operationalized as “crisis prone 
and non-crisis prone”, coding for industry was also conducted based first on the 2002 
NAICS listing of American Industries (Table 2 will be used for the description of the 
industry) (α =. 98) and then on Millar’s (2004) findings regarding those industries that 
are the most crisis prone (α = .99). There were more units of analysis for crisis prone 
industries (see Table 6, n = 267) including finance and insurance; professional, scientific, 
and technical services; information; transportation and warehousing; manufacturing; and 
mining than non crisis prone industries (n = 132). As Table 7 demonstrates there were 
between 3 and 114 units of analysis for each Industry included in the sample (M = 23.47).  
Fourth, the crisis type (i.e., organizational transgression, events, or events outside 
the organization’s control) was identified. Fifth, for the purposes of sample description, 
the specific crisis (e.g., illegal corporate behavior, workplace violence, or rumor) will 
also be identified (for organizational transgressions α = .93, for organizational events 
α = .95, for events outside the organization’s control α = .94). For each crisis, only one 
type will be identified—the predominant “issue” were judged to be the type of crisis the 
organization is facing (α = .94). Table 8 includes the descriptive statistics for crisis type. 





greatest number being examples of illegal corporate behavior (n = 92), but with examples 
in each of the types of organizational transgressions. There were a total of 149 units of 
analysis for organizational events with the greatest number being examples of mergers/ 
failed mergers (n = 66) and economic downturns requiring organizational action (n = 56), 
but with examples in each of the types of organizational events. There were a total of 108 
units of analysis for events outside the organization’s control with the greatest number 
being rumors (n = 49), challenges (n = 23), and natural disasters (n = 27), but with 
examples in each of the types of events outside the organization’s control.  
Sixth, for each of the eight crisis response strategy categories (self-enhancement 
α = .75, routine communication α = .76, framing the crisis α = .88, framing the 
organization α = .86, anti-social or defensive α = .91, accommodative α = .83, 
excellence/renewal α = .86, or emphasizing interorganizational relationships α = 84) 
identified by Table 1 and discussed in chapter 2, the presence or not presence of the 
strategy in each unit of analysis were be coded (α = .84). Seventh, for the purposes of 
description, the specific crisis response strategies were also be coded (e.g., transcendence, 
apologia, or burnishing). Table 9 includes the descriptive statistics for crisis response 
strategies invoked during crises.  
Eighth, the primary strategy employed for each unit of analysis were evaluated by 
the coders to identify which of the crisis response strategy categories was the focus for 
each unit of analysis (α = .92). See Table 10 for the descriptive statistics of the primary 





primary strategy category were those that frame the crisis (n = 118) and anti-social or 
defensive strategies (n = 139).  
Ninth, for each of the four forms of organizational culture (symbols α = .82, 
language α = .81, narratives α = .74, and practices α = .88) identified by Table 5 and 
discussed in chapter 2, the presence or not presence of the strategy in each unit of 
analysis was coded (α = .81). See Table 11 for the descriptive statistics for the invocation 
of the forms of organizational culture. Cultural invocation of language (e.g., jargon or 
metaphors) was the most common cultural form invoked (n = 163).    
Methods of Data Analysis 
 Because the present study is primarily interested in investigating the relationships 
between important situational variables and crisis response messages, content analysis is 
a strong methodology to employ. Moreover, as Frey et al. (2000) point out, this method 
in combination with analytical methods is likely to be effective in exploring such 
relationships. In this section, the analysis procedures for each research question and 
hypothesis will be highlighted.  
 Because hypothesis one and research question one are exploring the influence of 
organization type on crisis response strategies and invocation of the forms of 
organizational culture chi-square tests were used to identify the CRSs9 and forms most 
common for each type of organization. To best understand the two-way distribution (i.e., 
crisis prone * crisis response strategy or industry * crisis response strategy), a maximum 
                                                 
9 For the tests, self-enhancement strategies were excluded because there were only 5 total observations of 





likelihood chi-square test was used10 because uncertainty does not pertain to sample size, 
but to the classification of organization type (Powers & Yu, 2000).  
 For hypotheses two through four as well as research question three A, B, and C, 
only the cases including the relevant crisis were selected and a maximum likelihood chi-
square test was used to test the two-way distributions (e.g., crisis response strategy * 
organizational transgressions and primary crisis response strategy * organizational 
transgressions). Because research question two and research question three (overall) 
address the differences in the use of crisis response strategies and the invocation of the 
forms of organizational culture, respectively, based on the crisis type, the maximum 
likelihood chi-square test examining two-way distributions included all three crisis types 
and the relevant dependent variable.  
Research questions four and five examine any interactions effects for the 
independent variables organization type and crisis type on the dependent variables crisis 
response category and invocation of cultural forms, respectively. First, a Logit Loglinear 
model was applied to test the relationship between the variables. Logit Analysis was 
appropriate because I was analyzing the relationship between the categorical dependent 
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variable (e.g., crisis response category) and the interaction of the categorical independent 
variables (Powers & Yu, 2000).  
The analysis of the model fit revealed that the interaction for neither Crisis 
Response Strategy * Organization Type (with separate tests for crisis prone and industry) 
* Crisis Type nor for Form of Organizational Culture * Organization Type (with separate 
tests for crisis prone and industry) * Crisis Type would be an acceptable model. Further, 
the chi-square for the main effects was also found to be significant, also indicating the 
model was not a good fit for each element (Powers & Yu, 2000). 
 Because research question six examines the relationships between the categories 
of crisis response strategies, a number of methods were employed to analyze the data. 
First, because the data for the inclusion of each crisis response category is nominal, but 
only based on presence or not, a correlation was performed to identify relationships 
between crisis response strategies employed in crisis communication messages. Second, 
to understand the relationship between the total number of strategies used in a unit of 
analysis and primary strategy employed, the strategies were added together to get a total 
number of strategies employed and a one-way analysis of variance was performed with 
Scheffe post hoc tests to examine specific differences between primary strategies. Third a 
simple chi-square test was performed to analyze the presence of each crisis response 
strategy in crisis response messages. Fourth a simple chi-square test was performed to 
analyze the primary strategies used in crisis response messages. Finally, a maximum 
likelihood chi-square test was performed to compare the employment of each crisis 





 Because hypothesis five examines the use of single versus multiple strategies 
employed in crisis response messages, the data was recoded to indicate single versus 
multiple strategies and a one sample t-test was performed. Similarly, because hypothesis 
six posits that the forms of organizational culture will be a significant component of crisis 
response messages, the data were recoded to examine the invocation of the forms—
generally—and a one sample t-test was performed.  
 Research question seven seeks to identify the relationships between the forms of 
organizational culture invoked in crisis response messages. As was the case in research 
question six, the nominal data only has two categories and a correlation between the 
forms of organizational culture was performed to answer this question. Similarly, because 
research question eight explores the relationships between the forms of organizational 
culture and crisis response strategies, correlations were used to partially answer this 
question. Additionally a maximum likelihood chi-square analysis was used to test the 





















 Overall, these data demonstrate that organization type and crisis type do influence 
both the crisis response strategies employed and the invocation of the forms of culture by 
organizations in crisis (see Figure 3 for a summary of all results).  
Organization Type’s Influence on Crisis Response Strategies and Forms of 
Organizational Culture 
The influence of organization type on crisis response strategies employed. 
Hypothesis one posited there would be differences in the crisis response strategies used 
by organizations depending on the type of organization. Hypothesis 1A posited that there 
would be differences in the crisis response strategies used by organizations experiencing 
crises in crisis prone industries when compared to those experiencing crises in industries 
that are less crisis prone. Hypothesis 1A was partially supported. There were only 
differences in the use of routine communication χ2 (1, N = 399) = 4.91, p = .03 and 
excellence χ2 (1, N = 399) = 4.24, p = .04 strategies. See Table 12 for the significant 
results for hypothesis 1A. In non crisis prone industries the results demonstrate, 
simultaneously, a greater than expected number of cases where routine communication 
was not present and a less than expected number of cases where it was present. However, 
in crisis prone industries routine communication was more likely to be employed than 
expected. Additionally, in non-crisis prone industries, excellence strategies were less 
likely to be used than expected and in crisis prone industries, excellence strategies were 





employ both routine communication and excellence strategies whereas non-crisis prone 
industries are less likely to employ both routine communication and excellence strategies.  
 Hypothesis 1B posited that there will be differences in crisis response strategies 
employed based on industry. These data partially support this hypothesis. There were 
differences among industries for strategies that frame the crisis χ2 (17, N = 399) = 30.14, 
p = .03, anti-social or defensive strategies χ2 (17, N = 399) = 29.30, p = .03, and 
accommodative strategies χ2 (17, N = 399) = 29.87, p = .03. See Table 13 for significant 
results for hypothesis 1B. As an industry, Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Hunting is 
slightly less likely than expected to employ strategies that frame the crisis, are strongly 
less likely than expected to employ anti-social or defensive strategies, and slightly more 
likely than expected to employ accommodative strategies. In the Mining industry, 
organizations are less likely than expected to employ strategies that frame the crisis, 
slightly more likely than expected to employ anti-social or defensive strategies, and 
strongly more unlikely than expected to employ accommodative strategies. In the Utility 
industry organizations are more likely than expected to employ strategies that frame the 
crisis, slightly more likely than expected to employ anti-social or defensive strategies, 
and slightly less likely than expected to employ accommodative strategies. In the 
Construction industry, organizations are less likely than expected to employ strategies 
that frame the crisis, more likely than expected to employ anti-social or defensive 
strategies, and more unlikely than expected to employ accommodative strategies. In the 
Manufacturing industry, organizations are strongly more unlikely than expected to 





anti-social or defensive strategies, and slightly more likely than expected to employ 
accommodative strategies.  
In the Wholesale Trade industry, organizations are slightly less likely than 
expected to employ strategies that frame the crisis, slightly less likely than expected to 
employ anti-social or defensive strategies, and strongly more likely than expected to 
employ accommodative strategies. In the Retail Trade industry, organizations are less 
likely than expected to employ strategies that frame the crisis, strongly more likely than 
expected to employ anti-social or defensive strategies, and more unlikely than expected 
to employ accommodative strategies. In the Transportation and Warehousing industry, 
organizations are slightly more likely than expected to employ strategies that frame the 
crisis, more likely than expected to employ anti-social or defensive strategies, and 
slightly more likely than expected to employ accommodative strategies. In the 
Information industry, organizations are moderately more likely than expected to employ 
strategies that frame the crisis, more likely than expected to employ anti-social or 
defensive strategies, and moderately more unlikely than expected to employ 
accommodative strategies. In the Finance and Insurance industry, organizations are 
moderately more likely than expected to employ strategies that frame the crisis, more 
unlikely than expected to employ anti-social or defensive strategies, and slightly more 
likely than expected to employ accommodative strategies.  
In the Professional, Scientific, and Technical industry, organizations are highly 
more likely than expected to employ strategies that frame the crisis, strongly more 





unlikely than expected to employ accommodative strategies. In the Management of 
Companies industry, organizations are more likely than expected to employ strategies 
that frame the crisis, are more unlikely than expected to employ anti-social or defensive 
strategies, and more unlikely than expected to employ accommodative strategies. In the 
Administrative Support and Waste Remediation industry, organizations were more 
unlikely than expected to employ strategies that frame the crisis, strongly more likely 
than expected to employ anti-social or defensive strategies, and strongly more likely than 
expected to employ accommodative strategies than expected. 
 In the Educational Services industry, organizations are more likely than expected 
to employ strategies that frame the crisis, more unlikely than expected to employ anti-
social or defensive strategies, and slightly more unlikely than expected to employ 
accommodative strategies. In the Health and Social Assistance industry, organizations are 
slightly more likely than expected to employ strategies that frame the crisis, more likely 
than expected to employ anti-social or defensive strategies, and slightly more likely than 
expected to employ accommodative strategies. In the Arts and Entertainment industry, 
organizations are slightly more likely than expected to employ strategies that frame the 
crisis, more likely than expected to employ anti-social or defensive strategies, and 
slightly more unlikely to employ accommodative strategies. In the Accommodation and 
Food Services industry, organizations are slightly more likely than expected to employ 
strategies that frame the crisis, more unlikely than expected to employ anti-social or 
defensive strategies, and more likely than expected to employ accommodative strategies. 





employ strategies that frame the crisis, slightly more likely than expected to employ anti-
social or defensive strategies, and slightly more likely than expected to employ 
accommodative strategies.  
 The influence of organization type on the invocation of cultural forms. Research 
question asked if there were differences in the invocation of the forms of organizational 
culture based on the type of organization. Results indicate that the invocation of symbols 
and practices is likely to be influenced by organization type. Specifically, research 
question 1A asked if there were differences in the invocation of the forms of 
organizational culture used by organizations experiencing crises in crisis prone industries 
when compared to those industries experiencing crises which are less crisis prone. These 
data suggest that whether an organization is crisis prone only influences the invocation of 
practices χ2 (1, N = 399) = 3.93, p = .05. The results indicate that in non-crisis prone 
industries, organizations are more likely than expected to invoke their practices in crisis 
response messages. They also indicate that in crisis prone industries, organizations are 
more unlikely than expected to invoke their practices in crisis response messages.  
 Research question 1B asked if there were differences in the invocation of the 
forms of organizational culture based on industry. These data suggest that industry 
influences the invocation of symbols χ2 (17, N = 399) = 30.73, p = .02 and practices χ2 
(17, N = 399) = 31.23, p = .02. In the Agriculture, Fishing, and Hunting industry, 
organizations are more likely than expected to invoke symbols, and more likely than 
expected to invoke practices in their crisis response messages. In the Mining industry, 





than expected to invoke practices in their crisis response messages. In the Utilities 
industry, organizations are more unlikely than expected to invoke symbols and more 
likely than expected to invoke practices in their crisis response messages. In the 
Construction industry, organizations are more unlikely than expected to invoke symbols 
and more unlikely than expected to invoke practices in their crisis response messages.  
In the Wholesale Trade industry, organizations are more unlikely than expected to 
invoke symbols and slightly more likely than expected to invoke practices in their crisis 
response messages. In the Retail Trade industry, organizations are more unlikely than 
expected to invoke symbols and more likely than expected to invoke practices in their 
crisis response messages. In the Transportation and Warehousing industry, organizations 
are more likely than expected to invoke symbols and more likely than expected to invoke 
practices in their crisis response messages. In the Information industry, organizations are 
more likely than expected to invoke symbols and more likely to invoke practices in their 
crisis response messages. In the Finance and Insurance industry, organizations are neither 
more likely nor unlikely than expected to invoke symbols and strongly unlikely to invoke 
practices in their crisis response messages.  
In the Professional, Scientific, and Technical industry, organizations are more 
likely than expected to invoke symbols and slightly more unlikely to invoke practices in 
their crisis response messages. In the Management of Companies Industry, organizations 
are strongly more unlikely than expected to invoke symbols and strongly more unlikely 
than expected to invoke practices in their crisis response messages.  In the Administration 





expected to invoke symbols and slightly more likely than expected to invoke practices in 
their crisis response messages. In the Educational Services industry, organizations are 
slightly more likely than expected to invoke symbols and slightly more likely than 
expected to invoke practices in their crisis response messages. In the Health and Social 
Assistance industry, organizations are more likely than expected to invoke symbols and 
more likely than expected to invoke practices in their crisis response messages. In the 
Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation industry, organizations are more likely than expected 
to invoke symbols and slightly more likely than expected to invoke practices in their 
crisis response messages. In the Accommodation and Food Services industry, 
organizations are slightly more likely than expected to invoke symbols and slightly more 
likely than expected to invoke practices in their crisis response messages. Finally, in the 
Public Administration industry, organizations are slightly more likely than expected to 
invoke symbols and slightly more unlikely than expected to invoke practices in their 
crisis response messages.  
Crisis Type’s Influence on Crisis Response Strategies and Forms of Organizational 
Culture 
 The influence of crisis type on crisis response strategies. This was measured with 
three different hypotheses and one research question. Hypothesis two posited that 
organizations facing organizational transgressions will emphasize message strategies 
focusing on self-enhancement, framing the organization, accommodative, and/or 
excellence or renewal crisis response strategies. This hypothesis was tested using both the 





response strategy employed by organizations facing organizational transgressions. These 
data indicate that this hypothesis should be primarily rejected. The significant individual 
chi-square tests for each crisis response strategy (see Table 15) indicate that routine 
communication strategies χ2 (1, N = 142) = 134.11, p = .00, strategies that frame the 
organization χ2 (1, N = 142) = 54.54, p = .0011, accommodative strategies χ2 (1, N = 142) 
= 14.90, p = .00, excellence or renewal strategies χ2 (1, N = 142) = 36.51, p = .00), and 
strategies that invoke interorganizational relationships χ2 (1, N = 142) = 22.09, p = .00 
are all present significantly less than expected. Only anti-social or defensive strategies are 
presently significantly more often than expected χ2 (1, N = 142) = 6.34, p = .01. 
Hypothesis two was also tested by examining the differences between primary strategies 
employed during organizational transgressions. These data suggest χ2 (5, N = 142) = 
101.72, p = .00 that organizations facing such crises primarily employ (see Table 16) 
anti-social or defensive strategies, strategies that frame the crisis, and accommodative 
strategies more often than expected. Only the use of accommodative strategies supports 
hypothesis two. Because the other three were not present, it suggests the prediction was 
not accurate.  
 Hypothesis three posited that organizations facing organizational event crises 
would emphasize crisis response strategies focusing on those that frame the crisis, frame 
the organization, and/or are anti-social or defensive. This hypothesis was tested using 
both the general employment of the different crisis response strategies as well as the 
primary response strategy employed by organizations facing organizational 
                                                 





transgressions. These data indicate that this hypothesis should be primarily supported. 
The significant individual chi-square tests for each crisis response strategy (see Table 17) 
indicate that routine communication χ2 (1, N = 149) = 137.24, p = .00, accommodative χ2 
(1, N = 149) = 46.2, p = .00, and excellence or renewal χ2 (1, N = 149) = 26.64, p = .00 
strategies were all employed by organizations less than expected in their crisis response 
messages. Hypothesis three was also tested by examining the differences between 
primary strategies employed during organizational events. These data suggest χ2 (5, N = 
149) = 30.95, p = .00 that organizations facing such crises primarily employ (see Table 
18) strategies that frame the crisis and anti-social or defensive strategies more than 
expected. Therefore, hypothesis three is primarily supported—organizations facing 
organizational events are more likely to employ strategies that frame the crisis and anti-
social or defensive strategies and to a lesser extent, strategies that frame the organization. 
While strategies that frame the organization were not significantly different than expected, 
these data suggest they are still a focus of strategies employed. Additionally, while the 
invocation of interorganizational relationships was not greater than expected and was not 
significant on its own, these findings suggest that it was incorporated a substantial 
amount of the time with organizational events.  
 Hypothesis four posited that organizations facing events or actions outside the 
organization’s locus of control would emphasize strategies that frame the crisis, frame the 
organization and/or anti-social or defensive strategies. This hypothesis was tested using 
both the general employment of the different crisis response strategies as well as the 





transgressions. These data indicate that this hypothesis is partially supported. The 
significant individual chi-square tests for each crisis response strategy (see Table 19) 
indicate that routine communication χ2 (1, N = 108) = 71.70, p = .00, framing the 
organization χ2 (1, N = 108) = 21.33, p = .00, accommodative χ2 (1, N = 108) = 42.82, p 
= .00, and the invocation of interorganizational relationships χ2 (1, N = 108) = 25.04, p 
= .00 were all employed less than expected. Hypothesis four was also tested by 
examining the differences between primary strategies employed during events outside the 
organization’s locus of control. These data suggest χ2 (6, N = 108) = 106.15, p = .00 that 
organizations facing such crises primarily employ (see Table 20) strategies that frame the 
crisis and are anti-social or defensive. This suggests that hypothesis four is only partially 
supported because only anti-social or defensive strategies and strategies that frame the 
crisis are more likely to be employed than expected.  
 Research question two asked when directly comparing organizations facing each 
type of crisis if there were differences in the employment of crisis response strategies. 
Findings using the chi-square analysis for each crisis response strategy indicate 
significant findings for routine communication χ2 (2, N = 399) = 12.45, p = .00, framing 
the crisis χ2 (2, N = 399) = 35.52,  p = .00, framing the organization χ2 (2, N = 399) = 
23.62, p = .00, anti-social or defensive χ2 (2, N = 399) = 8.92, p = .01, accommodative χ2 
(2, N = 399) = 8.84, p = .01, and the invocation of interorganizational relationships χ2 (2, 
N = 399) = 11.84, p = .00. See Table 21 for the results. Significant results were also 
found comparing the differences in primary strategy categories for the different crisis 





 These data suggest that routine communication is most strongly associated with 
crises that are outside the organization’s locus of control. This was demonstrated by the 
findings for the chi-square for routine communication alone along with the results for the 
primary strategy category comparing the strategies and crisis types. Events outside the 
organization’s control were the only crisis type where routine communication was 
employed more than expected.  
Framing the crisis is most strongly associated with organizational event crises. 
This was demonstrated both in the chi-square test for framing the crisis alone along with 
the results for the primary strategy category comparing the strategies and crisis types. In 
both cases organizational events were the only crisis type where framing the crisis was 
employed more than expected.  
Framing the organization was associated predominantly with organizations facing 
organizational event crisis; though somewhat also associated with events outside the 
organization’s control. This was demonstrated both by the chi-square test for framing the 
organization alone as well as the chi-square comparing primary strategy categories 
employed among different crisis types. In both cases organizational events was the only 
crisis type where framing the organization was employed more than expected, but also in 
cases of events outside the organization’s control it was employed only slightly less than 
expected.  
Anti-social or defensive strategies are most strongly associated with organizations 
facing organizational transgressions and events outside the organization’s control. This 





as well as the chi-square comparing primary strategy categories employed among 
different crisis types. In both cases organizational transgressions very strongly employed 
anti-social or defensive strategies and events outside the organization’s control employed 
them at greater than expected rates.  
Accommodative strategies are most strongly associated with organizational 
transgressions. While the chi-square for accommodative strategies alone was not 
significant, the findings for the chi-square comparing primary strategy categories 
employed among different crisis types indicated that organizational transgressions 
employed accommodative strategies about two-times more than expected. In contrast, 
organizational events and events outside the organization’s control used them less than 
expected.  
Excellence or renewal strategies are most associated with organizational events 
and events outside the organization’s locus of control. While the chi-square tests for 
excellence or renewal strategies alone was not found to be significant, the chi-square 
comparing primary strategy categories employed among different crisis types showed 
both organizational events and events outside the organization’s control employing these 
strategies more often than expected.  
The strategies to invoke interorganizational relationships were most strongly 
associated with organizational events. This was demonstrated both by the chi-square test 
for the invocation of interorganizational relationships alone as well as the chi-square test 





different crisis types. In both cases, organizational events were the only ones employing 
such strategies in their crisis messages more than expected. 
Overall, these results suggest that when directly comparing the use of different 
crisis response strategies among the three types of crises together, organizational 
transgressions are most strongly associated with anti-social or defensive strategies as well 
as accommodative strategies. Organizational events are most strongly associated with 
strategies that frame the crisis, strategies that frame the organization, excellence or 
renewal strategies, and strategies that invoke interorganizational relationships. Events 
outside the organization’s locus of control are most strongly associated with anti-social 
strategies, routine communication strategies, excellence or renewal strategies, and to 
some extent strategies that frame the organization.  
The influence of crisis type on the invocation of the forms of organizational 
culture. This was measured by one general research question with three sub-questions. 
Overall research question three asked to what extent does the type of crisis influence the 
forms of organizational culture invoked by organizations during periods of crisis. More 
specifically, research question 3A asked about the extent to which organizational 
transgressions influence the invocation of the forms of organizational culture. This was 
answered in two ways. First, the chi-square results for symbols χ2 (1, N = 142) = 101.41, 
p = .00, language χ2 (1, N = 142) = 11.27, p = .00, narratives χ2 (1, N = 142) = 119.01, p 
= .00, and practices χ2 (1, N = 142) = 52.09, p = .00 indicate that each form is employed 
less than expected (see Table 23) during organizational transgressions. Additionally, 





was invoked, findings indicate that for organizational transgressions, cultural forms are 
included less often than expected χ2 (1, N = 142) = 4.76, p = .03 (N = 58).  
Research question 3B asked about the extent to which organizational events 
influence the invocation of the forms of organizational culture. This was also answered in 
two ways. First the chi-square results for symbols χ2 (1, N = 149) = 37.75, p = .00, 
narratives χ2 (1, N = 149) = 85.70, p = .00, and practices χ2 (1, N = 149) = 33.83, p = .00 
indicate that each form is employed less than expected (see Table 24) during 
organizational events. While not significantly different than expected, it is noteworthy 
that language was included more often than expected (N = 78). Additionally, when the 
chi-square was run combining all cases where any organizational cultural form was 
invoked, findings indicate that for organizational events, cultural forms are included more 
often than expected χ2 (1, N = 149) = 4.20, p = .04.   
Research question 3C asked about the extent to which events outside the 
organization’s locus of control influence the invocation of the forms of organizational 
culture. This was also answered in two ways. First the chi-square results for symbols χ2 
(1, N = 108) = 25.04, p = .00, language χ2 (1, N = 108) = 14.82, p = .00, narratives χ2 (1, 
N = 108) = 62.26, p = .00, and practices χ2 (1, N = 108) = 27.00, p = .00 indicate that 
each form is employed less than expected (see Table 25) during events outside the 
organization’s control. Additionally, combining all the forms, results indicate that the 






To further investigate this question, the chi-square comparing the invocation of 
organizational cultural forms among all three crises at once found significant differences 
for the invocation of symbols χ2 (2, N = 399) = 18.31, p = .00, language χ2 (2, N = 399) = 
13.51, p = .00, and narratives χ2 (2, N = 399) = 6.68, p = .04. These findings suggest (see 
Table 26) that in cases of organizational transgressions, the invocation of cultural forms 
is not likely, especially when compared to the other types of crises. For all three 
significant forms of culture, organizational events were found to invoke culture more 
often than expected. Additionally, in cases where the crisis is an event outside the 
organization’s control, organizations are more likely than expected to invoke symbols 
and narratives.  
Interactions Between Organization Type and Crisis Type 
 In addition to the test of model fit indicating that the Logit Regression was not a 
viable model described in the Methods in Chapter 3, the Wald statistic for the logit model 
reveals an insignificant interaction for organization type (both operationalizations—crisis 
prone and industry) and crisis type for either crisis response strategies or the invocation 
of cultural forms. Because there was no interaction effect, these data suggest that only 
examining main effects as reported above for both variables is the most appropriate for 
analyzing the effects of the Situation or Organization on Message features in the 





Identifying Patterns of Combinations Among Crisis Response Strategies 
 In order to more fully address patterns and probably combinations of crisis 
response strategies alone, several analyses were conducted to answer research question 
six and hypothesis five was posited. The results of the correlation analysis (see Table 27) 
indicate several significant patterns among crisis response strategies. Initially, while 
sparsely used, self-enhancement strategies were positively correlated with strategies that 
frame the organization r = .12, p = .02 and excellence or renewal strategies r =.14, p 
= .00. Routine communication was negatively correlated with anti-social or defensive 
strategies r = -.13, p = .01 and strategies that invoke interorganizational relationships r = 
-.12, p = .02. Strategies that frame the crisis were negatively correlated with anti-social or 
defensive strategies r = -.30, p = .00 and positively correlated with strategies that frame 
the organization r =.24, p = .00, excellence or renewal strategies r =.15, p = .00, and the 
strategies that invoke interorganizational relationships r =.28, p = .00.  Strategies that 
frame the organization were also positively correlated with accommodative strategies r 
=.16, p = .00, excellence strategies r =.38, p = .00, and strategies that invoke 
interorganizational relationships r =.33, p = .00. Anti-social or defensive strategies were 
only negatively correlated with the aforementioned routine communication and framing 
the crisis. Accommodative strategies were also positively correlated with excellence or 
renewal strategies r =.26, p = .00 and strategies that invoke interorganizational 
relationships r =.22, p = .00. Strategies that invoke interorganizational relationships were 





 To better understand the ways in which crisis response strategies are combined in 
crisis response messages a one-way ANOVA was performed analyzing the differences in 
the total number of strategies employed in a crisis response message, depending on 
primary crisis response category employed. Levene’s test for homogeneity of variance 
was found to be acceptable and the ANOVA (see Table 28) was found to be significant F 
(1, 398) = 17.93, p = .00 with an adjusted R2 value of .20. The Scheffe post hoc findings 
(see Table 29) for this test indicate that the number of strategies included is significantly 
fewer when the primary strategy category is framing the crisis is then when framing the 
organization p =.00, excellence or renewal p = .03, or invoking interorganizational 
relationships p = .00 strategies are employed as the primary strategy. When an 
organization employs framing the organization as its primary strategy, it will use more 
total strategies than when an organization employs anti-social or defensive strategies p 
= .00. Finally, when an organization uses the invocation of interorganizational 
relationships as their primary strategy, they will use significantly more total strategies 
than organizations employing anti-social or defensive p = .00, accommodative p = .00, or 
routine communication p = .04 as their primary strategies.  
 The third way that research question was analyzed was to examine the chi-square 
results for the inclusion of the crisis response strategies in crisis response messages. 
Findings analyzing both individual chi-squares for each crisis response category (see 
Table 30) as well as for their use as primary strategy categories (see Table 31) indicate 
that only strategies that frame the crisis and anti-social or defensive strategies were used 





individual chi-squares for each crisis response category, anti-social or defensive were not 
significantly different than expected, but were greater than expected N = 215 and frame 
the crisis were significantly different than expected χ2 (1, N = 399) = 41.71, p = .00. 
However, all others including: self-enhancement χ2 (1, N = 399) = 379.25, p = .00, 
routine communication χ2 (1, N = 399) =341.26, p = .00, frame the organization χ2 (1, N 
= 399) = 57.15, p = .00, accommodative χ2 (1, N = 399) = 97.27, p = .00, excellence or 
renewal χ2 (1, N = 399) = 97.27, p = .00, and invoking interorganizational relationships 
χ2 (1, N = 399) = 37.92, p = .00 were all found less than expected. These findings were 
supported by the analysis of the presence of each strategy as the primary strategy 
category χ2 (6, N = 398) = 277.73, p = .00. These data suggest that the most common 
strategies employed by organizations in crisis are framing the crisis and anti-social or 
defensive strategies.  
 Finally, in answering research question six, the chi-square results comparing the 
use of each strategy category to the primary strategy employed indicated strong results. 
See Table 32 for the results. When routine communication is employed as a strategy χ2 (6, 
N = 398) = 93.32, p = .00 it was found in crisis response messages more often than 
expected when the primary strategies were framing the organization, accommodative, and 
routine communication. When framing the crisis was employed as a strategy χ2 (6, N = 
398) = 162.71, p = .00, it was found in crisis response messages more often than expected 
when the primary strategies were framing the crisis, framing the organization, excellence 
or renewal, or invoking interorganizational relationships. When framing the organization 





response messages more often than expected when the primary strategies were framing 
the organization, excellence or renewal, or invoking interorganizational relationships. 
When anti-social or defensive were employed as a strategy χ2 (6, N = 398) = 183.99, p 
= .00, it was only found in crisis response messages more often than expected when the 
primary strategy was also anti-social or defensive. When accommodation was employed 
as a strategy χ2 (6, N = 398) = 163.43, p = .00, it was found in crisis response messages 
more often than expected when the primary strategies were framing the organization, 
accommodative, or excellence or renewal.  When excellence or renewal was employed as 
a strategy χ2 (6, N = 398) = 120.18, p = .00, it was found in crisis response messages 
more often than expected when the primary strategies were framing the organization, 
accommodative, excellence or renewal, or invoking interorganizational relationships. 
Finally, when invoking interorganizational relationships was employed as a strategy χ2 (6, 
N = 398) = 87.69, p = .00, it was found in crisis response messages more often than 
expected when the primary strategies were framing the organization, accommodative, 
excellence or renewal, or invoking interorganizational relationships.  
 Hypothesis five posits that organizations will use crisis response strategies in 
combination (i.e., multiple strategy categories) more often than single crisis response 
strategies. Table 33 shows the t-test results for this hypothesis. These data support 
hypothesis five t (398) = 70.06, p = .00. In single cases, multiple strategy categories were 
employed 66.2 percent (N = 264) of the time compared to employing a single strategy 





by a chi-square analyzing the differences in the number of times we would expect to find 
multiple versus single strategies employed χ2 (1, N = 399) = 41.71, p = .00.  
Identifying Patterns Associated with the Invocation of the Forms of Organizational 
Culture 
 There was one hypothesis and one research question used to further analyze 
patterns associated with the invocation of organizational culture in crisis response 
messages. First, hypothesis six posited that the forms of organizational culture will be a 
significant component of crisis response messages invoked by organizations during 
periods of crisis. While the t-test was significant t (398) = 20.10, p = .00, the difference in 
the number of times that culture was included N = 201 versus not included in crisis 
response messages N = 198 was only 3 cases, so when the chi-square indicated there were 
no differences between expected and observed values, it suggests that the results are 
mixed. The values for the chi-square were as expected, which can suggest a significant 
inclusion; however, to the degree that this was combining all forms of organizational 
culture would suggest that cultural forms, overall, are a significant component of crisis 
response messages.  
 Research question seven asked about the extent to which different forms of 
organizational culture invoked are also correlated in crisis response messages. These 
findings (see Table 34) show that the invocation of symbols, language, narratives, and 
practices are all strongly positively correlated to one another. Symbols is positively 





p = .00. Language is positively correlated with narratives r =.26, p = .00 and practices r 
=.33, p = .00. Narratives are positively correlated with practices r =.35, p = .00.  
Patterns of Crisis Response Strategies and Invocation of the Forms of Organizational 
Culture 
 Finally, research question eight asked about the ways in which the forms of 
organizational culture are invoked with different crisis response strategies by 
organizations responding to crisis situations. This question was answered in two ways. 
First, correlations reveal many significant relationships between the strategies and forms 
invoked in crisis response messages (see Table 35). The invocation of symbols is 
positively correlated with self-enhancement r =.18, p = .00, frame the crisis r =.16, p 
= .00, frame the organization r =.41, p = .00, accommodative r =.16, p = .00, excellence 
or renewal r =.35, p = .00, and invoking interorganizational relationships r =.28, p = .00 
strategies. The invocation of language is positively correlated with frame the crisis r =.19, 
p = .00, frame the organization r =.41, p = .00, accommodative r =.26, p = .00, 
excellence or renewal r =.35, p = .00, and invoking interorganizational relationships r 
=.28, p = .00 strategies. Narratives are positively correlated with frame the crisis r =.17, 
p = .00, frame the organization r =.27, p = .00, accommodative r =.13, p = .00, 
excellence or renewal r =.31, p = .00, and invoking interorganizational relationships r 
=.28, p = .00 strategies. Finally practices are positively correlated with self-enhancement 
r =.15, p = .00, frame the organization r =.34, p = .00, anti-social r =.13, p = .00, 
accommodative r =.21, p = .00, excellence or renewal r =.34, p = .00, and invoking 





 To answer research question eight, the chi-square analysis comparing crisis 
response strategies and organizational cultural forms revealed a large number of 
significant results (see Table 36 for the results). When strategies that frame the crisis 
were employed symbols χ2 (1, N = 399) = 9.96, p = .00, language χ2 (1, N = 399) = 13.63, 
p = .00, and narratives χ2 (1, N = 399) = 12.06, p = .00 were all invoked more often than 
expected. When strategies that frame the organization were employed symbols χ2 (1, N = 
399) = 65.51, p = .00, language χ2 (1, N = 399) = 67.53, p = .00, narratives χ2 (1, N = 
399) = 29.25, p = .00, and practices χ2 (1, N = 399) = 46.62, p = .00 were all invoked 
more often than expected. When anti-social or defensive strategies were employed only 
practices χ2 (1, N = 399) = 7.21, p = .01 were invoked more often than expected. When 
accommodative strategies were employed symbols χ2 (1, N = 399) = 9.96, p = .00, 
language χ2 (1, N = 399) = 25.93, p = .00, narratives χ2 (1, N = 399) = 6.94, p = .01, and 
practices χ2 (1, N = 399) = 17.02, p = .00 were all invoked more often than expected. 
When excellence or renewal strategies were employed symbols χ2 (1, N = 399) = 48.54, p 
= .00, language χ2 (1, N = 399) = 88.84, p = .00, narratives χ2 (1, N = 399) = 38.51, p 
= .00, and practices χ2 (1, N = 399) = 46.77, p = .00 were all invoked more often than 
expected. When invoking interorganizational relationships were employed symbols χ2 (1, 
N = 399) = 30.83, p = .00, language χ2 (1, N = 399) = 91.29, p = .00, narratives χ2 (1, N = 
399) = 30.43, p = .00, and practices χ2 (1, N = 399) = 33.94, p = .00 were all invoked 




















 From the beginning, there have been two primary goals for this study. The first 
goal was to develop a theoretical model that would connect our knowledge of crisis 
response messages to the situational and organizational factors likely to affect those 
messages. This goal recognized that one of the strengths in the study of crisis 
communication is a breadth of description of strategies that organizations employ to try 
to manage crisis situations; however, I also emphasized that the greatest weakness was a 
lack of a strong model to explain when those strategies were likely to be employed. 
Building from the first goal, the second goal was to more effectively describe the features 
of messages used in crisis communication statements by connecting them to 
characteristics of context. Allen and Caillouet (1994) argue that such an endeavor is 
valuable because, “It is important to study the actual complex milieu of messages 
occurring in the public arena because these messages potentially build and shape public 
perceptions of legitimacy.” (p. 56) I believe that this study has been successful in meeting 
those two goals. This study is an important step in developing the Strategic Model of 
Crisis Communication linking the strategic components of organizational crisis response 
messages with the situational and organizational factors that most directly influence those 
strategies and message components. Such a study situates both academics and 
practitioners to better understand the phenomenon of crisis communication. In discussing 
the findings and contributions of this research, this chapter will: (a) discuss the results in 





contributions to the SMOCC, crisis communication, and the field of organizational 
communication; and (c) discuss potential future work associated with the SMOCC.  
 Before discussing the primary findings, one important finding, or in this case a 
non-finding, was with regard to two of the strategy categories discussed in the literature 
and tested in this study. While authors have suggested that self-enhancement and routine 
communication strategies—including marketing, image advertising, communication of 
mission, annual reports, and newsletters can be invoked in response to crisis situations 
(e.g., Fiol, 1995; Heath 1994; Proto & Supino, 1999; Scott & Lane, 2000), these data 
suggest they are not employed to an important degree in public and print media-oriented 
statements. This finding runs somewhat contrary to Allen and Calliouet’s (1994) findings 
that self-enhancement strategies were a primary strategy in responding to crises. However, 
this difference is likely attributable to differences in the operationalization of these 
strategies because what they coded as self-enhancement strategies was a general term for 
any effort to make the organization appear strong. In the present study, the 
operationalizations for each of the strategy categories were based on more common 
taxonomies of crisis response strategies. These may be valuable strategies to examine 
with other channels of crisis communication; however, they were of little consequence 
when organizational representatives discuss crises with the media.  
Discussion of the Results 
 In designing this study, I argued there were significant gaps in our knowledge and 
understanding connecting organizational and situational factors to crisis response 





research questions have been made based on case studies and analytic arguments; 
therefore, by answering questions, verifying, or rejecting present thought in a cross-
sectional design, these results mark a decided step forward in the study of crisis response 
messages. This discussion of the results will first address the influence of organization 
type on crisis response messages, second the influence of crisis type on crisis response 
messages, and finally discuss the new information learned from this study about crisis 
response strategies themselves along with the invocation of the forms of organizational 
culture in CRMs.  
Organization Type 
 Because previous research has argued that an organization’s identity, needs, and 
often reactions to organizations is grounded by the industry to which the organization 
belongs (e.g., Arpan, 2002; Ginzel, et al., 1993; Glynn, 2000; Millar, 2004), this study 
began by conceptualizing organization type as being grounded by industry and two 
operationalizations emerged from that definition. First, Coombs (2004) had argued that 
an organization’s history with crises would influence its responses to crises; therefore, 
because organizations draw many of their needs, identity, and modus operandi from their 
industries, this study examined the effects of being in a crisis-prone industry on crisis 
response messages. Second, to further examine organization type, the broader 
operationalization of ‘industry’ was employed to identify if industries respond to crises in 
similar ways.  
 Crisis prone versus non-crisis prone industries. Essentially, whether an industry 





the crisis response strategies used or the forms of organizational culture invoked in their 
messages. There were, however, two exceptions to this finding. First, crisis prone 
industries are more likely to employ Excellence or Renewal Strategies; at the same time, 
non-crisis prone industries are less likely to employ these strategies than expected. What 
makes this particular finding interesting is that part of the ‘point’ in employing these 
strategies is that the organization is demonstrating that it is committed to moving forward 
or beyond the crisis (e.g., Henriques & Sadorsky, 1999). This suggests that organizations 
in industries who are more likely to have experienced crises or see their competition go 
through them have a greater propensity to look beyond the crisis, as part of their approach 
to crisis communication and crisis management whereas organizations in less crisis prone 
industries are more apt to focus on the crisis itself in their CRMs.  
 This analysis is complemented by the finding for the invocation of organizational 
culture. The non-crisis prone organizations focus more on the present than looking ahead 
because they are much more likely to invoke their present practices by either discussing 
organizational rituals or routines. These two findings support a consistency in the 
approach of crisis prone and non-crisis prone industries. These findings suggest that the 
primary difference in approach (see Table 37) between crisis prone and non-crisis prone 
industries is a future versus present orientation in their crisis response messages. Crisis 
prone industries emphasize a future-oriented approach—including, perhaps, avoiding 
discussing present circumstances, the present situation, or their practices directly. In 2005 
a federal judge issued a summary judgment in a patent infringement lawsuit brought by 





cartridges. In a statement after the judgment, Dan Crane, the senior vice president of 
marketing for Epson demonstrated the future-oriented approach in the following 
statement that emphasizes both Excellence/ Renewal and IOR strategies: 
  We are pleased by this important progress in the Multi-Union case. We will 
continue vigorous enforcement of our intellectual property rights to protect our 
innovative printers and printer supplies against unfair competition of all types 
including patent infringement, unsubstantiated performance claims, and 
counterfeiting. 
Non-crisis prone industries emphasize a more present-oriented approach—they seem 
more likely to take on the crisis more directly. In 2005, as the National Hockey League 
was facing the decision whether to cancel the season with the ongoing NHL owner 
lockout, a statement supporting the NHL Players Association, made by the Service 
Employees International Union’s Canadian vice president demonstrated a present-
oriented approach emphasizing both defensive/ anti-social and accommodative strategies: 
Hockey is Canada’s game and it would be a disservice to all fans if the season 
were to be cancelled. Our members are hockey fans, but we stand in solidarity 
with the players and respect their rights when it comes to the collective 
bargaining process. It’s important to remember why the NHLPA exists. Players in 
the early days of the NHL had to keep day jobs and had trouble making ends meet. 






 Effects of industry. The specific industry to which an organization belongs 
demonstrated a greater number of differences in strategies employed and cultural forms 
invoked. This suggests that industry is probably a stronger predictor of differences in 
crisis communication messages than the broader operationalization of crisis prone and 
non-crisis prone organizations. This finding directly supports previous analysis (e.g., 
Arpan, 2002; Millar, 2004; Sutton, 2003) that it would make sense for a ‘niche’ or 
‘sector’ to influence an organization’s reaction to crises because there are likely 
commonalities in organizational routines, stressors, and identities among such 
organizations. However, because Hypothesis 1B was only partially supported in its 
prediction that industry would influence the strategies, it also suggests that there are 
limits on the degree to which industry influences an individual organization’s responses 
to crisis situations. This cautiousness was also confirmed with findings for Research 
Question 1 where industry did affect the invocation of cultural forms, but only two of the 
forms. More optimistically, these data support that industry does influence the use of 
strategies that frame the crisis, anti-social or defensive strategies, and accommodative 
strategies as well as the invocation of the cultural forms of symbols and practices.  
Based on industry, five more approaches (see Table 37) to the use and 
combination of crisis response strategies also emerged from these data. The first 
approach that emerged from the findings for the influence of industry on the use of CRSs 
was an aggressive approach. An aggressive approach is one where the organization’s 
crisis response messages endeavor to tell their stakeholder’s what is (or is not) occurring 





examining industries, the combination of strategies that frame the crisis with anti-social 
or defensive strategies took the most aggressive turn in the crisis responses. The Utility, 
Information, and Arts/Entertainment/Recreation industries all employed this approach to 
using crisis response strategies in their CRMs. One example of such a statement emerged 
from the 2004 Culinary 206 Strike against Atlantic City casinos as Harrah Casino’s 
president Gary Loveman spoke about the strike using both strategies that frame the crisis 
as well as anti-social/ defensive strategies: 
Despite the inconvenience the labor action creates, Harrah’s is not willing to 
concede on the contract link. I worry about their capacity to strike me everywhere 
at the same time. What they would like to do is set it up so they could do that. 
That’s what the strike is all about, we’ll just have to wait it out. We will stand 
firm in this position no matter how long this unfortunate situation persists. We 
will not ratify a contract that threatens the health of our company and that of the 
industry broadly. We are not willing to take a contract that supports union 
leaders’ interests at the expense of our employees and colleagues in Atlantic City.  
The second is the defensive approach. A defensive approach certainly emphasizes 
any effort on the part of an organization to deny culpability or at least minimize their role 
in a crisis; however, what makes it different from just the anti-social or defensive 
strategies is that it also involves an effort to improve their image while denying or 
minimizing culpability. In the industry analysis, this involved pairing the anti-social or 
defensive strategies with accommodative strategies. These are two seemingly opposite 





also tries to soften their response. Manufacturing and Administrative and Support and 
Waste and Remediation Services industries employed this approach to using crisis 
response strategies in their CRMs. In late March of 2005 Intertape Polymer Group, Inc. 
experienced an explosion in an external steam generation unit at the company’s 
manufacturing facility in South Carolina. A statement including both anti-
social/defensive and accommodative strategies from Burgess Hildreth, the company’s 
vice president of human resources demonstrate the defensive approach: 
First and foremost our hearts and thoughts are with the family of our lost co-
worker. IPG is committed to the highest employee safety standards and is leading 
the investigation into the cause of this incident. We have also offered counseling 
to those workers affected by this unfortunate event.  
The third is the explanative approach. An explanative approach emphasizes a 
combination of trying to define the problem and/ or organization and appearing open or 
sympathetic as an organization—thus endeavoring to create good will with the approach. 
In this case, the explanative approach included strategies that frame the crisis and 
accommodative strategies. The Accommodation and Finance/ Insurance industries 
employed this approach to using crisis response strategies in their CRMs. While not in an 
industry that typically employs an explanative approach, Major League Baseball’s Barry 
Bonds of the San Francisco Giants has had to face continued pressure in the wake of the 
steroids scandal. In his first statement to the media since baseball implemented its drug 
policy in 2005, Bonds used a strongly explanative approach to his comments 





Allow the drug testing program to work. I commend Bud Selig, the players union, 
and all the players for trying to put together a testing program that tries to satisfy 
everyone. I look forward to the day when this thing will blow over. You guys (the 
media) need to turn the page. Let us play the game and we will fix it. I don’t 
believe steroids can help your hand-eye coordination in hitting a baseball. I don’t 
know if steroids will help you in baseball.  
The fourth is the offensive approach. In the offensive approach, the organization 
is trying to create as many opportunities for itself to ‘score’ as possible by mixing several 
strategies all at once. The choice to include a very strategy-rich12 approach might be an 
effort to reach a number of different audiences or might be a less-calculated effort to 
cover different bases and potential reactions. In the analysis of industry, it involved the 
employment of all three significant crisis response strategies—framing the crisis, anti-
social or defensive, and accommodative. The Transportation and Warehousing, Health 
and Social Assistance, and Public Administration industries all employed this approach to 
using strategies in their CRMs. While not in these industries but facing an organizational 
event General Motors’ spokeswoman Toni Simonetti, and GM CEO Rick Wagoner 
statements, addressing the company’s poor economic performance, employed an 
offensive strategy combining strategies that frame the organization, frame the crisis, anti-
social/defensive, and excellence/renewal: 
                                                 
12 A crisis response message can be thought of as strategy-rich when it includes several different strategies 
in the same message.  On the other side of the spectrum are strategy-lean messages focusing primarily on a 





The rule of thumb, of course, is that you should generate more cash than you 
consume. But what we said is that it looks like we’ll consume $2 billion more 
than we generate this year. It’s entirely a North American issue. North America, 
simply put, is our 800 pound gorilla. Today’s announcement really shows how 
important it is that we get this business right. We are fighting for every single sale. 
We want to be smart. We want to offer the best value. But we’re fighting for 
every tenth of a point we can get.  
The final is the single strategy approach. Obviously, this is the opposite of the 
offensive approach because the organization most strongly emphasizes a single strategy 
category in their crisis response messages. These data found that, among those strategy 
categories employed differently an expected—about half the industries emphasized single 
strategies. Industries emphasizing strategies that frame the crisis included Professional/ 
Scientific/ and Technical, Management of Companies, and Educational Services. 
Industries emphasizing anti-social or defensive strategies included Mining, Construction, 
and Retail Trade. Industries emphasizing accommodative strategies include Agriculture/ 
Forestry/ Hunting/ Fishing and Wholesale Trade. In a statement discussing Wal-Mart’s 
closing of a store in Quebec that was closest to reaching a union contract, Wal-Mart 
spokesman Andrew Pelletier employed an anti-social/defensive single strategy in 
response to the situation: 
It’s a deeply disappointing day for us. The store in Jonquiere has been struggling 
for sometime economically, and in our view the union’s demands failed to 





In discussing the approaches to the invocation of organizational culture, symbols 
and practices were the only ones found to be significantly differently invoked than 
expected. The three approaches to invoking culture include: culturally rich crisis response 
messages (i.e., where multiple forms are invoked), crisis response messages absent of 
cultural forms, and single-form invoked crisis response messages. Because approaches 
that are culturally rich invoke multiple cultural forms, organizations are more vividly 
communicating their identity, values, and ideology in their CRMs. Several industries 
emphasized culturally rich CRMs including: Agriculture/ Forestry/ Fishing/ Hunting, 
Transportation and Warehousing, Information, Administrative and Support and Waste 
and Remediation Services, Educational Services, Health and Social Assistance, Arts/ 
Entertainment/ Recreation, and Accommodation. Organizations with CRMs absent any 
cultural forms are making no effort to communicate neither their organization’s ideology 
nor a strong communication of identity and included the Construction, Finance and 
Insurance, and Management of Companies industries. Finally, some organizations only 
invoke one form of organizational culture—in this case that most likely meant that the 
organization would discuss its practices. Those industries emphasizing practices only 
included: Mining, Utilities, Manufacturing, Wholesale Trade, and Retail Trade. However 
there were also two industries that emphasized an invocation of symbols only—the 
Professional/ Scientific/ Technological and Public Administration Industries.  
Taken together, these findings offer some very specific information about the 
ways in which organization type can influence the use of strategies as well as the 





also emerges into a handful of approaches affords valuable new information and 
understanding of crisis response strategies. The emergence of different approaches to 
crisis response messages confirms previous research (e.g., Millar, 2004) that niche or 
sector will influence an organization’s patterns of communication, but extends previous 
analysis by offering specific ways in which we can expect different industries to respond 
to organizational crises. Finally, asking whether organizations invoked elements of their 
culture is an important question to ask. These data demonstrate that the forms of 
organizational culture are invoked and invoked differently based on industries.  
Crisis Type 
 Previous research and analysis had argued that understanding the role of the crisis 
type was paramount in understanding the nature of crisis response messages and crisis 
communication more broadly (Coombs & Holladay, 1996; 2002; Pearson & Mitroff, 
1993). Coombs and Holladay (2002) even make the point that without understanding the 
relationships between these two variables, crisis managers are unlikely to understand 
what type of crisis communication is necessary for any particular situation. In their 
analysis, they also address the types of responses they believe should occur with different 
types of crises. These recommendations and analysis based in their own case studies and 
field experiences formed the bases of the hypotheses predicting the relationships between 
each type of crisis and the crisis response strategies. These data suggest, at best, only a 
partial support for conventional knowledge on the selection of crisis response strategies 





organizational transgressions, organizational events, and events outside the organization’s 
locus of control.  
 Organizational transgressions. Conventional wisdom (see Coombs & Holladay’s 
1996; 2002 analysis) would tell organizations that during crises, such as organizational 
transgressions that the organization should select strongly image-oriented approaches; 
however, this cross-sectional study found that organizations facing such transgressions 
typically do not emphasize such strategies. There were two ways that organizational 
transgressions were examined in the present study. First, is isolating organizational 
transgressions and analyzing the CRSs employed and invocation of organizational culture. 
Second, the CRSs employed and invocations of organizational culture for organizational 
transgressions were analyzed in comparison to the other crisis types. Additionally, for 
each mode of comparison, organizational transgressions were analyzed in terms of the 
inclusion of any strategy as well as the primary strategy employed for the CRM (see 
Tables 15, 16, 21, 22).  
 Across all four analyses of organizational transgressions, anti-social or defensive 
strategies emerged as the most typical strategy employed by organizations experiencing 
these crises. Accommodative strategies were also commonly included during 
organizational transgressions. Finally, to a lesser extent, strategies that frame the crisis 
were also employed by organizations. This suggests that there is one primary approach 
employed by organizations facing transgression crises. This approach—best 





previously described. In the cross-crisis comparison only the anti-social or defensive and 
accommodative strategies were employed at greater than expected rates.  
While this approach is the only one demonstrated clearly in these findings, we can 
still expect organizations facing transgressions to typically employ anti-social or 
defensive, strategies that frame the crisis, and accommodative strategies as the single 
primary strategy in public or media responses to the crises. These data suggest it may also 
be possible for organizations facing transgressions to employ aggressive, explanative, or 
offensive approaches; however, those conclusions are not directly supported in these data. 
Further research could specifically investigate the inclusion of those approaches as well.  
These data also suggest that an organization experiencing a transgression employ 
an approach to the invocation of organizational culture that is absent of cultural forms 
(see Tables 23 & 26). While organizations experiencing organizational transgressions do 
not invoke any form of culture more than expected, they are more likely to use culturally 
specific language than the other forms. However, taken together with the focused CRS 
findings, it suggests that organizations facing transgressions focus on a relatively lean 
public response endeavoring to defend their organization rather than really build on the 
image with more future-oriented approaches, as the previous literature suggested. Yet, 
there is an overlap between previous literature’s analysis about the approach to dealing 
with the transgressions and the findings from this study—there does appear to be an 
effort to be accommodative to those affected in the crisis response. However, instead of 
tying that accommodation to image, it is tied to a denial or minimization of the 





Organizational events. In the case where a crisis exists where the onus of 
responsibility is ambiguous—such as with organizational events—present understanding 
of crisis communication would predict that organizations would employ strategies that 
frame the crisis, frame the organization, and/or anti-social or defensive strategies 
(Coombs & Holladay, 1996). Unlike organizational transgressions, these data supported 
that prediction; however, additional strategies were also employed more often than 
expected. Like with the organizational transgressions, organizational events were 
analyzed both alone and in comparison to the other two types of crisis as well as with the 
use of the strategies alone and primary strategies employed (see Tables 17, 18, 21, 22).  
Organizations facing organizational events employ strategies that frame the crisis, 
anti-social or defensive strategies, strategies that frame the organization, excellence or 
renewal strategies, and invoke interorganizational relationships more often than expected. 
Consistently these data suggest that organizations facing organizational event crises 
employ strategies that frame the crisis most often. However, based on the comparison 
among the three types of crises, the most typical approach appears to be an explanative 
approach. While employing several types of strategy categories, with organizational 
events CRMs were focused most strongly on framing the organization and crisis along 
with invoking positive good will with the use of excellence and renewal strategies along 
with invoking their interorganizational relationships. While the explanative approach 
offers the best explanation of the combination of strategies, these data could also suggest 






This is strongly consistent with the previous literature and analysis on such crises 
because the primary recommendation was to ensure that the organization controlled, as 
much as possible, views of the crisis itself then manage the crisis from that point. Overall, 
these findings also suggest a complex, multi-faceted, and situationally or perhaps 
organizationally dependent set of approaches to CRMs by organizations facing 
organizational transgressions. It is also important to note that while multi-faceted and 
strategy-rich, this is a much different approach to CRMs than either of the other types of 
organizational crises.  
Complementing these findings for response strategies is the invocation of the 
forms of organizational culture by organizations facing organizational events. When 
examining the invocation of organizational culture, on their own, organizational events 
seems to be absent of cultural forms; however, when comparing the invocation of culture 
to other types of crises, organizational events emerge as crises where organizations 
invoke culture in a very rich manner. Organizations experiencing organizational events 
invoke symbols, language, and narrative forms at a greater than expected rate. This 
suggests, overall, that when organizations face organizational events ranging from 
mergers to strikes to workplace violence to economic downturns that they tend to use rich 
and multi-faceted responses to crises; however, responses that also support previous 
knowledge and expectations about their responses.  
Events outside the organization’s locus of control. In 1996, Coombs and Holladay 
argued that organizations facing crises where they had no control over the situation that 





incorporate anti-social or defensive strategies. The findings from this study support, but 
only partially support this prediction. As with the previous two types of crises, these 
findings were analyzed in isolation from the other crisis types as well as in comparison to 
the other types and by examining different strategies inclusion in the CRMs and as the 
primary crisis response strategy (see Tables 19, 20, 21, 22).  
These data suggest that organizations facing events outside the organization’s 
control most consistently employ strategies that frame the crisis, anti-social or defensive, 
and routine communication strategies. One interesting finding is that these crises are the 
only crisis type likely to employ routine communication as an important crisis response 
strategy. The most probable explanation is that because these events are outside the 
organization’s control, the use of mission or vision and annual reports are one way to 
manage the crisis and get information about the organization to the public in a situation 
that they had no control over. This also suggests that there is a predominant approach 
employed by organizations facing these crises—an aggressive approach. Because the 
aggressive approach emphasizes an organization telling stakeholders what is occurring 
and actively being defensive about their role or culpability in the crisis, it is an approach 
that pairs well with these findings. This is, in spirit, consistent with previous research and 
suggestions that organizations facing these crises should take a strong approach to their 
responses. This is also an approach that certainly encompasses the inclusion of routine 
communication strategies but also the previously discussed inclusion of strategies that 
frame the crisis and anti-social or defensive strategies as well. This approach and its 





organizations have to make sure people understand the crisis and that the crisis is totally 
outside of the control or fault of the organization.  
Like in the case of organizational events, examining the invocation of 
organizational culture in events outside the organization’s locus of control alone would 
suggest that organizations experiencing events outside their control have an approach to 
invoking culture that is absent of cultural forms (see Table 25). However, when 
comparing the invocation of culture among organizations experiencing all three types of 
crises, organizations experiencing them actually employ a culturally-rich approach to 
invoking the forms of organizational culture with symbols and narratives invoked more 
often than expected. Using both symbols and narratives complement the strong and 
aggressive approach with these crises. In order for the aggressive approach to work, the 
culpability and nature of the crisis would need to be clear, so the inclusion of a saga or 
heroic narrative would be a useful way to imbed the denial or minimization and 
explanation of the nature of the crisis. Additionally, invoking symbols adds richness to 
the portrayal of the organization as an innocent bystander in a difficult situation.  
Taken together, while the findings for each of the crisis types—organizational 
transgressions, organizational events, and events outside the organization’s locus of 
control—only partially support previous analysis on the crisis response messages, they 
also demonstrate a consistency and parity in the responses that organizations make to 
crisis situations. This information is valuable in more specifically understanding the 
influence that the type of crisis can have on an organization’s choices of crisis response 





Crisis Response Strategies and Forms of Organizational Culture 
 Given that crisis response strategies and the forms of organizational culture offer 
important information about what influences differences in the use of crisis response 
strategies and the invocation of the forms of organizational culture; yet, are certainly not 
the only influences on the crisis response strategies and invocation of culture. Therefore, 
it is also important to examine the general patterns for these two variables as well. In this 
section I will first discuss the findings for CRSs, then for the invocation of cultural forms, 
and then their combination.  
 Discussion for crisis response strategies. The approaches to combining strategies 
discussed in the previous sections demonstrate that organizational spokespersons 
approach crisis situations with particular communicative goals and priorities in mind and 
that these goals and priorities vary based both on organization type and crisis type. This is 
consistent with previous research on the use of crisis response strategies in response to 
organizational crises (e.g., Allen & Calliouet, 1994); however, marks a significant 
development in any previous understanding of the ways in which crisis response 
strategies are combined in public and media-oriented CRSs. By examining the general 
correlations in the use of different CRSs, we can more thoroughly understand what 
approaches or sets of strategies are typically viewed as compatible or incompatible (see 
Tables 27 & 32).  
 More than any other strategy, the invocation of interorganizational relationships is 
strongly correlated to several other strategies. The strongest is that nearly half of the time 





renewal strategies are also used (r = .46). There were also very strong correlations 
between interorganizational relationships and framing the crisis and framing the 
organization (each approximately an r = .30). Interorganizational relationships also 
correlated strongly with accommodative strategies. Because there are four other strategies 
with significant positive correlations, it suggests that when organizations use 
interorganizational relationships as a response strategy they are taking, what I previously 
described as an offensive approach—one characterized by a strategy-rich crisis response. 
Additionally, there is also a future-orientation and explanative component to these 
correlations which suggests that these might also be approaches used when the presence 
of invoking an organizations interorganizational relationships is detected in CRMs.  
 Another strong correlation is that between the excellence and renewal strategies 
and strategies that frame the organization (r = .38). Taken together, these strategies 
represent an approach not clearly evident in the analyses of the independent variables—
an image-oriented approach. Strategies in both categories emphasize maintaining or re-
building an image of the organization despite the crisis. Strategies that frame the 
organization do so by making claims about the character of the organization as a way to 
minimize potential negative effects of the crisis (e.g., Coombs & Schmidt, 2000; Marra, 
1998; Sellnow & Brand, 2001). Excellence and renewal strategies accomplish this by 
emphasizing the importance to move forward and the positive steps that the organization 
is taking to accomplish that goal (e.g., Henriques & Sadorsky, 1999; Milliman et al., 
1994; Williams & Olaniran, 1998). This approach is distinctive from, for example, the 





present, not the future; therefore, it seems most likely that when these two strategies are 
used in combination that an organization is taking an image-oriented approach to 
employing CRMs.  
 Excellence and renewal strategies also strongly correlated to accommodative 
strategies, suggesting that organizations employing these strategies also employ a future-
oriented approach. Such an approach is an effort, by these organizations, to move beyond 
the crisis in order to focus on how the organization can re-build and contribute to those 
affected by it. Excellence and renewal strategies are also significantly positively 
correlated to strategies that frame the crisis and self-enhancement strategies. Like 
interorganizational relationship strategies, excellence and renewal strategies are likely to 
be used in strategy-rich contexts, but with approaches that are consistent. Aside from the 
image-oriented and future-oriented approaches, the approach that would seem most likely 
to routinely appear when excellence and renewal strategies were present would be the 
offensive approach because they seem to be used most in strategy-rich contexts.  
 Strategies that frame the organization also tend to occur in strategy-rich contexts 
with significant positive correlations to self-enhancement, strategies that frame the crisis, 
accommodative, excellence and renewal, and interorganizational relationship strategies. 
Since strategies that frame the organization are meant to make strong claims about the 
organization to minimize the crisis’s damage it also makes sense to only emphasize other 
strategies that are geared at making the organization look good in comparison to the crisis. 
Certainly, we might expect to see an offensive approach present when strategies that 





context. However, depending on the other strategies used at the same time, we might well 
expect to see a strongly present-oriented approach when note used with excellence or 
renewal strategies. Additionally, because there is a strong correlation with strategies that 
frame the crisis (r = .24), we might expect to see an explanative approach used often.  
 Strategies that frame the crisis and accommodative strategies each had significant 
positive correlations with three other strategy categories. This suggests that they are a 
little less strategy-rich in their use than interorganizational relationship, excellence and 
renewal, and framing the organization strategies. However, they are still likely to be used 
in strategy-rich response contexts including offensive approaches, future-oriented 
approaches, and explanative approaches.  
 Also important in these findings was that, unlike the other major strategies used 
by organizations in crisis, anti-social or defensive strategies typically did not occur in as 
strategy-rich CRMs. There were no significant positive correlations to other strategies 
and very importantly there was a strong negative correlation between employing anti-
social or defensive strategies and strategies that frame the crisis (r = -.30). This is ironic 
given that the aggressive approach, previously discussed in terms of its application to the 
Utility, Information, and Arts/ Entertainment/ Recreation Industries as well as with 
events outside the organization’s locus of control, directly pairs the framing the crisis and 
anti-social or defensive strategy categories. This suggests that while atypical, that when 
we see these strategies used in the same CRM that we can expect to see an aggressive 





 In general, these findings on the richness of strategies were also supported by the 
analysis of variance examining relationships between the total numbers of individual 
strategies employed in a crisis response message and the strategy categories also 
employed (see Tables 28 & 29). Like with the correlations interorganizational 
relationship, excellence or renewal, and framing the organization strategy categories 
occurred with the largest number of strategies used in CRMs. On average, when 
interorganizational relationships were employed almost seven different strategies were 
included in the message. Also high ( M > 5) were the strategies that frame the 
organization and excellence or renewal strategies. Not surprisingly, anti-social or 
defensive strategies were associated with relatively few individual strategies employed in 
the CRM (M < 3). However, an interesting finding was that strategies that frame the crisis 
were associated with the fewest total strategies included in the CRM, yet still has 
significant positive correlations with three other strategy categories. This suggests that 
while a strategy-rich context that when strategies that frame the crisis are present there 
are relatively few different strategies included at the same time—that the messages 
themselves are not as complex as with messages including other strategies.  
 Interestingly, while the other strategies are associated with larger numbers of 
strategies in a single CRM and/or larger number of strategy categories co-employed, 
strategies that frame the crisis and anti-social or defensive strategies are the most 
common strategy categories employed by organizations in crisis (see Tables 30 & 31). 
They are the only strategy categories where the observed values exceeded the expected 





common as anti-social or defensive and framing the crisis strategies. Additionally, taking 
all of this into account with the strong negative correlation between these two strategy 
categories, in general we can expect relatively simple CRMs from organizations in public 
or media-oriented statements. Yet, given that it would seem that simple rather than 
complex approaches are used most often in CRMs, it would leave the question—is it 
more typical to employ single or multiple strategy categories? Based on the t-test findings, 
it is more common to see multiple strategy categories employed in crisis response 
messages. So, even though the most common response strategies are relatively austere in 
the sheer number of strategies included in each CRM, it is rarer to see a single-strategy 
approach to crisis communication. Taken together with the other findings, these data 
suggest that crisis response messages tend to be rich in their approaches—more typically 
employing multiple strategy approaches even when with relatively straight-forward 
messages.  
Therefore, this research has not only contributed new knowledge of the influence 
of organizational and situational factors influence on CRMs, but a deeper understanding 
of how strategies are combined in CRMs. Specifically, there are two significant 
implications from this research on our knowledge of crisis communication. First, these 
findings afford researchers better opportunities to make predictions about the nature of 
crisis response messages based on organizational and situational factors than before. This 
predictive ability is advantageous on its own because—no matter the research design—
researchers will have a better opportunity to identify whether an (or a set of) 





which the organization belongs. Second, better understanding and predicting the content 
of crisis response messages allows researchers to make better informed research 
questions, inquiries into, and connections between crisis communication messages, 
organizational image, stakeholder groups, and other outcomes of crisis response and 
crisis management.   
 Discussion of the invocation of the forms of organizational culture. Another major 
contribution from this research is its inclusion of organizational culture as an explicit part 
of crisis response messages. While some authors (e.g., Marra, 1998) have argued that 
organizational culture is inextricably linked to crisis communication or that symbols or 
narratives are often used in crisis response messages (e.g., Glynn, 2000; Kauffman, 2001), 
there has not been a study to explicitly analyze the invocation of the forms of 
organizational culture in crisis response messages until the present study.  
 These data found (see Table 34) that each of the forms of organizational culture 
were strongly positively correlated to one another. This suggests that organizations either 
employ culturally-rich or culturally-lean crisis response messages. Overall, the invocation 
of cultural forms is not necessarily a routine (see Table 11) component in CRMs; 
however, as the previous discussion of findings indicates that their invocation does 
complement several of the strategies. This sparing invocation of the forms is also 
consistent with the findings that the most common strategies—those that frame the crisis 
and anti-social or defensive strategies—are used in contexts where relatively few 





invocation of organizational culture in the longer and more complex or strategy-rich 
public and media-oriented CRMs from organizations.  
 By further examining the results connecting crisis response strategies to the 
invocation of the forms of organizational culture, we get more depth and understanding 
of the nature of CRMs. While there were many strong and positive correlations between 
the forms (see Tables 35 & 36) and the CRSs, there are several findings that are 
noteworthy. First, consistent with the leaner findings for the connection of anti-social or 
defensive strategies to other CRSs, these were only significantly positively correlated (r 
= .13) to practices. So, when an organization uses anti-social or defensive strategies, 
about 13 percent of the time we can also expect the organizations to invoke their 
practices. Therefore, the majority of the time, it is unlikely that organization using anti-
social or defensive strategies will invoke cultural forms. This makes the anti-social or 
defensive strategy category the most lean strategy category—in all ways measured—
culturally, correspondence to other strategies, and the sheer number of strategies included 
in a crisis response message.  
 Strategies that frame the crisis, our second most lean strategy category had 
significant positive correlations for symbols, language, and narratives with correlations 
ranging from r = .16 to .19. Compared to the other major CRS categories, this made 
strategies that frame the crisis the second most lean category. This was also the only 
major strategy not to be correlated with the invocation of practices. While interesting, this 





organization, so the invocation of practices or rituals would not be consistent when 
emphasizing the crisis in a CRM. 
 On the other side of the spectrum, strategies that frame the organization were 
probably the most culturally rich CRS with an r = .41 correlation for both symbols and 
language and strong correlations for narratives (r = .28) and practices (r = .34). When an 
organization is responding to a crisis by employing the framing the organization strategy, 
they are strongly likely to also invoke their organization’s culture. This just makes sense, 
if an organizational representative is trying to frame the organization to the public and 
media; they are likely to try to communicate about the nature of the organization. 
Therefore, talking about the ‘characters’ in the organization, using company slogans, 
trying to incorporate the organization into a larger narrative, or talking about the rituals in 
the company would be effective ways to communicate about the nature and the ideology 
of the organization in order to portray it in a way to minimize the potential negative 
effects of the crisis on the organization.  
 The last three major strategy categories—accommodative, excellence or renewal, 
and interorganizational relationship—each had significant positive correlations with all 
four forms of organizational culture invoked in CRMs. Among all three strategies, the 
cultural form language was invoked most strongly. Its invocation through jargon or slang, 
humor, gossip or rumors, metaphors, and/or proverbs or slogans were all strongly 
incorporated into CRMs, especially with excellence and renewal as well as 
interorganizational relationship strategies as the correlation was very strong (r = .48). 





and these strategy categories. This suggests that the same organizations that employed 
strategy categories that were strategy-rich are also more likely to infuse a culturally rich 
invocation of cultural forms into their CRMs.  
SMOCC Discussion 
 Taken together, this study deepens and broadens our fundamental knowledge of 
crisis communication by offering a good sense of the state of the art of current practice of 
crisis response in public-oriented messages. This study has demonstrated that both 
situational and organizational variables are likely to influence the crisis response 
messages that an organization uses when communicating to public and media sources. 
This study has also demonstrated that the Strategic Model of Crisis Communication is 
developing as a useful tool for explaining and predicting phenomena associated with 
crisis response messages by demonstrating that organization type and crisis type are 
useful in explaining differences in the approaches to the use of CRSs as well as the 
invocation of the forms of organizational culture.  
SMOCC and Organization Type 
 These findings suggest that organizational variables are likely to influence the 
communicative messages used in periods of crisis. Initially, while limited in its 
usefulness, the propensity for an organization’s industry to be crisis prone is still useful in 
understanding many organization’s communicative choices. The variable is limited 
because there is such diversity in the organizations that either are or are not crisis prone 
that responses are better influenced by other factors. However, it is still a useful 





prone industries are more likely to have a more future-oriented approach to their public 
CRMs whereas organizations in industries that are less crisis prone are more likely to be 
present-oriented in their public CRMs. Another way to examine the influence of a crisis 
history on an organizations CRMs would be to operationalize the variable differently—
instead of operationalizing crisis prone versus non-crisis prone as belonging to an 
industry that faces many crises if it were operationalized as a particular organization’s 
history as crisis prone versus non-crisis prone this might result in a variable that more 
strongly predicts differences in an organization’s use of CRSs and invocation of 
organizational culture.  
 Industry, however, is a good tool of explanation and prediction of an 
organization’s use of CRSs and invocation of organizational culture. This study was 
designed to balance the number of cases in crisis type and take a cross-sectional 
examination of industries in crisis during a six-month period, so despite some very small 
cell counts for some of the industries not facing many crises in the time period selected, 
this study still found that industry influences three of the CRS categories—framing the 
crisis, anti-social or defensive, and accommodative. Industry also influenced the 
invocation of symbols and practices as cultural forms in public CRMs. It is possible that 
with larger cell counts for some of the industries that more influence on the strategies and 
invocation of organizational culture would be found. However, these findings do indicate 
that industry membership is a strong predictor of differences in approaches that 






 Taken together, organization type was found to be a useful distinction for 
understanding CRMs—certainly offering one layer of support for the SMOCC as a 
valuable model for investigating crisis communication. In the future, additional 
distinctions or comparisons for organizational type, such as based on sector (i.e., for 
profit, nonprofit, governmental), might be useful operationalizations for organization type. 
Because of the industry focus, this study emphasized business sources of CRMs.  
SMOCC and Crisis Type  
 These findings indicate that situational variables—in particular crisis type are 
very strong predictors of differences in the strategies used and invocation of 
organizational culture in CRMs. From these findings, a strong picture emerges of the 
patterns of influence that crisis type has on CRMs. Initially, organizations experiencing 
organizational transgressions use a strongly defensive approach to their CRMs 
emphasizing anti-social or defensive and accommodative strategies. Transgressions also 
typically incorporate the least culturally rich messages as well. Organizations 
experiencing organizational events have the richest sets of approaches to their public and 
media-oriented CRMs. We can expect to see strategies that frame the crisis, strategies 
that frame the organization, excellence or renewal strategies, and strategies that invoke 
interorganizational relationships most typically. Additionally, this study found that there 
are a couple of major approaches likely during organizational events—the explanative 
and offensive approach. This study also found that CRMs during organizational events 
were also most culturally rich influencing the significant inclusion of symbols, language, 





of control these data found that organizations are most likely to employ an aggressive 
approach to crisis management. Additionally, despite the strong inclusion of anti-social 
or defensive strategies as well as strategies that frame the crisis, when organizations 
experience these crises they are also likely to employ symbols and narratives in their 
CRMs.  
Value of the SMOCC 
These findings offer strength and validity to the proposition of crisis type as a key 
situational variable in the SMOCC. More than that, these findings also suggest that with 
continued development and analysis of organizational and situational variables that the 
SMOCC will continue to develop and be a useful model for examining crisis 
communication. The better that we understand different variables’ influence on crisis 
response messages, the more effectively we will understand both the phenomenon and 
practice of crisis communication. This study offers a benchmark test for predicting and 
understanding how organizations across industries and types of crises ‘typically’ respond 
to crises in their public and media-oriented crisis response messages. This benchmark is 
possible because this study is the first cross-sectional examination of the influence of 
such factors on the content of crisis response messages. One of very few other examples 
of cross-sectional analysis of crisis response messages—Allen and Calliouet’s (1994) 
study of the relationship of impression management strategies and different stakeholder 
groups—was valuable in emphasizing the influence of different stakeholder groups on 
messages. However, this study progresses from such previous research because it offers a 





factors as a prima facie source of influence on the CRMs. Therefore, this study represents 
a decided move beyond the identification of strategies and their rich case-oriented 
discussion to a process of theory-building.  
This study has offered a much more detailed picture of crisis response messages 
than previously existed. There are two central contributions that this study makes. First it 
is a benchmark effort to specifically examine how organizational culture is invoked in 
CRMs. Certainly, invoking one’s organizational culture is not a part of each CRM; 
however, this study found that they are, overall, a meaningful component in CRMs. 
Additionally, this study found previously unknown and strong connections between crisis 
response strategies and the invocation of the forms of organizational culture. This 
contribution from the research offers a much stronger amount and quality of information 
about the nature of public and media-oriented crisis communication than previously 
existed in the research. These findings also suggest that the invocation of cultural forms 
is one important way that organizations try to communicate their ideology, priorities, and 
identify while managing crisis situations.  
The second critical contribution that this study has made to the study of crisis 
communication is by moving beyond descriptive taxonomies and examples of crisis 
response strategies. By identifying the ways in which these strategies are used together, 
this research is distinctive from previous research in that it has identified actual 
approaches in the employment of crisis response strategies. Understanding how these rich 
and interesting strategies fit together when they are used by organizations provides a new 





cross-sectional analyses, and longitudinal studies to catalog and develop more 
sophisticated discussions of specific approaches to crisis response messages—particularly 
with predictive ability based on organization and crisis type. Essentially, this study 
provides a basis for new language in analyzing and discussing CRMs—both in terms of 
the richness of the approaches, response strategies, and invocation of cultural forms and 
in terms of the actual approaches to response strategies possible combining different 
strategic categories.  
SMOCC research contributions to other areas of organizational communication. 
Because crisis communication is an area of study that represents a “situation” in which an 
organization might find itself, there are many important contributions the present research 
makes to the field’s knowledge of organizational communication in crisis contexts 
including: stakeholder communication combined with organizational image or legitimacy 
research as well as research in organizational culture. Cheney, (1992) argued: 
Viewed in one way, public relations is the study and practice of corporate public 
rhetoric: the organization speaking to/with various publics. And, with the 
expansion of corporate communications into issue management, identity 
management, or related activities, the role of the corporate rhetor in American 
society (and for that matter, in the entire industrialized world) is taking on greater 
visibility and importance. Today we find all sorts of organizations and collectives 
speaking. Nevertheless, we know surprisingly little about message by, from, and 
for organizations. Put another way, we have difficulty both in coping with and 





communication from corporate bodies all the time (messages of businesses, 
governments, religious groups, lobbies, hospitals, universities, unions, social 
action groups, and so forth). Neither rhetorical nor communication theory have 
fully come to terms with the organizational nature of much of communication in 
our society (p. 166-7). 
Fundamentally, these findings offer substantially more information about how 
organizations speak to their publics during periods of crisis—situations which affect all 
organizations and represent a real threat to organizations with effects ranging from 
financial, to environmental, to image (e.g., Hays & Patton, 2001; Pearson & Clair, 1998). 
For researchers interested in stakeholder communication, crisis communication should be 
a critical concept of consideration when addressing the phenomena of stakeholder 
communication and image or legitimacy management. In fact, Heath (1994) argues that, 
“organizational communication is all that is said and done that helps stakeholders enact 
their relationships with the company…as well as the ways the company communicates its 
relationship with stakeholders" (p. 161). This certainly applies not only to stakeholder 
communication, but also to crisis communication from organizations to their multiple 
constituencies. However, much contemporary research already links stakeholder and 
crisis communication with image and issue management (Basham, 2001; Greer & 
Moreland, 2003; Hayes & Patton, 2001; Johnson, Zorn, Tam, Lamontagne, & Johnson, 
2003; Trettin & Musham, 2000). These findings offer several contributions to the study 
of stakeholder and image communication. First, organizations, as Cheney suggests, are 





organizations both depending on the industry and the type of crisis being experienced. 
Because much contemporary research on stakeholder and image management is already 
focusing on crisis situations, the present research offers a more robust way to examine the 
typicality of messages employed by an organization as well as the degree to which those 
messages are focused on actively managing the image, aggressively denying the 
organization’s culpability, or trying to explain the situation. Such research can inform 
research design, message content, and explanation of outcomes.  
 Additionally, in finding that organizational culture is an important component to 
crisis response messages, the present study contributes to the study of organizational 
culture at a macro-level of consideration. Some previous research on organizational 
culture has examined it as an industry level of phenomenon. For example, Beyer and 
Browning’s (1999) research found that leaders in the semi-conductor industry created a 
metaphor of struggle characterizing the industry. Beyer and Browning’s work did not 
focus on public discourse; however, it demonstrates the emergence of a consistent 
invocation of a metaphor in an industry. The present study expands such an 
understanding of organizational culture by examining the invocation of forms across both 
industries and types of crisis. This study is also an extension of the study of 
organizational culture in crisis situations more specifically as well. For example, in their 
study of promotionalism, Knight and Greenberg (2002) argue that what has made Nike 
both more susceptible to activism and more effective in addressing complaints about the 
company has been in its active integration of identity in their corporate messages. This 





communicated through appeals to their organization’s culture. The present study 
incorporated and expanded this interrogation of communicating an organization’s identity 
specifically in crisis response strategies to identify the ways in which cultural forms were 
invoked by organizations. The connection between the invocation of organizational 
culture and crisis response has been identified since the 1980s (Trujillo & Toth, 1987) 
and continued into the 1990s (Pearson & Clair, 1998), and has remained a connection of 
interest into the 2000s (Moore, 2004). However, the present study built on previous ways 
of examining the invocation of organizational culture by explicitly arguing and 
demonstrating that it is an important variable of interest in crisis response strategies that 
follows specific patterns based on both industry and crisis type.  
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
While this study’s central limitation of an imbalance in the cells for industry and 
several directions for future research have already been discussed, it is important to 
develop a more detailed discussion of each. Initially, there was a sampling limitation. 
While there is no better and more thorough resource for corporate printed press releases 
and print media coverage of crisis response messages than Lexis/Nexis™; it is a limited 
sample in that it does not include announcements, speeches, or corporate websites. 
Certainly announcement and speech segments are included in print media coverage of 
crises; however, they are also edited for space and content. This could suggest a bias in 
the types of crisis responses included; however, this potential bias is minimized because 
the Lexis/Nexis™ data base also includes press releases directly from companies. 





However, that does not alleviate the limitation that the present study only incorporated 
print public rhetoric about crises. Future studies should examine and compare other 
channels of communication as well.  
An additional limitation in the study is the cross-sectional nature of the study 
design. While the design is advantageous in that it affords the examination of crisis 
response messages across many industries and offers a strong examination of current 
practices in crisis response message design, it is also limited because crises often take 
years to resolve, so a six-month cross-section of crises does not allow for an in-depth 
analysis of any changes to message components. One alternative design that should 
afford the same advantages as the cross-sectional, but without its limitations would be a 
study with a longitudinal design. It would include fewer different crises, but follow each 
organization’s communication about the crisis from beginning to ending.  
Future Research Based on the SMOCC 
Essentially, there are three major directions for future research emerging from this 
model and the present study. Initially, the top priority should be given to continuing to 
develop organizational and situational factors including a more balanced analysis of 
industry. As I argued in the rationale and proposal of this particular study, these are the 
factors that ground the model; understanding these factors makes for a stronger 
understanding of the phenomenon of crisis communication, but also makes better 
predictions for the outcomes of the model possible. Yet, there is a need to continue to 
develop and test organizational and situational factors. Other such factors might include 





association, an individual organization’s knowledge and organizational learning after 
crises seems likely to influence its future crisis responses. Additionally, there is a need to 
continue to test for interaction effects between the different factors influencing CRMs, so 
building more balanced study designs would be useful in order to more effectively 
examine interaction effects. Finally, it will be valuable to examine changes in these 
trends over time. This study was certainly influenced by contemporary organizational 
climates including what industries are affected, the ways they are affected by crisis, an 
influx of major environmental disasters, etc.; therefore, it will be useful to compare 
different periods in CRMs to best account for the influence of contemporary 
organizational environments on organizational responses to those crises.  
Once the patterns of influence are understood there are two ways that researchers 
can further develop our understandings of the influence and outcomes of CRSs. First, 
future research should explore crisis response message movement through the SMOCC 
as a whole. This could be accomplished by following sets of crises from start to finish 
examining all the factors in the model: organizational and situational factors; message 
features including strategies, invocation of culture, stakeholder decisions, and channels of 
communication employed; and ending with analyzing the crises outcomes to understand 
this as part of the process of crisis management. Second, future research should also 
focus on the persuasive elements of crisis response messages. By focusing on message 
features, we can continue to develop our understanding of the explicitly communicative 
elements of crisis communication. This can be accomplished by examining the 





response strategies and invocation of organizational culture—delivered through different 
channels to different stakeholder groups. This direction would most closely focus on 
image-oriented outcomes of messages. Across all three directions for future research 
there is a wealth of opportunity for research, regardless of ontological perspective or 
research methodology employed. In fact, this model would be best served through 
rigorous interrogations of it from multiple ontological perspectives along with multiple 
methodological applications ranging from organizational ethnography to experimental 
design. 
Connecting SMOCC Research to Other Areas of Organizational Communication 
 For researchers not immediately excited by the future research focusing 
specifically on crisis response messages specifically, there are also three strong directions 
of future research connected to other areas of research in organizational communication; 
stakeholder communication, organizational and legitimacy research, and organizational 
culture. Because stakeholder communication is a part of the SMOCC, developing 
stakeholder research and knowledge specifically related to the model will be useful; 
however, extending the present research to develop other areas of research connecting 
stakeholder and crisis communication will also yield valuable information about the 
phenomena. In their analysis of issue management, Cheney and Christensen (2001) argue 
that an organization’s identity and issue management is interwoven, that organizations 
have many different types of stakeholders—both internal and external—that have to be 
managed when issues present themselves, and there are balances to be achieved between 





discussed here including the influence of different industries, crisis types, and approaches 
emerging from those influences would be to examine similarities and differences in 
communication to the type of stakeholder (e.g., internal or external). Building on such 
research, future research connecting stakeholder communication and crisis response 
should examine the effectiveness of the eight approaches outlined in the discussion with 
different stakeholder groups and under different situations. Additionally, it would also be 
interesting to examine the degree to which approaches or crisis response strategies were 
both expected and desirable by different stakeholder groups. In all, applying the findings 
from this research to future research on stakeholder communication could be explored 
using qualitative, quantitative, and experimental designs depending on the interests and 
research questions or hypotheses of the researcher(s).  
 Additional research applying the findings from the present research can be used 
for organizational communication scholars interested in examining organizational image 
or legitimacy more specifically. One such direction for future research would be to 
identify communicative goals by organizations in crises along with different types of 
stakeholder groups, then identify the degree to which the messages communicated 
achieve both sets of goals, and the resulting influence on the assessment of the 
organization in crisis’s image or legitimacy. Matching goals and communicative effects 
would be an interesting and distinctive evolution in the study of organizational image and 
legitimacy, particularly during periods of crisis.  
 Finally, researchers interested in focusing on organizational culture and its culture 





the invocation of the forms of organizational culture by organizations in their crisis 
response messages would be to compare the cultural messages communicated by an 
organization in crisis with organizational members’ lived experiences with ideology and 
the organization’s culture. Such a study could code crisis response messages for content 
and/or categories and include either qualitative or quantitative measures of the members’ 
cultural experiences. Such a study would be an interesting way to compare the public and 
private ‘faces’ of an organization to identify parity in them. An additional exploration of 
organizational culture that applies and extends the present research would be to 
investigate the ways in which organizational leaders and crisis managers translate an 
organization’s culture into their crisis response strategies—including the level of intent as 
well as methods to translate the lived experience into a public explanation of 
organizational identity.  
 As a way of concluding this research, this model, and this dissertation process I 
go back to this metaphor of a puzzle where the pieces have not yet been assembled. There 
is process in the assembly—some pieces should go together first, which is why a study of 
the Strategic Model of Crisis Communication necessarily had to begin by focusing on 
those factors that influence the crisis response messages themselves. In assembling pieces 
of this puzzle, this research has made several important contributions to our 
understanding of crisis communication and in particular crisis response messages. 
However, from the process of assembly to the interrogation of the picture, future research 












Strategy Description Key Author(s) 
Self-
Enhancement 
Marketing Emphasizing product quality, prices, 
safety, promotions 
Heath (1994), Proto 
& Supino (1999), 
Scott & Lane (2000) 
 Image 
Advertising 
Providing information to make the 
organization look positive. Framing an 
issue for the stakeholders 
Heath (1994; 1998), 







organizational goals/ mentioning mission/ 
vision 
Heath (1994) 
 Annual Reports Report monetary assets, liabilities, future 
liabilities, interest in cooperation to 
increase market value 
Heath (1994), Proto 
& Supino (1999) 
 Newsletters Report monetary gains, attention to 
stakeholder concerns 
Fiol (1995), Heath 




Accounts Development of dominant narrative, use 
of narrative to explain the problem 
Kauffman (2001), 
Massey (2001), 




Delivering information regarding the issue 
to educate, often with the goal of 
increasing stakeholder sense of 
empowerment 





 Issue Salience Communicating importance, often uses 





Williams & Olaniran 
(1998) 
 Preconditioning Influencing stakeholders to the 
organization’s position on a crisis and 
their opinions about the organization by: 
downplaying damage, putting act in a 
more favorable context, or attacking 
accusers 




Ingratiation Efforts to create positive image by 
reminding stakeholders of past good 
works or qualities 




Presenting the organization as being 
highly competent, effective, successful 
Marra (1998), 




Issue diagnosis, advocacy advertising  Cheney & 
Christensen (2001), 
Gonzales-Herrero & 
Pratt (1998), Hayes 
& Patton (2001)  
 Supplication Portraying the organization as dependent 
on others in effort to solicit assistance 




Making task success appear unlikely in 
order to have ready-made case for failure 






Table 1 (Continued) 
 Bolstering An effort to separate the organization 
from the crisis by emphasizing past 
accomplishments, stress good traits 
Benoit & Czerwinski 
(1997), Benoit 
(2004), Coombs & 
Schmidt (2000), 
Kauffman (2001), 








 Disclaimers Explanations given prior to an action that 
might be embarrassing to ward off 
negative implications to image 




Indicating that actions are driven by 
compliance or requirements 
Henriques & 
Sadorsky (1999) 
 Evasion of 
Responsibility 
De-emphasizing role in blame by: 
emphasizing lack of control over events; 
emphasizing accident; or emphasizing 
good intentions 
Benoit (2004; 1997), 
Benoit & Czerwinski 
(1997), Coombs & 
Holladay (2002), 
Coombs & Schmidt 
(2000), Henderson 






The most defensive strategy—shifting or 
minimizing responsibility for fault 
Benoit (2004), 
Benoit (1997), 
Coombs & Holladay 
(2002), Coombs & 
Schmidt (2000), Ray 
(1999) 
 Simple Denial The organization did not perform the act Benoit & Czerwinski 
(1997), Benoit 




Not releasing many details, able to keep 
stories consistent 
Sellnow & Ulmer 
(1995), Ulmer & 
Sellnow (2000), 
Sellnow & Ulmer 
(2004)  
 Intimidation Representing the organization as powerful 
or dangerous, willing and able to 
adversely affect those who oppose its 
efforts 
Mohamed, et al. 
(1999) 
 Minimization Emphasizing act or event not serious Benoit (2004: 1997), 
Benoit & Czerwinski 
(1997), Coombs & 
Schmidt (2000) 
 Transcendence Emphasizing more important 
considerations 
Benoit & Czerwinski 
(1997); Benoit 
(2004) 
Accommodative Corrective Action/ 
Compensation 
Effort to ‘correct’ actions adversely 
affecting others. Can include 
announcements of recall or offers of 
compensation 
Benoit (2004; 1997), 
Benoit & Czerwinski 
(1997), Coombs & 
Holladay (2002), 
Coombs & Schmidt 
(2000), Henderson 
(2003), Martinelli & 
Briggs (1998), 
Mohamed, et al. 





Table 1 (Continued) 
 Apologia Communication of contrition, admission of 
blame including remorse and requests for 
pardon, mortification 
Benoit (2004; 1997), 
Benoit & Czerwinski 
(1997), Coombs & 
Holladay (2002), 
Coombs & Schmidt 
(2000), Hearit 
(1999), Henderson 
(2003), Martinelli & 
Briggs (1998), 
Mohamed, et al. 
(1999) 
 Compassion Communication of concern over well-
being/ safety of public; helping people 
psychologically cope with crisis 
Coombs (1999), 
Martinelli & Briggs 
(1998), Mohamedet 




‘This will never happen again…’ 




Asking stakeholders to feel sorry for the 
organization because of what happened 
Ray (1999) 
 Transparency Emphasizing complete compliance, 
openness to inquiry, requesting 
information seeking 
Greer & Moreland 
(2003), Kauffman 
(2001), Sellnow & 
Seeger (2001), 
Sellnow & Ulmer 
(1995), Williams & 
Olaniran (1998) 
 Volunteering Seeking stakeholder involvement with the 





Dialogic Emphasizing openness and willingness to 
engage about the issue 
Das & Teng (1998), 
Milliman, et al. 
(1994), Nielson & 
Bartenuk (1996), 
Williams & Olaniran 
(1998) 
 Exemplification Portraying the organization as having 
integrity, social responsibility, moral 
worthiness 
Benoit & Czerwinski 
(1997), Henriques & 
Sadorsky (1999), 
Marra (1998), 




Engaging in actions to atone for 
transgression and persuade stakeholders 
of positive identity 
Mohamed, et al. 
(1999), Sellnow & 
Brand (2001)  




Blaring Others Identifying a negative link to an 
undesirable other 
Mohamed, et al. 
(1999) 
 Blasting Exaggerating negative features of an 
undesirable other 
Mohamed, et al. 
(1999), Sellnow & 
Brand (2001) 
 Burying Obscuring or disclaiming a positive link to 
an undesirable other 
Mohamed, et al. 
(1999) 
 Blurring Obscuring or disclaiming a negative link 
to a favorable other 






Table 1 (Continued) 
 Belittling Minimizing traits or accomplishments of a 
negatively linked other, attacking 
accuser’s credibility 
Benoit & Czerwinski 
(1997),  Coombs & 
Schmidt (2000), 
Mohamed, et al. 
(1999) 
 Boosting Minimizing undesirable features of a 
positively linked other 
Mohamed, et al. 
(1999) 
 Boasting Proclaiming a positive link to a desirable 
other 
Mohamedet al.,  
(1999) 
 Burnishing Enhancing desirable features of a 
positively linked other 
Mohamed, et al. 
(1999) 
 Collaboration Emphasizing desire to change and work 




Martinelli & Briggs 









2002 NAICS Listing of American Industries 
 




All Crop Production and Farming, Greenhouse, Nursery, and Floriculture, Food Crops 
Grown Under Cover, Nursery and Floriculture Production, Other Crop Farming, Food 
Animal Production, Animal Aquaculture, Apiculture, Horses and Other Equine 
Production, All Other Animal Production, Forestry and Logging, Fishing, Hunting and 
Trapping, Support Activities for Agriculture and Forestry, Farm Labor Contractors and 
Crew Leaders, Support Activities for Animal Production, Support Activities for Forestry 
Mining All Mining, Quarrying, and Support Activities 
 
Utilities Electric Power Generation, Transmission and Distribution, Natural Gas Distribution, 
Water, Sewage and Other Systems, Steam and Air-Conditioning Supply 
Construction 
 
Construction of Buildings, Heavy and Civil Engineering Construction (utilities, 
water/sewer, oil and gas lines, power and communication lines), Land Subdivision, 
Highway, Street, and Bridge Construction, Specialty Trade Contractors 
 
Manufacturing Food Manufacturing (human and animal consumption), Grain and Oilseed Milling, 
Starch and Vegetable Fats and Oils Manufacturing, Sugar and Confectionery Product 
Manufacturing, Fruit and Vegetable Preserving and Specialty Food Manufacturing, 
Dairy Product Manufacturing, Animal Slaughtering and Processing, Seafood Product 
Preparation and Packaging, Bakeries and Tortilla Manufacturing, Other Food 
Manufacturing, Beverage and Tobacco Product Manufacturing, Textile Mills, Textile 
Product Mills, Apparel Manufacturing, Leather and Allied Product Manufacturing, 
Wood Product Manufacturing, Paper Manufacturing, Printing and Related Support 
Activities, Chemical Manufacturing, Plastics and Rubber Products Manufacturing, 
Nonmetallic Mineral Product Manufacturing, Primary Metal Manufacturing, Fabricated 
Metal Product Manufacturing, Machinery Manufacturing, Computer and Electronic 
Product Manufacturing, Electrical Equipment, Appliance, and Component 
Manufacturing, Transportation Equipment Manufacturing, Furniture and Related 
Product Manufacturing, Miscellaneous Manufacturing 
Wholesale Trade Merchant Wholesalers, Durable Goods, Merchant Wholesalers, Nondurable Goods, 
Wholesale Electronic Markets and Agents and Brokers 
 
Retail Trade Motor Vehicle and Parts Dealers, Furniture and Home Furnishings Stores, Electronics 
and Appliance Stores, Building Material and Garden Equipment and Supplies 
Dealers, Food and Beverage Stores, Health and Personal Care Stores, Gasoline 
Stations, Clothing and Clothing Accessories Stores, Sporting Goods, Hobby, Book, 





Air Transportation, Rail Transportation, Water Transportation, Truck Transportation, 
Transit and Ground Passenger Transportation, Pipeline Transportation, Scenic and 
Sightseeing Transportation, Support Activities for Transportation, Postal Service, 
Couriers and Messengers, Warehousing and Storage 
Information Publishing Industries (except Internet), Motion Picture and Sound Recording 
Industries, Broadcasting (except Internet), Internet Publishing and Broadcasting, 
Telecommunications, Internet Service Providers, Web Search Portals, and Data 




Monetary Authorities - Central Bank, Credit Intermediation and Related Activities, 
Securities, Commodity Contracts, and Other Financial Investments and Related 
Activities, Insurance Carriers and Related Activities, Funds, Trusts, and Other 
Financial Vehicles 
Real Estate and 
Rental/Leasing 
Real Estate, Rental and Leasing Services, Lessors of Nonfinancial Intangible Assets 





Table 2 (Continued) 
 
Professional, Scientific, 
and Technical Services 
Legal Services, Accounting, Tax Preparation, Bookkeeping, and Payroll 
Services, Architectural, Engineering, and Related Services, Specialized 
Design Services, Computer Systems Design and Related Services, 
Management, Scientific, and Technical Consulting Services, Scientific 
Research and Development Services, Advertising and Related Services, Other 




Bank holding and Executive Offices 
Administrative and 
Support and Waste 
Management and 
Remediation Services 
Administrative and Support Services, Facilities Support Services, Employment 
Services, Business Support Services, Travel Arrangement and Reservation 
Services, Investigation and Security Services, Services to Buildings and 
Dwellings, Other Support Services, Waste Collection, Waste Treatment and 
Disposal, Remediation and Other Waste Management Services 
Educational Services Elementary and Secondary Schools, Junior Colleges, Colleges, Universities, 
and Professional Schools, Business Schools and Computer and Management 
Training, Technical and Trade Schools, Other Schools and Instruction, 
Educational Support Services 
Health Care and Social 
Assistance 
Ambulatory Health Care Services, Hospitals, Nursing and Residential Care 
Facilities, Social Assistance, Child and Elderly Care (non-resident) 
Arts, Entertainment, and 
Recreation 
Performing Arts, Spectator Sports, and Related Industries, Museums, 
Historical Sites, and Similar Institutions, Zoos and Botanical Gardens, 
Amusement, Gambling, and Recreation Industries, Golf Courses and Country 
Clubs, Skiing Facilities, Marinas, Fitness and Recreational Sports Centers, All 
others 
Accommodation and Food 
Services 
 
Traveler Accommodation, RV (Recreational Vehicle) Parks and Recreational 
Camps, Rooming and Boarding Houses, Food Services and Drinking Places, 
Special Food Services, Drinking Places (Alcoholic Beverages) 
Other Services (except 
Public Administration) 
Repair and Maintenance, Personal and Laundry Services, Religious, 




Executive, Legislative, and Other General Government Support, Justice, 
Public Order, and Safety Activities, Administration of Human Resource 
Programs, Administration of Environmental Quality Programs, Administration 
of Housing Programs, Urban Planning, and Community Development, 
Administration of Economic Programs, Space Research and Technology, 








Types of Crises 
 





Intentional or unintentional activities of an 
agent or organization, done for the 
organization’s benefit. Examples: 
conspiring to fix prices, antitrust 
violations, discrimination, patent 
infringement 
Baucus & Baucus 
(1997), Coombs & 
Holladay (2002), 
Hearit (1999), 





Accident caused by technology or 
equipment failure. Example: airline 
crashes 
Coombs & Holladay 
(2002), Hearit (1999), 






Recall of a product because of technical 
or equipment failure 
Coombs & Holladay 
(2002), Hearit (1999), 
Marcus & Goodman 
(1991), Pearson & 
Clair (1998) 
 Megadamage A technical breakdown accident that 
produces significant environmental 
damage. Example: the Exxon Valdez 
crash 
Coombs & Holladay 





Industrial accident caused by human 
error. 
Coombs & Holladay 
(2002), Hearit (1999), 





Product recall that is a result of human 
error. 
Coombs & Holladay 
(2002), Hearit (1999), 
Marcus & Goodman 





Occurs when management knowingly 
deceives stakeholders, but no injury 
results to stakeholders. 
Coombs & Holladay 
(2002), Hearit (1999), 





Occurs when management knowingly 
places some stakeholders at risk and 
some are injured and/or killed. 
Coombs & Holladay 
(2002), Hearit (1999), 







Combination (or failure to) combine, to 
some degree, with another organization.  
Basham (2001), King 
(2002) 
 Strikes The stoppage or threat to stop work at an 
organization by a union or group of 













Attacks on the job by organizational 
members or former members resulting in 
violence. Examples: Post Office 
Shootings, Sexual Harassment 
Coombs & Holladay 














Rumor The circulation of false information 
designed to hurt the organization. 
Coombs & Holladay 
(2002), King (2002); 





Damage of products or services by an 
external agent that harms the 
organization 
Coombs & Holladay 
(2002), Pearson & 
Clair (1998) 
 Challenge Confrontation by disgruntled 
stakeholders claiming the organization 
has acted wrongly. Examples: Pressure 
Group Activism, Boycotts 
Coombs & Holladay 
(2002), Heath 
(1996), Pearson & 
Clair (1998) 
 Shifting Political 
Attitudes 
As the political attitudes change 
products, services, company ideals, etc. 




Naturally occurring event that harms the 
organization and/or its stakeholders. 
Examples: Tornado, Earthquake 
Basham (2001), 
Coombs & Holladay 
(2002), Gonzales-
Herrero & Pratt 
(1998), Pearson & 
Clair (1998) 
 Terrorist Attack Actions by an outside agent with an array 
of impacts from loss of stakeholders, 
employees, infrastructure, collapses in 
demand, significant secondary effects 
(e.g., customer service, breakdowns in 


















Channel Definition Key Author(s) 
Public Mass Media (not 
including the 
Internet) 
Television, newspapers, magazines, 
journals, radio. The media can both be a 
target audience and a channel of 
communication 
Argenti (2002), Benoit 
& Czerwinski (1997), 
Henderson (2003) 
 Advertising Television, print, radio.  Basham (2001) 
 Editorial Boards Articles, letters to the editor, newsletters, 
background briefs, public relations 
statements 
Basham (2001) 
 Internet  Either internal websites or external 
information pages. Are widely available, 
easily updated, flexible content, 
inexpensive 
Basham (2001), Greer 
& Moreland (2003), 
Moore (2004), Perry 




Often counter protests, typically done in 
response to protest or activism by 
pressure groups. 
Heath (1998) 
 Third Party 
Channels 
Instead of directly countering assertions, a 
third party will make challenges to 
criticisms, etc. Thought that it is a softer 
form of confrontation, focusing on the 





With key community influentials, major 
customers, community/ non-profit 
groups, ethic organizations, low 
income/senior groups 
Basham (2001) 
 Public Speaking 
Engagements 
Often with the community or business 
organizations. Can be used to adopt a 
public negotiating stance to 
communicate the organization does not 
operate behind closed doors 
Basham (2001), 
Heath (1998) 
 Live Employee 
Briefings 




Email, employee newspapers, information 
for videos 
Basham (2001) 
 CEO Letters  Typically delivered to critical stakeholder 













Type of Form Definition and/ or Example of Form 
Symbols Objects Uniforms; Physical barriers; attire; emblems of the organization 
such as flags, seals, certificates, diplomas, photos; physical 
environment; sources of identification, physical objects used to 
represent the organization 
 Settings Physical layout of the space; organization of the location; colors 
included; furnishings 
 Performers and 
Functionaries 
Individuals used to characterize the organization, e.g., Colonel 
Sanders for KFC  
Language Jargon and 
Slang 
Specialized language used by those that must be learned by 
outsiders, e.g., NEC (Naval Enlisted Classification) or CC 
(Company Commander) used by the Navy.  
 Gestures, 
Signs 
Nonverbal forms of communication representing the organization 
or that only members of the organization know.  
 Songs Mary Kay Cosmetic’s popular corporate song, “I’ve Got that Mary 
Kay Enthusiasm”.  
 Humor, Jokes, 
Gossip, and 
Rumor 
Humor is an expression of culture tied to the organization’s values 
and norms. Banter and jokes are also included in this category. 
Gossip consists of informal talk about recent events. Rumor 
uses ‘the grapevine’ to communicate information 
 Metaphors Comparisons where people reach understanding by comparing 
one thing to another. E.g., ‘Time is money’ 
 Proverbs and 
Slogans 
Proverbs are brief popular sayings, e.g., “Absolutely pure, 
therefore the best.”  (from Cadbury, Ltd.) Slogans are used to be 
specifically persuasive, e.g., “Just do it.” (from Nike) 
Narratives Stories and 
Legends 
Stories that are widely shared and carry a distinctive cultural 
meaning for the individuals communicating the story. Relation of 
previous experiences to present experiences.  
 Sagas Stories that focus on the heroic exploits of organizational 
members performed in the face of adversity.  
 Myths Stories used to explain the origins or transformation of things of 
great importance in the organization.  
Practices Rituals and 
Taboos 
Rituals are simply combinations of repetitive behaviors. Those 
typical routines that are either performed or explicitly not 
performed in an organization.  
 Rites and 
Ceremonials 
Rites of Passage—e.g., induction and basic training in the US 
Army 
  Rites of Degradation—e.g., firing and replacing top executives 
  Rites of Enhancement—e.g., Mary Kay seminars 
  Rites of Renewal—e.g., annual meetings 
  Rites of Conflict Reduction—e.g., collective bargaining 
  Rites of Integration—e.g., corporate Christmas party 
  Rites of Creation—e.g., creation of new roles to bring about 
change 
  Rites of Transition—e.g., rite to celebrate the change in 
administration 







Descriptive Statistics for Crisis Prone versus Non-Crisis Prone Organizations 
 
Condition n P Intercoder Reliability 
Non-Crisis Prone 132 33.1  
Crisis Prone 267 66.9  





Descriptive Statistics for Different Industries Experiencing Crises 
 
Industry n P Intercoder Reliability 
Agriculture 14 3.5  
Mining 18 4.5  
Utilities 15 3.8  
Construction 3 .8  
Manufacturing 114 28.6  
Wholesale Trade 18 6.5  
Retail Trade 26 6.5  
Transportation & Warehousing 13 3.3  
Information 50 12.5  
Finance & Insurance 42 10.5  
Professional, Scientific, and Technological 30 7.5  
Management of Companies 3 .8  
Administration Support & Waste Remediation 3 .8  
Educational Services 3 .8  
Health and Social Assistance 5 1.3  
Arts, Entertainment and Recreation 24 6.0  
Accommodation and Food Services 12 6.0  
Public Administration 6 1.5  








Descriptive Statistics for Crisis Type  
 
Type of Crisis n P Intercoder 
Reliability 
Organizational Transgression 142 35.6 .93 
Illegal Corporate Behavior 92   
Technical Breakdown/Accident 9   
Technical Breakdown/Recall 9   
Megadamage 3   
Human Breakdown/Recall 6   
Misdeed without Injuries 14   
Misdeed with Injuries 9   
Organizational Events 149 37.3 .95 
Mergers & Failed Mergers 66   
Strikes 18   
Economic Downturns with Organizational Action 
Needed 
56   
Workplace Violence 6   
Events Outside the Organization’s Control 108 27.1 .93 
Rumor 49   
Malevolence/ Product Tampering 6   
Challenge 23   
Natural Disasters 27   
Terrorist Attack 6   








Descriptive Statistics for Crisis Response Strategies Invoked During Crises 
Strategy Category n M SD P Intercoder Reliability 
Self-Enhancement 5 1.01 .11 1.26 .75 
Image Advertising 5     
Routine Communication 15 1.04 .19 3.77 .76 
Annual Reports 14     
Newsletters 1     
Frame the Crisis 264 1.66 .47 66.33 .88 
Accounts 61     
Information Dissemination 178     
Issue Salience 40     
Preconditioning 93     
Frame the Organization 124 1.31 .46 31.16 .86 
Ingratiation 18     
Organizational Promotion 69     
Organizational Handicapping 22     
Bolstering 48     
Issue Management 22     
Supplication 9     
Defensive or Anti-Social 215 1.54 .50 54.02 .91 
Noncompliance 53     
Disclaimers 11     
Defensive Compliance 17     
Evasion of Responsibility 16     
Shifting the Blame 23     
Simple Denial 63     
Strategic Ambiguity 61     
Minimization 48     
Transcendence 23     
Intimidation 26     
Accommodative  101 1.25 .44 25.38 .83 
Corrective Action 58     
Apologia 13     
Compassion 15     
Eliciting Sympathy 10     
Transparency 11     
Offering Reassurances 29     
Excellence & Renewal 101 1.25 .44 25.38 .86 
Exemplification 61     
Pro-Social Behavior 32     
Dialogic 26     
Interorganizational Relationships 138 1.35 .48 34.67 .84 
Blaring Others 45     
Belittling Others 35     
Boasting 49     
Collaboration 76     
Blasting 20     
Burying 6     
Boosting 4     
Burnishing 22     








Descriptive Statistics for Primary Strategy Category Employed by Organizations 
in Crisis 
 
Strategy Category n P Intercoder Reliability 
Routine Communication 3 .8  
Framing the Crisis 118 29.6  
Framing the Organization 41 10.3  
Anti-Social or Defensive 139 34.8  
Accommodative 44 11.0  
Excellence or Renewal 18 4.5  
Interorganizational Relationships 35 8.8  





Descriptive Statistics for the Invocation of the Forms of Organizational Culture 
 
Form of Organizational Culture n M SD P Intercoder Reliability 
Symbols 76 1.19 .39 19.05 .82 
Objects 21     
Settings 18     
Performers & Functionaries 58     
Language 163 1.41 .49 40.85 .81 
Jargon & Slang 114     
Gestures, Signals, & Signs 2     
Humor, Jokes, Gossip, Rumor 7     
Metaphors & Imagery 72     
Proverbs & Slogans 25     
Narratives 37    .74 
Stories & Legends 10     
Myths 13     
Sagas 9     
Practices 94 1.24 .43 23.60 .88 
Rituals & Taboos 52     
Rites & Ceremonies 55     








Significant Chi-square Findings for Hypothesis 1A: Differences in CRS 
Categories  
 
Based on Crisis Prone versus Non-crisis Prone Organizations 
 
 
Crisis Response Strategy Category
Organization Type 







Routine Communication   4.91 1 .03 
Not Present Count 131                          253    
       Expected Count 127                          257    
Present Count 1                              14    
Expected Count 5                              10    
Excellence  4.24 1 .04 
Not Present Count 107                          191    
Expected Count 98.6                         199.4    
Present Count 25                            76    























Not Present   Present 
 
Accommodative3
Not Present    
Present 
Agriculture      5                    9 10                      4 10                    4 
Expected  4.7                 9.3 6.5                     7.5 10.5                 3.5 
Mining             8                    10 8                        10 18                    0 
Expected  6.1                 11.9 8.3                      9.7 13.4                 4.6 
Utilities            4                    11 6                         9 12                    3 
Expected  5.1                 9.9 6.9                      8.1 11.2                 3.8 
Construction   3                    0 0                         3 3                      0 
Expected  1                    2 1.4                      1.6 2.2                   .8 
Manufacturing 47                  67 51                       63 81                    33 
Expected  38.6               75.4 52.6                    61.4 85.1                 28.9 
Wholesale Trade  8                    10 10                       8 8                      10 
Expected  6.1                 11.9 8.3                      9.7 13.4                  4.6 
Retail Trade   12                  14 6                        20 24                     2 
Expected  8.8                 17.2 12                      14 19.4                  6.6 
Trans/Warehousing   4                    9 4                         9 9                       4 
Expected  4.4                 8.6 6                         7 9.7                    3.3 
Information     15                  35 20                      30 40                     10 
Expected  16.9               33.1 23.1                   26.9 37.3                  12.7 
Finance/Insurance 10                  32 24                      18 30                     12 
Expected  14.2               27.8 19.4                   22.6 31.4                  10.6 
Prof/Sci/Tech  2                    28 18                      12  25                      5 
Expected  10.2               19.8 13.8                   16.2 22.5                   7.6 
Mgmt of Companies 0                     3 3                         0 3                        0 
Expected  1                     2 1.4                     1.6 2.2                     .8 
Admin/Waste  2                     1 0                        3 1                        2 
Expected  1                     2 1.4                     1.6 2.2                     .8 
Education Services      0                     3 2                        1 2                        1 
Expected  1                     2 1.4                     1.6 2.2                     .8 
Health & Social 
Serv.            
2                     3 1                        4  3                        2 
Expected  1.7                  3.3 2.3                    2.7 3.7                    1.3 
Arts/Ent/Recreation   8                     16 10                     14 18                      6 
Expected  8.1                  15.9 11.1                  12.9 17.9                   6.1 
Accommodation 4                     8 8                        4 7                        5 
Expected  4.1                  7.9 5.5                     6.5 9                        3 
Public Administration  1                     5 3                        3 4                        2 
Expected  2                     4 2.8                     3.2 4.5                     1.5 
1χ2 (17, 399) = 30.14, p = .03 
2χ2 (17, 399) = 29.30, p = .03 







Significant Chi-square Findings for Research Question 1B: Differences in the 







Not Present   
Present 




Not Present   
Present 
Agriculture      9                     5  9                    5 
Expected  11.3                2.7  10.7               3.3 
Mining             16                   2  13                  5 
Expected  14.6               3.4  13.8               4.2 
Utilities            14                  1   10                  5 
Expected  12.1               2.9  11.5              3.5 
Construction   3                    0  3                    0 
Expected  2.4                 .6  2.3                 .7 
Manufacturing 103               11  93                  21 
Expected  92.3              21.7   87.1               26.9 
Wholesale Trade  16                 2  13                  5 
Expected  14.6              3.4  13.8               4.2 
Retail Trade   23                 3  18                  8 
Expected  21                 5  19.9               6.1 
Trans/Warehousing   8                   5  7                    6 
Expected  10.5              2.5  9.9                 3.1 
Information     37                13  35                 15 
Expected  40.5             9.5  38.2              11.8 
Finance/Insurance 34                8  41                 1 
Expected  34                8   32.1              9.9 
Prof/Sci/Tech  22                8  23                 7 
Expected  24.3             5.7  22.9              7.1 
Mgmt of Companies 3                  0  3                   0 
Expected  2.4               .6  2.3                .7 
Admin/Waste  2                  1  2                   1 
Expected  2.4               .6  2.3                .7 
Education Services     2                  1  2                   1 
Expected  2.4               .6  2.3                .7 
Health & Social 
Serv.            
2                 3  1                   4 
Expected  4                 1  3.8               1.2 
Arts/Ent/Recreation   16               8  18                6 
Expected  19.4           4.6  18.3             5.7 
Accommodation 9                3  9                  3 
Expected  9.7             2.3  9.2               2.8 
Public 
Administration  
4                2  5                  1 
Expected  4.9             1.1  4.6               1.4 
1χ2 (17, 399) = 30.73, p = .02 







Significant Chi-square Results for Hypothesis 2: The Use of CRS by  
 
Organizations Facing Organizational Transgressions 
 
Crisis Response Strategy Category Observed Expected χ2 df p N 
Self-Enhancement 1 71 138.03 1 .00 142 
Routine Communication 2 71 134.11 1 .00 142 
Frame the Organization 27 71 54.54 1 .00 142 
Anti-Social or Defensive 86 71 6.34 1 .01 142 
Accommodative 48 71 14.90 1 .00 142 
Excellence or Renewal  35 71 36.51 1 .00 142 




Significant Chi-square Results for Hypothesis 2: Primary Strategies Employed by  
 
Organizations Facing Organizational Transgressions 
 
Crisis Response Strategy Category Observed Expected χ2 df p N 
Framing the Crisis 31 23.7 101.72 5 .00 142 
Framing the Organization 6 23.7     
Anti-Social or Defensive 61 23.7     
Accommodative 31 23.7     
Excellence or Renewal 5 23.7     





Significant Chi-square Results for Hypothesis 3: The Use of CRS by  
 
Organizations Facing Organizational Events 
 
Crisis Response Strategy Category Observed Expected χ2 df p N 
Self-Enhancement 4 74.5 133.43 1 .00 149 
Routine Communication 3 74.5 137.24 1 .00 149 
Frame the Crisis 125 74.5 68.43 1 .00 149 
Accommodative 33 74.5 46.20 1 .00 149 








Significant Chi-square Results for Hypothesis 3: Primary Strategies Employed by  
 
Organizations Facing Organizational Events 
 
Crisis Response Strategy Category Observed Expected χ2 df p N 
Framing the Crisis 56 24.7 66.46 5 .00 148 
Framing the Organization  24 24.7     
Anti-Social or Defensive 32 24.7     
Accommodative 7 24.7     
Excellence or Renewal 8 24.7     




Significant Chi-square Results for Hypothesis 4: The Use of CRS by  
 
Organizations Facing Events Outside the Organization’s Control 
 
Crisis Response Strategy Category Observed Expected χ2 df p N 
Routine Communication 10 54 71.70 1 .00 108 
Frame the Organization 30 54 21.33 1 .00 108 
Accommodative 20 54 42.82 1 .00 108 
Excellence or Renewal 23 54 35.59 1 .00 108 




Significant Chi-square Results for Hypothesis 4: Primary Strategies Employed by  
 
Organizations Facing Events Outside the Organization’s Control 
 
Crisis Response Strategy Category Observed Expected χ2 df p N 
Framing the Crisis 31 15.4 106.15 6 .00 108 
Framing the Organization 11 15.4     
Anti-Social or Defensive 46 15.4     
Accommodative 6 15.4     
Excellence or Renewal 5 15.4     
Interorganizational Relationships 6 15.4     








Significant Chi-square Results for Research Question 2: Differences in the Use 
of CRSs Among Organizations Facing Crises 
 
 
Crisis Response Strategy Category
Crisis Type









Routine Communication   2          3            10 12.45 2 .00 399 
Expected  5.3       5.6          4.1     
Frame the Crisis 75        125        64 35.52 2 .00 399 
Expected  94        98.6       71.5     
Frame the Organization 27        67          30 23.62 2 .00 399 
Expected 44.1     46.3       33.6     
Anti-Social or Defensive 86        66          63 8.92 2 .01 399 
Expected 76.5     80.3       58.2     
Accommodative 48        33          20 8.84 2 .01 399 
Expected 35.9     37.7       27.3     
Interorganizational Relationships 43        67          28 11.84 2 .00 399 
Expected 49.1     51.5       37.4     
1Organizational Transgressions 
2Organizational Events 








Significant Chi-square Results for Research Question 2: Primary Strategy 
Categories Used Among Organizations Facing Crises 
 
 
Crisis Response Strategy Category
Crisis Type









Frame the Crisis 31         56           31 68.02 12 .00 398 
Expected  42.1      43.9        32.0     
Frame the Organization 6           24           11     
Expected 14.6      15.2        11.1     
Anti-Social or Defensive 61         32           46     
Expected 49.6      51.7        37.7     
Accommodative 31         7             6     
Expected 15.7      16.4        11.9     
Excellence or Renewal 5           8             5     
Expected 6.4        6.7          4.9     
Interorganizational Relationships 8           21           6     
Expected 12.5      13.0        9.5     
Routine Communication 0            0            3     
Expected 1.1         1.1         .8     
1Organizational Transgressions 
2Organizational Events 








Significant Chi-square Results for Research Question 3A: Organizational 
Transgression Influence on the Invocation of the Forms of Organizational Culture 
 
Form of Organizational Culture Observed Expected χ2 df p N 
Symbols 11 71 101.41 1 .00 142 
Language 51 71 11.27 1 .00 142 
Narratives 6 71 111.01 1 .00 142 




Significant Chi-square Results for Research Question 3B: Organizational Event  
 
Influence on the Invocation of the Forms of Organizational Culture 
 
Form of Organizational Culture Observed Expected χ2 df p N 
Symbols 37 74.5 37.75 1 .00 149 
Narratives 18 74.5 85.70 1 .00 149 




Significant Chi-square Results for Research Question 3C: Events Outside of the  
 




Form of Organizational Culture Observed Expected χ2 df p N 
Symbols 28 54 25.04 1 .00 108 
Language 34 54 14.82 1 .00 108 
Narratives 13 54 62.26 1 .00 108 








Significant Chi-square Results for Research Question 3: Differences in the 
Invocation of Cultural Forms by Organizations Facing Crises 
 
 
Form of Organizational Culture 
Crisis Type









Symbols 11         37           28 18.31 2 .00 399 
Expected  27         28.4        20.6     
Language 51         78           34 13.51 2 .00 399 
Expected 58         60.9        44.1     
Narratives 6           18           13 6.68 2 .04 399 
Expected 13.2      13.8        10.0     
1Organizational Transgressions 
2Organizational Events 




Correlations Between CRSs Employed In Crisis Communication Messages 
 
Crisis Response Strategy1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Self-Enhancement - -.02 -.02 .12* -.03 -.06 .14** .06 
2. Routine Communication  - .03 .10 -.13** .10 .00 -.12* 
3. Frame the Crisis   - .24** -.30** .01 .15** .28** 
4. Frame the Organization    - -.10 .16** .38** .33** 
5. Anti-social or Defensive     - -.07 -.01 .06 
6. Accommodative      - .27** .22** 
7. Excellence or Renewal       - .46** 
8. Interorganizational Relationships        - 
1N = 399 
* = significant at p = .05 level (two-tailed) 




Analysis of Variance for Primary Strategy Influence on Numbers of Strategies 
 
Primary Strategy Category M SD N 
Framing the Crisis 2.38 2.55 118
Framing the Organization 5.37 2.63 41 
Anti-Social or Defensive 2.92 2.49 139
Accommodative 3.66 2.55 44 
Excellence or Renewal 5.17 3.63 18 
Interorganizational Relationships 6.94 3.46 35 








Scheffe Post Hoc Findings for Primary Strategy Influence on Numbers of 
Strategies 
 





Framing the Crisis Excellence or Renewal -2.59 .68 .03 
 Interorganizational 
Relationships 
-4.37 .52 .00 
Framing the Organization Framing the Crisis 2.79 .49 .00 
 Anti-Social or Defensive 2.44 .48 .00 
Anti-social or Defensive Interorganizational 
Relationships 
-4.02 .51 .00 
Accommodative Interorganizational 
Relationships 
-3.28 .61 .00 
Interorganizational 
Relationships 




Chi-square Analysis of the Presence of CRSs in Crisis Response Messages 
 
Crisis Response Strategy Observed Expected χ2 df p N 
Self-Enhancement 5 199.5 379.25 1 .00 399 
Routine Communication 15 199.5 341.26 1 .00 399 
Frame the Crisis 264 199.5 41.71 1 .00 399 
Frame the Organization 124 199.5 57.15 1 .00 399 
Anti-Social or Defensive 215 199.5     
Accommodative 101 199.5 97.27 1 .00 399 
Excellence or Renewal 101 199.5 97.27 1 .00 399 




Chi-square Analysis of Primary CRS in Crisis Response Messages 
 
Primary Strategy Category Observed Expected χ2 df p N 
Framing the Crisis 118 56.9 277.73 6 .00 398 
Framing the Organization 41 56.9     
Anti-Social or Defensive 139 56.9     
Accommodative 44 56.9     
Excellence or Renewal 18 56.9     
Interorganizational Relationships 35 56.9     












    Primary 
Strategy 
























Routine Comm.1 4 5 0 3 0 0 3 
Expected 4.4 1.5 5.2 1.7 .7 1.3 .1 
Frame Crisis2 118 35 44 22 13 32 0 
Expected 78.3 27.2 92.2 29.2 11.9 23.2 2.0 
Frame Org.3 20 41 21 11 10 21 0 
Expected 36.8 12.8 43.3 13.7 5.6 10.9 .9 
Anti-Social4 27 14 139 13 7 16 0 
Expected 63.7 22.1 75.1 23.8 9.7 18.9 1.6 
Accommodative5 12 11 17 44 9 8 0 
Expected 29.9 10.4 35.3 11.2 4.6 8.9 .8 
Excellence6 12 18 15 16 18 22 0 
Expected 29.9 10.4  35.3 11.2 4.6 8.9 .8 
IOR’s7 28 18 29 18 11 35 0 




t-Test Results for Hypothesis 5: Analyzing Single versus Multiple CRS 
Categories Used 
 
Strategy Category N M SD SEM 
Number of Categories Used 399 1.66 .47 .02 
Single Strategy Category 135    




Correlations Between the Forms of Organizational Culture 
 
Form of Organizational Culture 1 2 3 4 
1. Symbols - .36** .42** .32**
2. Language  - .26** .33**
3. Narratives   - .35**
4. Practices    - 



























Self-Enhancement .18** .09 .04 .15** 
Routine Communication .07 -.03 .07 -.02 
Frame the Crisis .16** .19** .17** .09 
Frame the Organization .41** .41** .27** .34** 
Anti-Social or Defensive .01 .07 .07 .13** 
Accommodative .16** .26** .13** .21** 
Excellence or Renewal .35** .48** .31** .34** 
Interorganizational Relationships .28** .48** .28** .29** 




Chi-square Findings Comparing Forms of Organizational Culture and Crisis 

















Frame the Crisis 62** 125** 34** 69 
Expected 50.3 107.8 24.5 62.2 
Frame the Organization 53** 88** 26** 56** 
Expected 23.6 50.7 11.5 29.2 
Anti-Social or Defensive 42 95 24 62** 
Expected 41 87.8 19.9 50.7 
Accommodative 30** 63** 16** 39** 
Expected 19.2 41.3 9.4 23.8 
Excellence or Renewal 43** 82** 25** 49** 
Expected 19.2 41.3 9.4 23.8 
Interorganizational Relationships 47** 101** 28** 56** 
Expected 26.3 56.4 12.8 32.5 
** = significant at the p =.01 level 
 
 
Table 37 Approaches to Crisis Response Messages 
   Approach Definition Strategies
Included 
















Crisis Prone Organizations We are pleased by this important progress in the 
Multi-Union case. We will continue vigorous 
enforcement of our intellectual property rights to 
protect our innovative printers and printer supplies 
against unfair competition of all types including 
patent infringement, unsubstantiated performance 
claims, and counterfeiting (Epson, after winning a 
lawsuit against a large manufacturer of off-brand 


















Hockey is Canada’s game and it would be a 
disservice to all fans if the season were to be 
cancelled. Our members are hockey fans, but we 
stand in solidarity with the players and respect 
their rights when it comes to the collective 
bargaining process (Service Employees 
International Union in solidarity with National 
Hockey Player’s Association during 2004-2005 
NHL strike).  
Aggressive  CRSs tell
stakeholders what 






Framing the Crisis, 
Anti-Social/ 
Defensive 
Utility Industry, Information 
Industry, Arts/ 
Entertainment/ Recreation 
Industry, Events Outside 
the Organization’s Control, 
Organizational 
Transgressions1
Despite the inconvenience the labor action 
creates, Harrah’s is not willing to concede on the 
contract link. I worry about their capacity to strike 
me everywhere at the same time. What they 
would like to do is set it up so they could do that. 
That’s what the strike is all about, we’ll just have 
to wait it out. We will stand firm in this position no 
matter how long this unfortunate situation persists. 
We will not ratify a contract that threatens the 
health of our company and that of the industry 
broadly (Harrah’s President, Gary Loveman 
speaking about the 2004 Culinary workers’ strike 





Table 37 Continued 




culpability or role, 
but also actively 












First and foremost our hearts and thoughts are 
with the family of our lost co-worker. IPG is 
committed to the highest employee safety 
standards and is leading the investigation into the 
cause of this incident. We have also offered 
counseling to those workers affected by this 
unfortunate event (Intertape Polymer Group Inc.’s 
VP of Human Resources, Burgess Hildreth, on an 
explosion in a factory in 2005).  
Explanative CRSs endeavor to 









sympathetic to the 
situation 







Allow the drug testing program to work. I 
commend Bud Selig, the players union, and all 
the players for trying to put together a testing 
program that tries to satisfy everyone. I look 
forward to the day when this thing will blow over. 
You guys (the media) need to turn the page. Let 
us play the game and we will fix it. I don’t believe 
steroids can help your hand-eye coordination in 
hitting a baseball. I don’t know if steroids will help 
you in baseball (Barry Bonds first statement to the 
media after the Steroids Policy put in place in 
MLB in 2005).  
Offensive CRSs endeavor to 
create many 
possibilities to 




including a variety 
of strategies in a 
single message 
Any of the 
strategies in 
combination with 
three or more 
prominent 
strategies in the 
message 
Transportation & 
Warehousing, Health & 





The rule of thumb, of course, is that you should 
generate more cash than you consume. But what 
we said is that it looks like we’ll consume $2 billion 
more than we generate this year. It’s entirely a 
North American issue. North America, simply put, 
is our 800 pound gorilla. Today’s announcement 
really shows how important it is that we get this 
business right. We are fighting for every single 
sale. We want to be smart. We want to offer the 
best value. But we’re fighting for every tenth of a 
point we can get (GM’s spokesperson Toni 
Simonetti and CEO Rick Wagoner addressing the 










a single strategy 
in the message.  







Industry, Mining Industry, 
Construction Industry, 
Retail Trade Industry, 
Agriculture/ Forestry/ 
Hunting/ Fishing Industry, 
Wholesale Trade Industry 
It’s a deeply disappointing day for us. The store in 
Jonquiere has been struggling for sometime 
economically, and in our view the union’s 
demands failed to take into account the fragile 
condition of the store (Wal-Mart spokesperson 
Andrew Pelletier on closing a store in Quebec 








image despite the 
crisis by making 







Not clearly identified in 
analyses of Independent 
Variables alone; however 
strong correlation between 
the strategies suggests a 
potential approach.  
 






Message Content Audience & Channel 
Message Features 
Organizational & 
Situational Factors Outcomes 
Organization Type





• During crisis 













• Routine communication 
• Framing the crisis 
• Framing the organization 
• Anti-social/ Defensive 
• Accommodative  
• Excellence/ Renewal 















































• Routine communication 
• Framing is Organization Type
• Framing anization • Propensity to be crisis 
prone  • Anti-soc nsive 
• Accomm   • Industry 







































Figure 3. Significant Findings for the SMOCC
Organization Type
Propensity to be crisis prone 
o Crisis Prone 





o Arts/Entertainment/ Recreation 
o Manufacturing 
o Administrative & Support/ Waste 
Remediation 
o Accommodation 
o Finance/ Insurance 
o Transportation & Warehousing 
o Health & Social Assistance 
o Public Administration 
o Professional/ Scientific/ Technical 
o Management of Companies 
o Educational Services 
o Mining 
o Construction 
o Retail Trade 
o Agriculture/ Fishing/ Forestry/ 
Hunting 
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